


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**READINGS
in
COUNTER - GUERRILLA
OPERATIONS**

US ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

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UNITED STATES ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL
Fort Bragg, North Carolina

17 January 1961

FOREWORD

This volume, Readings in Counter Guerrilla Operations, has been compiled by the Special Warfare School from some of the best articles in the field. Its purpose is to provide the reader with additional background in the theory and practice of counter-guerrilla operations, as well as to stimulate an interest in obtaining further knowledge on the subject. Most of these writings will be listed as supplemental material in the instructors' Advance Sheets or referred to during the Counter-Guerrilla Operations course; all of them should increase the reader's appreciation of the problems involved in Counter-Guerrilla operations. Copyright permission for all of the previously published articles has been granted to the Special Warfare School.

The opinions contained in the articles are those of the author and do not necessarily coincide with the teachings of the United States Army Special Warfare School and Department of the Army doctrine.

FOR THE COMMANDANT:

CHARLES R. SMITH
Captain, Infantry
Secretary

I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Problems of Cold War Operations

THIS ARTICLE IS REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION GRANTED TO THE US ARMY
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The Problems of Cold War Operations

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from a copyrighted article by Captain T. Lenske
in "The Army Quarterly" (Great Britain) July 1957.

*You are a counselor; if you can command these elements to silence, and
work the peace of the present, we will not hand a rope more; use your authority.*

—*The Tempest, Act I*

IN ALL parts of the world, under all manner of conditions, the units of the British Army for the past 10 years have been engaged in what is variously described as cold war operations, duties in aid of the civil power, or, perhaps with decreasing popularity, imperial policing.

In most instances these operations have been very costly in both time and effort. Troops still are engaged in Malaya after eight years, in Kenya after four, and in Cyprus the emergency is about to enter its third year. We know that economically and

politically we can ill afford such emergencies, but how can they be shortened? Are there military weaknesses? Have we the right equipment and techniques and are our troops correctly organized and trained?

The Nature of Cold War

Civil disturbances are apt to occur almost anywhere in the world, although underdeveloped areas such as the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia are undoubtedly more prone to disturbance. Thus, although we can differentiate in degree of

risk, we cannot concentrate all our effort in any one theater, nor can we base our equipment and tactics on any one type of terrain or climate. All planning for cold war operation made more difficult because of this feature.

Internal security problems are only internal in the geographical sense. External forces act in every case. Communist influence is always applied, other elements make use of such situations for their own ends, and even friends, allies, and our own nationals at times complicate the reestablishment of law and order by their activities. Thus rapid and decisive action often is frustrated and disaffections strengthened by external support, some malicious—some merely misguided

The Phases

Every emergency goes through two phases. The first is a preparatory or political phase. This begins with a political or social discontent gradually being crystallized into specific demands upon the government. Political agitation and propaganda promote these demands and gather internal support, while external agencies provide political and often material support. Subversive activities begin, and gradually the foundations of the future terrorist organization are laid.

The importance of recognizing this phase lies in the fact that it provides an opportunity for averting the subsequent phase of terrorism. There are two ways of doing this—in the Gold Coast the demands were met; in British Guiana the disaffection was put down. Prompt enlightened action proved effective in each case. During this phase the presence of military units helps greatly both as a steady influence in threatening situations and in supporting preventive measures with timely strength.

The terrorist phase that follows is the result of the failure of the policies pursued in the preparatory phase. The situation passes beyond the control of the normal forces of law and order and be-

comes an emergency. The main responsibility for establishing law and order falls to the military, and special legislation is evoked to assist. At this point it would be of value to touch briefly on the characteristics of the terrorists from whose activities the emergency has arisen.

Terrorist Organizations

Because the tactics of the terrorist resemble those of the guerrilla so closely, it is best to begin by pointing out the essential difference between them. The guerrilla is a uniformed member of his country's armed forces fighting a recognized enemy after a declaration of war. The terrorist is a criminal engaged in unlawful subversive activities usually involving the murder of his own people. It is important that everyone should realize this in considering the necessary severity of anti-terrorist operations.

The terrorist's aim is to destroy confidence in the forces of law and order throughout the country. He will try to inflict casualties on the security forces to demonstrate his power and to destroy their morale, and he will inflict casualties on his own people in order to coerce their assistance and ensure his own security.

Terrorist organizations have certain inherent advantages vis-à-vis the security forces. They fight either in their own country or one which is favorable to them. They have the support, willing or coerced, of the civil population. They exploit the existence of inaccessible or difficult country. They usually have the initiative during the early period of the emergency and they have the ability to disappear at will from the scene of their activities. They operate under conditions of great secrecy, and usually local knowledge and contacts provide excellent intelligence of security forces' activities. Finally, the mounting guilt of the terrorist makes him an implacable enemy who is likely to become increasingly savage and careless of life as the emergency continues.

However, it would be wrong to assume that the terrorist is invulnerable. Many of his advantages also limit him. The difficult nature of the country in which he operates imposes problems of delay, isolation, and hunger. The security forces get to know the type of country he favors and harass him there. His tactics of operating in small groups lead to difficulties in control. His measures of secrecy interfere with the passage of information and render him vulnerable to antiterrorist propaganda and rumor.

But the major weakness of the terrorist organization lies in his dependence on the civil populace. Once this link can be broken, his organization becomes as a tree without roots, and it is only a matter of time before its destruction. For this reason a great proportion of the security forces' effort must be employed to this effect. Food denial and village guards are aimed at disrupting contacts and reestablishing confidence. This is expensive in time and effort perhaps, but essential.

The Security Forces

In general, military forces can be discussed in three different categories, although the actions of all three are interrelated. The three divisions may not be accepted generally, but dealing with them in this way leads to greater clarity in deciding their roles, organization, and equipment.

The number of troops required depends on several factors—the location of the area, its population and the number of vulnerable points within it, the nature of the disaffection, and, of course, the time at which the force is applied. One thing is certain: we cannot continue to afford to have forces of considerable size committed, particularly if emergencies occur simultaneously—economy in force must be a prime factor in our considerations.

Garrison Troops

Garrison troops form the framework of cold war precautionary measures. Their

normal dispersal provides immediate support to the civil powers. The emergencies of Cyprus, Kenya, and Malaya have shown that generally there is never less than a brigade's worth of major units within close proximity to any troubled area. It would be impractical to suggest any strengthening of overseas garrisons and, in fact, if used promptly, forces of this size—in conjunction with the colonial police—should be adequate. But there are one or two features concerning garrison troops that must be stated.

First, it should be emphasized that the prime duty of a garrison unit in any station is to be prepared to enforce the peace within that station. Its training and equipment, particularly if it is not an infantry battalion, must be based on this requirement. It is entirely wrong for garrison units to have to wait until the emergency is declared before being issued suitable vehicles and equipment. This wastes valuable time, makes garrison troops appear inefficient in the eyes of the population, and defeats their entire purpose.

The training of garrison troops in internal security duties is absolutely imperative, irrespective of the arm of service to which they belong. The internal security scheme must not be the final item in the tabulated list for production during the administrative inspection. It must be made to live, and all garrison training must be based on it, even in deepest peace.

Next, there must be continuous and imaginative cooperation between the civil administration, the police, and the garrison. Social relations, mutual exchange of information, and training must all be better than in the past.

Relations with the ordinary civil population also are of great importance. The garrison must gain knowledge of local conditions, create an atmosphere of friendship, and inspire respect. In many ways the Royal Navy indicates the right line—a friendly cocktail party in the shadow

of a 6-inch gun is not a bad thing. Above all, garrison units must demonstrate their military efficiency, and there should be no need to be bashful about practicing internal security drills and exercises in public, providing they are well done and it is understood that they are part and parcel of normal army training everywhere.

The employment of civilians can be an acute embarrassment in time of emergency, for they often grow to occupy positions of trust and importance within the unit. The rule must be that only the smallest administrative increment should be allowed and that no civilian should occupy a position in the unit's operational establishment. Even this small increment should be easily dispensed with on short notice. This policy would aid security and also assist the unit to maintain its appearance of effectiveness and efficiency in spite of occasional internal weaknesses.

Finally, the structure of garrison commands abroad must be more operational in nature, less administrative, and capable of rapid development to include reinforcing units.

Containing Force Units

Units of the containing force are concerned in the security measures which have to be taken to prevent the growth of the emergency and to restore law and order within the centers of population. Generally speaking, these tasks are of a preventive nature, countering the aims of the terrorists, protecting persons and property, and supporting or even replacing the activities of the police force.

The nucleus of these forces will be the garrison units, for obvious reasons, but as the emergency develops reinforcements will be needed. For this purpose it is suggested that each theater should provide its own reserve, thus avoiding delays in transport and acclimatization and problems in reequipping. There is no need for these to be uncommitted reserves—they can be

garrison troops from unaffected areas acting in a planned subsidiary internal security role for which they have trained.

Containing force units should be ordinary infantry battalions, but there is no reason why major units of other arms should not be equally effective. They need some special equipment; numerous jeep type vehicles, excellent communications, bicycles, tracker dogs, riot equipment, tear gas, truncheons, and small arms. No heavy weapons are required except perhaps mortars in jungle country. All this equipment must be available in theater stocks.

These containing units will be acclimated; they also should be fit and well-trained. They must have mastered the techniques of internal security duties and must be prepared to patrol, mounted or on foot, literally, as one well-known regiment found to its cost in Kenya, "till the cows come home."

The arrival of these units to reinforce the garrison will call for changes in the command structure. The obvious choice for command would appear to be the man on the spot in every case. He knows the ground and he knows the form; he has contacts with the administration and he has already established command facilities. There are other considerations, however.

The local commander may be overfamiliar with his surroundings and somewhat contemptuous of the emergency. He may be reluctant to adopt "face-losing" precautions, and he will tend to underrate the terrorists. In company with some members of the administration and the police he may resent the emergency as a personal setback and the arrival of reinforcements as a slur on his own capabilities. So the appointment of commanders must be balanced between the qualities of the "new broom" and the "old hand," and it is important that a right choice should be made.

The activities of the containing force units form the framework from which real antiterrorist action can be carried out.

Striking Force Units

No matter how effective the containing forces are, terrorists can never be knocked out purely by counterpunching. The initiative must be gained and the fight carried into the terrorists' camp.

To do this we must have infantry, and nothing else will do. The more superb the infantry the better. They need not be parachutists or commandos but their state of fitness and training must be on a par with such units. They have to meet the terrorist at his own game, on his own ground, and beat him. They may have to use the jungle, the mountains, or the swamp lands; they must not be deterred by terrain or climate. This requires battle-craft, endurance, marksmanship, and junior leadership of the highest order.

Such standards seldom can be achieved by units in isolation or without good leadership and incentives. We need specialist formations, but as the requirements of antiterrorist operations are so essentially basic infantry tactics, these formations also will be capable of functioning in any other form of warfare.

The best size formation seems to be the brigade group, but we do not need all the clutter normally found in such a formation. Let us, therefore, call our cold war formation the Light Brigade Group. A proposed establishment is shown in the chart. With the economies in manpower achieved by cutting out supporting arms and services, we should be able to afford three of these. In the Far East one could be provided admirably by Gurkhas. The other two should be based either in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.

The United Kingdom has definite disadvantages: there is insufficient range of climate and terrain for training, and the constant distractions of home life affect rigorous training schedules and very short states of readiness. At least one of the two British brigades should be abroad, and they should be rotated.

These then would be our strategic reserve troops for striking force duties. It goes without saying that they must be 100 percent air transportable, and it must be a matter of honor between the air force and the army that they should be landed anywhere in the world within 24 hours.

The support of these brigades and the provision of heavy equipment will be based on prestocking under arrangements by overseas commands. The scales of equipment and location will be decided in relation to the area concerned.


It should be emphasized that these formations should not be used in the containing troops' role but that containing troops frequently may assist in striking force operations.

Intelligence

Success in defeating terrorism is directly proportionate to the quality of the information available about the terrorist organization. Once the picture is clear, the destruction of the organization is a comparatively straightforward military task. Therefore, the duration of the emergency is related to the effectiveness of the intelligence services; if we want to reduce time and effort, then we must increase the efficiency of intelligence.

Just as there are three legs to a stool, so there are three types of intelligence required in the cold war; and just as a stool will collapse if one leg is weak, so the security forces will fall down if one of the sources of intelligence is lacking. The agencies for political intelligence, criminal intelligence, and military intelligence must be fused effectively.

In time of emergency Britain's military intelligence element joins with the Colonial Office and Police Special Branch in Joint Intelligence Centers. These are effective, but it is recommended that they should be established now in all colonies or possible areas of emergency. Military intelligence elements should be given the facilities necessary for developing their own sources



and contacts, so that in time of emergency they are not so entirely reliant upon the police who, after all, are not trained in military intelligence requirements.

Finally, there is a need for tactical intelligence when the emergency occurs and troops are committed to antiterrorist operations. In the past, units have had to ferret out this intelligence for themselves. Some attempts have been made at specialization, and it is believed that these should be developed.

The organization of the Light Brigade Group contains provision for a reconnaissance squadron, and this unit is proposed for field intelligence tasks. The proposal is for a number of officer-led teams, specially trained and equipped according to the requirements of the terrain, assisted by local recruits—settlers, trackers, and informers—with the task of gaining information upon which operations could be mounted. The training of these teams requires a special study which probably will have to include a special intelligence course.

Staff Procedures

There is an immediate need for improvement in staff procedures. Cold war operations have become a branch of warfare quite as different from conventional war as is nuclear warfare.

There is a great field of experience to draw on and it is time that a textbook of these operations was prepared. Discussion with officers concerned in different emergencies has proved how often the lessons of one had to be relearned in another. It is not always wise to say that every emergency is different; there are both common principles and techniques. All this saves time and enables action to be taken quickly and automatically.

Administrative Problems

For operations to be effective and brief there must be no administrative delays. Therefore, the logistical implications of

emergencies in any area must be foreseen and plans and preparations made and reviewed realistically. This may mean expense in time of peace and perhaps some waste in providing facilities that are never used—such as airstrips, harborages, and dumped stocks—but these are insurance policies and if they are not needed, so much the better.

Conclusion

All over the world the British Army finds itself committed to cold war operations. These operations are a heavy strain on the resources of the country and the army. The growth of Communist influence everywhere makes it imperative that we should find some way of averting these emergencies or of bringing them quickly to a successful conclusion.

The pattern of the emergencies shows that they are best averted in the preparatory phase. Prompt and enlightened action by the colonial government is needed, but it has been seen that well-trained, alert garrison troops established at strategic points can be of great assistance.

The terrorist operations which lead to the emergency have been shown to result from the failure of the government to act suitably in the preparatory phase. The nature of terrorist operations emphasizes reliance upon support from the local population and the need for the security forces to exploit this weakness.

A study of the problems of the security forces suggests that *there is no shortcut to the end of the emergency once it has started*. But there is room for greater efficiency in dealing with it and much scope for planning and preparation in time of peace.

In detail, it is recommended that garrison troops should be better trained, equipped, and apprised of their duties. Troops used in the emergency should be divided into containing forces and striking forces, the former provided by theater

reserves, and the latter by strategically based special formations. It is emphasized that the headquarters of overseas garrisons should be more operational and capable of expansion.

Great reductions in effort can be attained by improving intelligence. Perhaps this is the key to the entire problem. The recommendations are for improvements, in time of peace, along two lines: first, in the static intelligence chain, by maintaining Joint Intelligence Centers in overseas

areas with the Colonial Office, and, second, by providing field intelligence teams to work in support of the Light Brigade Groups to obtain tactical intelligence.

Finally, it must be emphasized that military measures in themselves are never the best answer to cold war problems. The aim must be to retain the authority of the counselor by political rather than military means. Then, like the Boatswain in *The Tempest*, we need not hand a rope more—and that is the ideal situation.

Talk to U.S. Army Civil Affairs School
Fort Gordon, Georgia, 1 November 1960

THE FREE CITIZEN IN UNIFORM
by
Brig. Gen. Edward G. Lans. 'e, USAF

I.

A few days ago in Miami, Secretary Gates gave a talk in which he made it plain that our national defense strength has been built to the point where it is the greatest the world has ever known. If you can get a copy of this talk, I recommend that you do so and read it. In it is a thought which is worth extracting as the take-off point for our discussion this morning.

At one place in his talk, Secretary Gates noted that the flow of people escaping from Communist tyranny continues to rise, that the number of escapees from East Germany alone is a third higher than last year. He then commented that these people, who know the bitter truth within the Communist state, "do not flee to a second rate haven. They flee by the hundreds of thousands to first rate freedom and first rate strength."

Now, as military men, we must be alertly concerned with maintaining our first rate strength. But even further, as free citizens in uniform -- and particularly those of us here this morning who have such firm missions in the cold war -- we must be equally alert and concerned with maintaining first rate freedom. It is the only true basis for the tactical doctrine with which we will win this present struggle.

So, this morning, we will discuss the strengthening of freedom in the world by the citizen in uniform. My task will be to stimulate your thinking on this subject -- for you will have to translate your thoughts into deeds when you graduate from this school. Your deeds, your future actions soon, may well determine the deeds, the future actions soon, of hundreds of thousands of your fellow men in nations throughout the world. In order to stimulate your thinking, then, I will touch briefly on the nature of the warfare of the past 15 years, the role of the armed forces in many free world nations where you will be working, the true battle ground of the cold war, and your own place and duty on this battleground.

II.

First, then, let's take a brief look at warfare in the past 15 years. There are still too few military men who understand much of this warfare well enough to recognize its secretive tactics when they bump into them, or to carry out successful actions against an enemy who often remain half-hidden from view. Let's not kid ourselves, we all must learn more. In the 28 armed conflicts since the cold war began 15 years ago, Americans participated in two and only partially observed some of the other 26. We still have hard lessons to learn.

Most of the armed warfare of the past 15 years has been along "unconventional" lines, or what some have termed "revolutionary war" or "peoples' struggle." In this type of warfare, "proletarian military science," which is based upon the tactical military teachings of Mao Tse Tung, has largely supplanted the military science texts of free world military instruction.

Some examples since the end of World War II are the struggles in China, the Ukraine, the Philippines, Malaya, Indo-China, Burma, Indonesia, Tibet, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Egypt, Cyprus, Algeria, Cuba, recent Vietnam, and partially in the struggles in Greece, Hungary, Guatemala, Iran, Israeli, Laos, Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, and Colombia. During the same period, such struggles as those in Korea and the British-French-Israeli attempt at the Suez Canal were fought along more conventional and more inconclusive lines.

The important lesson for us in these examples of "revolutionary war" is that in each there was at least one armed force that fought as a political army. That is, the officers and men understood political principles and used them as operational weapons in their warfare. The Continental troops at Valley Forge, the officers and men under Marion, Greene, or Wayne would have found much that was familiar to them in the motivation of these modern troops, in the use of propaganda to defect enemy soldiers, in the covert political organs so reminiscent of the Committees of Correspondence, the Committees of Safety, and in the support of our Continental troops by farmers and shopkeepers with food, money, and hard military information.

If we Americans can recognize and accept the true terms of our heritage from our own Revolution, then we will start to understand the reality of today's battleground, the tactics which win in a type of battle our forefathers knew, and find our honest kinship with other free men throughout the world who are even now pledging their sacred honor, their lives, families and livelihoods to the outcome of this struggle.

III.

In many countries today, the national armed forces have a role which is quite different from the classical one of defending borders or of undertaking conquest. Often, the armed forces are the only truly national entity which keeps the government governing and the nation alive in political independence. It is time that we open our eyes and see these national armed forces the way their own leaders and people see them.

In some countries, the army has the only nation-wide communications net. Often, this is coupled with the fact that the military man is the only disciplined representative of the national government in the area and his uniform so identifies him with the people. Thus, it is natural and understandable that a chief of state, or one of his cabinet ministers, desiring a civil action in a province remote from the national capital, will transmit his orders through the Signal Corps radio net, and frequently expect the local military commander to carry them out. This expectation is firmed by the fact, in many countries today, that national armed forces have taken the cream of the educated class, the outstanding younger leaders of the nation to officer these forces. National economy, politics, and social organization all reinforce national security in demanding civic uses of a country's armed forces. Since the real battleground in today's conflict is down at the grass-roots among the people of a nation, the national security forces must be in good position on this battleground, know it thoroughly and favorably, if the enemy is to be defeated.

In Turkey, thousands of reserve officers have just been ordered to six months active duty -- to teach children in primary schools. In Indonesia, the Army replaced Soviet engineers to undertake flood control in East Java. In Burma, the Army rehabilitated Communist prisoners on agrarian projects and by operating a shipping line with its LSTs. In Laos, the Army instructed muong and tasseng chiefs in how to be good public administrators. In the Philippines, under Magsaysay, the armed forces undertook many civic actions which were adopted later by other nations -- and even used judge advocate officers to provide legal counsel to poor tenant farmers in court cases involving wealthy landlords.

IV.

Now, such actions by national armed forces have meaning for us when we see beyond their appearance of being only simple thrift to the national treasury or as mere do-goodism. We are primarily concerned that these

armed forces are used effectively to build a security in which the nation can grow strong, independent, and as our life-long friend. And remember, friendship is built upon shared beliefs.

The immediate belief we share is that we are partners in a struggle against international Communism. This is actually a negative belief, since we are against something, and a sound future must be constructed on something positive. So, it is vital that we all know the answer to the question: what are we for?

We can start finding the answer to "what are we for" by understanding -- and constantly remembering -- the fundamental issue at stake in the world today. This fundamental issue can be stated as the issue between man's liberty as a free individual and man's slavery as a possession of the state.

In this struggle, we must dedicate ourselves to strengthening man's liberty as a free individual.

V.

Now, these are not just fine words of pure "corn." This is the most serious sort of business for every man of good will in the armed forces or the free world, for every free citizen in uniform.

Our Defense establishment is supporting more than one million Americans overseas today: members of our Armed Forces, their families, and civilian employees. Besides manning units and bases abroad, we also maintain MAAGS and missions in more than 40 countries.

If this immense effort by the American people is to have heart and meaning, then we must say that no American in uniform, no American serving in Defense, can hold himself apart with honor or honesty from today's great conflict. We cannot afford spectators, those who accept overseas duty as a grand tour for personal pleasure, or as a hardship to be gotten over quickly while counting the days left to return home. Such spectators are as useless as the man in armed combat who fails to fire a shot or perform a needed duty.

VI.

On your next tour overseas, open your eyes to a sound understanding of the role of the armed forces in the country where you serve. If you are an

adviser, help the unit you are advising to be realistic in strengthening the true security of the nation against the half-hidden attacks of the Communists.

Here are some practical suggestions:

a. As a starting point, remember the promise in our own Declaration of Independence of "certain unalienable Rights," which are spelled out in the first ten Amendments to our Constitution. Local trends towards these rights need to be encouraged and strengthened -- not as something foreign, but translated into local understanding and readiness, as the present situation permits. This encouragement and strengthening needs real sensitivity in the doing. Our own political philosophy grew out of the hopes and dreams of many peoples over the centuries. This philosophy continues as the most dynamic political force the world has ever known. I have seen it roll up the Communists' dialectical materialism every time it was truly applied. But, don't confuse the mechanics of the system we Americans have developed to use these precepts to govern ourselves with being the only way they can be used. Learn to recognize these profound truths as they exist in the cultures of others, in their hopes, political backgrounds, and great moral teachings. When you recognize these precepts in their local concept, help them become dominant in the indoctrination of the national armed forces you advise. Through these forces you will help to bring to the fore among all the people of the nation, naturally and honestly, those precepts long honored in the culture of the nation which lead to man's liberty as an individual and a government responsive to the will of the people governed. This action by you is suggested as a constructive response when your views are requested.

b. An Army fighting Communist guerrillas who hide amongst the population must win over the population to support it -- before the guerrillas can be uncovered, recognized, and defeated. This Army must, therefore, become politically identified with the people. Study the 1953-1959 campaigns of the Burmese Defense Forces, the 1950-53 Philippines campaign against the Huks, and the Vietnamese pacification campaign of 1955 for examples of how to use civic action effectively in such combat, where the entire nation is in the forward area.

c. In applying the principles in the Bill of Rights and in attracting the population to support the military, be a good soldier. Make the little things go right. See that troops behave with true military courtesy at check points -- they can be alert for an enemy without bullying civilians. Put a

stop to needless commandeering of civilian property; such practices are often the result of poor administration of logistical means, and this is something any good American officer can help correct. It is all too easy for a man to get food and shelter at the point of a gun -- but when a soldier does this, he creates one more family who resent him and become ready to help the enemy. Make certain that military justice is used, is used impartially, and is known to the population. As the basic rules of good soldiering are applied, you will notice that the combat intelligence "take" will increase in proportion to the civilian population learning to trust the military as true protectors. Remember this and make use of it to convince the local commander of the correctness of your advice. If he has an ounce of real soldier in him, he isn't going to turn down an action that will increase his intelligence of the enemy immediately before him.

d. Above all, accord your fellow man with the dignity which is his birthright. In giving advice, be a true brother officer. Empathy -- sympathetic understanding of the problems, needs, and feelings of others -- is the priceless asset you need for your work abroad. It is far more valuable than mechanically learning a foreign language or taking a course in "human communications." Pass along your ideas in the constant spirit of wanting to help others to help themselves. Do so with humility, as I have seen some of our finest MAAG officers do. Do not discredit the authority of those you are trying to help by advising or criticizing in front of others. Earn the privilege of advising them in private as a friend who is welcome, whose advice is worth heeding. You will find it richly rewarding in terms of human affection when you treat others the way you expect to be treated yourself.

e. Practice what you preach. In many countries, your uniform will make you a man marked plainly as an American, a Yank, a gringo. By your own behavior, you can add real meaning to those names. The publisher of a great daily newspaper in Asia once told me how impressed he was over the MAAG Chief in his country -- whom he saw driving a car on a lonely road in the suburbs, with no traffic cops around, and driving within the legal speed limits. The Asian publisher had been about to pass this "slow" driver when he suddenly realized that the American was obeying the local law, his own country's law, and that he himself could do no less.

One of our OSO staff officers was in the capital of an allied nation not long ago and, while standing on the sidewalk, happened to say hello to a passing policeman. An old man came up to him afterwards and said that the United States must be a wonderful country because the American obviously

wasn't afraid of the policeman -- while he himself still remembered the old days in his country and was still afraid of the police. A little thing, yes, but it has deep meaning.

In newly independent nations, in nations trying to build national respect for their armed forces, you have a rare opportunity to set an example which many will follow. A smile and a greeting in their own language will set a whole new tone in the bearing and attitude of sentries at the gates of camps and headquarters you are visiting. Integrity, your adherence to a high code of honor in personal dealings, will be infectious among officers and men far beyond those with whom you come in contact yourself. Instead of being the gruff and distant American, or a mere fun-loving Rover Boy, try being the American your own family believes you are. The rewards will be priceless.

VII.

Finally, I hope this has stimulated your own thinking, your own dedication to the principles in our Constitution which all of us Americans in uniform have sworn to support. As free citizens who will have vital missions assigned to you in the cold war, I have two parting thoughts for you:

First, dare to win this conflict. Delay, pulling in your necks, falling back into safe and comfortable bureaucratic conformity with the past can only help the enemy. We still have our General Braddock types who want to do it yesterday's way. We must convince them that it will take enlightened progress to succeed in this great conflict which has its own unique rules.

And finally, it seems appropriate within this particular group that I pass along to you the spirit, thought and words which closed the orders sending me to Vietnam in 1954. They are: "God bless you."

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The United States and New Crossroads in World Economy

by *Edwin M. Martin*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs*¹

As an economist I have had some experience with the risks of economic forecasting. I suspect forecasting what future historians will say about the present is even more risky. Nevertheless, I shall be bold and predict that in the history books of 2500 A.D., if man is still dependent on such pedestrian things as books, the chapter on the 20th century will be quite a long one, recording it as a major turning point in the development of human society on this planet. There will be many things to talk about, from the scientific revolution to the two most destructive wars up to that date. But I would suspect that the most significant feature of 20th century life will prove to have been the foundation laid in that era for the history of mankind during a good many ensuing centuries by the success with which our century handled the problems created by the final disintegration of many ancient societies and cultures under the impact of Western "progress" and the dissolution of such organizing forces as were represented by the world empires of the 19th century. The emergence of a multitude of new nations and their transformation, along with numerous independent but heretofore aloof countries, into active participants in the stream of modern world history will surely appear as a major event. Will it prove to have been a constructive influence or a destructive one? To do what we can to influence the answer to this question is our great responsibility.

I can think of no problem which the human race has faced in its past which has been more challenging, more difficult, or more important than this

one. Let us look first at some of the factors which make it such a uniquely difficult task. But before doing so may I insert a brief word of warning before I proceed largely to ignore it. It is usual to speak of the less developed countries as if they were all similar in their characteristics and could all be the subject of accurate generalizations. This is, of course, not true, but there are, I believe, enough areas of likeness that one can safely draw some overall conclusions in the interests of brevity.

For several generations the growing impact of Western ideas and standards has been undermining the traditional social and cultural and economic structures which, at their own levels, had provided a cohesive force for a majority of the world's population. With the advent of modern means of communication and transport, this destructive process has been enormously accelerated in the last 40 years. One should not overlook the impact of World War II in giving many participants in the fighting armies a chance to see at first hand how the rich nations of the West lived.

Nationalism and Demand for Material Achievement

Along with the disintegration of old standards the West has contributed two new ambitions, both, in their immediate impact, more destructive than constructive. The first is nationalism and the desire for political independence at almost all costs. The second is the urgent demand for a higher standard of living, for a society which in its materialistic splendor can hope someday, and sooner rather than later, to match the riches of the industrial countries of Europe and North America. Not only does this establish an enor-

¹ Address made before the American Historical Association and the Mississippi Valley Historical Association at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 29.

mously difficult goal to reach, but the very emphasis on material achievement, desperately needed as it is, runs the risk of obscuring the importance of nonmaterial values without which the discipline and sacrifices necessary to material success can hardly be expected to emerge.

On ground already made relatively barren, or at least disorganized, culturally and intellectually by Western interventions these two seedlings have had a rank growth. It is impossible to expect people in the position of most of these countries to appreciate the long period of work and of sacrifice, the cycles of success and failure, the slow development of complex organic relationships within a society, to say nothing of a certain amount of geographical good fortune, which has been necessary to produce the relatively rich, stable, and politically democratic national societies which the less developed countries seem to wish to emulate. So we face an emotionally charged demand by a vast number of people, divided into illogically bounded nations, for an overnight miracle, an instantaneous creation of something great and good out of little more than an urgent desire and need to have it. This demand is a powerful force which will change a large part of the world; the only issue is whether or not it will be for the better.

We must not forget, in judging what may appear to be immaturity on their part in reaching too impatiently for these hardly won fruits, that we ourselves, with the advantage of several centuries of solid, largely constructive, experience behind us, still show important evidences of rather gross immaturity. Without probing too deeply into our societies, one need only mention the activities of Hitler's Germany and Mussolini's Italy in our own generation.

U.S. Interest in Less Developed Areas

The same technical progress that has accelerated the unrest in the less developed areas has also made it impossible for the industrialized countries like the United States to treat as of no interest the success or failure of the efforts of these striving nations to become responsible members of the modern world with a rapidly rising standard of living. Time distances have been so reduced that this once large planet is now but a neighborhood. Our ability to lead the kind of life we wish to lead here in the United States is inextricably bound up

with the kind of neighborhood which surrounds us.

Moreover we have to fear not just civil disorder and economic chaos among our neighbors but their organization under the leadership of the new force which is directed from the Kremlin and their use to achieve its goal of world communism, to which the United States is the principal obstacle. Our future is bound up with their success in reaching their goals; the Soviets can feed best on their failures. This makes our task not only urgent but a global one. We can only disregard the needs of a country at our peril.

For our own safety as well as our future opportunities for development of our way of life, we must take a direct interest in assisting the growth to maturity of these new and relatively less developed countries of the world. From what I have said it should be clear that I consider the existence of a Communist Soviet Union, actively engaged in seeking new satellites in Asia and Africa and Latin America, as a seriously complicating factor but not as the sole or even primary reason why the people of the United States should want to be of assistance.

Within this broad framework of urgency and difficulty there are other more specific complications. We have reached a state in medical science that insures that every step ahead taken by most of these peoples will reduce death rates without a corresponding change in birth rates and will thereby sharply limit the prospects for future progress. For to us economic progress must be measured not just in terms of national wealth but of individual wealth. The per capita investment required for even a low annual per capita income is substantial. It would be hard enough to find and combine together all the resources needed to give the existing populations a reasonably rising level of living, but to do so for populations which are expanding more rapidly all the time becomes a truly herculean task.

The rapid rate of current scientific development also creates new and especially difficult problems. It would be hard enough to help these people to jump from the wheel age to the automobile age or from wood to fuel oil, but when to be a respectable citizen of the present-day world it becomes a question of rockets and nuclear power the difficulties are enormously increased. It is hard to find a qualified expert who is interested in taking a peasant to the next stage from a hand-pushed

wooden plow, when all his experience has been in developing means to move from the single tractor-drawn plow to the multiple gang-plow technology. And the same applies in a hundred other fields.

Moreover the sensitive citizen of one of these countries is easily led to wonder whether he is being treated properly if he is not offered the latest developments of Western technology. A fundamental distrust can easily be created from such an apparent treatment as a second-class citizen. Too often these countries are not satisfied to concentrate on better roads and better water transportation or even railroads; they must all have their own jet airline.

While most countries wish to do all they can to pay their own way to a higher standard of living, we appear to them to have created obstacles to their doing so. Somewhat like our farmers, the people of the less developed countries feel, with some justice, that they are between economic millstones in which the prices of the manufactured products they buy are constantly rising to provide better incomes to the well-organized workers and managers and owners of the industrialized world, while the prices of the primary products they sell fail to keep pace, even often fall sharply. Moreover, their sales volume is also often subjected to wide fluctuations as the rich countries go through periods of recession and boom. This is not a small problem for just a few countries: 45 of them receive over 60 percent of their export income from one or two commodities. To add insult to injury, when they try to export manufactured products at low prices, based on the low incomes their workers will accept, they are faced with quotas and tariffs and cries of market disruption.

It is certainly to our interest that they expand their exports so that they can pay for the supplies and parts needed to keep their new factories operating, pay us back the money we are providing to build them, and be able to assume an increasing share of the foreign exchange costs of development themselves as truly independent nations. Our statesmanship will be tested to the full in achieving a reconciliation between their need to export to live and our need to protect our people and industries against the social dislocations of sudden swamping by imports. It will probably prove a harder nut to crack than securing large enough foreign-aid appropriations.

I suspect that we have created a further difficulty for ourselves by letting "development" be handled too much by the economists as primarily an economic problem; we also have gone too far in accepting the materialistic measure of success. Time and again I have heard discussions of "development" turn on percentage growth in gross national product as if health, education, governmental efficiency, even an individual's happiness in his environment didn't really matter. Perhaps we are led to this bias by the ease of measuring economic progress in precise terms. It's a lazy man's answer.

Creating Proper Political Framework

Not only are other areas of development important in themselves, but success in economic development is entirely dependent on success in creating a mature political and social framework in which economic activities can take place.

There must, of course, be political order. There must also, however, be a positive sense of loyalty which will enlist sacrifices for the common good by all citizens if the hard work, the savings, the cooperative effort, which are required if outside help is to do any good, are to be forthcoming.

National or international agencies can develop economic plans and make recommendations as to what should come first. But only the local government can in the last analysis decide what its national objectives are and in what order they shall be reached, and thus enlist a full measure of support from its citizens. It must be wise and strong to do this task well, and it is not a simple one. Even we have great difficulty, for example, in deciding as a nation such a broad question as what proportion of our economic output should go for consumer goods and what proportion should go for public services, like schools, hospitals, and roads. But for capital-starved new countries decisions in much greater detail are essential to maximizing their rate of growth.

In addition to the question of what to spend resources on, there is always the question of how fast an expansion should be sought. The gap between present levels of living and what would be decently humane, to say nothing of Western levels, is in every case so great that it is hard to resist trying to do some of everything at once and to spend much more rapidly than available resources in fact permit. The result is inevitably an inflation which destroys the desire to save and forces

a new start after serious real losses. There are no more difficult political—or economic—decisions than those involved in this question of the proper balance between growth with inflation versus deflation with stagnation, as we in this country should well know.

Closely related to this problem of inflation is that of a sound public fiscal system which, without curbing local initiative, will provide the local resources for the basic economic infrastructure needed to match aid from abroad.

There must also be chosen an appropriate political attitude toward foreign private enterprise. It is seldom that public enterprise alone can do the whole job. Not only does private enterprise have unique capacities, but it is an additional source of capital in a situation where capital is nearly always the scarcest resource. Here again these countries are faced with one of their most difficult policy decisions, as they naturally fear greatly the loss of real independence through possible economic imperialism, with which they have in many cases had some past experience. Even as mature a country as Canada is now finding cause for concern in the proportion of its enterprises which are owned in the United States.

And lastly a responsible government must find the means to insure that its growing wealth is equitably shared among its people, not all concentrated in the hands of a few. Here in the United States we can well understand the strains put upon a society in reaching and maintaining a workable and acceptable compromise between the superficial logic of equality and the practical importance of stimulating effort and sacrifice by appropriate material rewards.

I have mentioned just a few of the difficult political decisions which a country must make if its economic development is to succeed. I have said nothing about such less dramatic but still difficult questions as adequate staffing of the bureaucracy, its efficient operation free of corruption, and similar problems. What I have said should indicate that the creation of proper political attitudes, of a proper understanding of the role of the government and the nature of a sound political process for reaching decisions, as well as an understanding of difficult political-economic issues themselves, is an essential prerequisite to the organization and execution of an adequate economic development program. Of course, there are also many important noneconomic objectives

to be achieved by sound political development.

It is far more difficult to create proper attitudes and understanding in people, whether they are operating in a well-established cultural system or just beginning to create a new one, than helping them to learn to dig ditches or pile up bricks and mortar or repair a jeep. To the extent that it is a matter of attitudes and understanding, there is moreover undoubtedly less that can be done from the outside. Nevertheless, for all the reasons cited, I do believe that we must give more attention to the problems which many of these people face in creating a political system with a sense of depth of the sort which you as historians must well understand from your studies. Political development should take its place on the world stage alongside the present star—economic development.

Availability of Resources

If we could assume that the political foundations required for economic development did exist and would continue to improve as the economic problems presented for solution became more complicated with the development of a more intricate economic system, we would then find ourselves faced with several important issues in the economic field alone. Basically they are issues of availability of resources.

I want to talk first about people. Since the peoples being helped must do most of the work, must run the factories which we build for them, must operate their own economy in the end, it is essential that we provide the training which is appropriate to the kinds of economic development projects and programs which are shaping their future. While our funds for this purpose have probably been quite inadequate, and, with the emergence of 16 new states in Africa this year looking for rapid economic progress as the normal and obvious result of independence, will become even more so, we still have not been able to fill all the jobs for which we had money.

Not only do we need more people, but we need many more people with a sense of mission and a spirit of enthusiasm of the sort which can multiply the impact of the technical knowledge which they possess. Most of you are teachers and will be familiar with what I mean when I say that the task before us is one which challenges the most skilled of our teachers. The gap between teacher and student is usually far greater than you will find in your classroom. By the same token the

teaching genius required to bridge that gap, to select from the technical knowledge and experience of a rich and complicated society the knowledge that the citizens of one of the newer states need to acquire first and can best assimilate as a first step along the progress to full understanding—all this requires a teaching artist of the first order. In many cases he will have to start, not by explaining a new and better way to do something, but by proving that to change at all from the ways of the ancestors is a good thing. But he must also have technical knowledge, practical experience, and a willingness to live for periods of time in foreign lands, often under highly uncongenial conditions.

I do not see how we can meet the challenge of the 20th century to which I referred earlier with any degree of adequacy, or feel any assurance about our own longer term future, unless we can awaken in this country and in the industrialized countries of Europe a missionary spirit, embodied in an adequate number of inspired teachers who can show the way to the higher civilization, in all its facets, which we believe we possess. There is encouraging evidence that the newer generation coming out of our universities is inspired by this challenge and does see how exciting in terms of accomplishment such a life can be.

Need for Material Resources

But given this army of people we also need material resources in unprecedented amounts. Personally I think we need a rapid expansion in the flow of capital soon, though it will take a little time to develop the political and economic resources in the less developed countries to absorb efficiently the large quantities of additional capital that they will eventually need. But we must be prepared to step up its availability as rapidly as it can be utilized.

Our ability to expand our capital assistance has fortunately been greatly increased in the past few years, which have seen the greatest expansion of needs. For we have clearly crossed the line between the period of postwar economic reconstruction and the next era in the economic history of the industrialized West, as yet unnamed. The most dramatic symbol of this change is the disappearance of the dollar gap and the appearance of a U.S. balance-of-payments problem of considerable gravity. But with united efforts we can

now provide goods and finance on a constantly enlarging basis. With the establishment of the new Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, whose charter was signed this month in Paris,² the Atlantic world is better organized to press ahead with its common economic tasks.

Total public and private investment now going into the less developed countries has been estimated to be about \$5 billion a year. This, well used, might provide an annual per capita increase in gross national product of 1½ to 2 percent. It has been estimated that, if we assume it is 1¾ percent per year and continue at this level of investment for 40 years, we can raise the average per capita income in the less developed countries of the free world from about \$100 a year to \$200 a year. Meanwhile, if present trends continue, U.S. per capita income will increase not by \$100 but by nearly \$4,000, and that of the rest of the industrialized free world by \$2,600.

In large part this is such a discouraging result because it assumes present trends in population growth. But even apart from that it is indicative of the enormous problem which we face in giving these less fortunate people even a slight sense of progress, let alone a decent standard of living. The gap between "have" and "have not" countries would on these assumptions widen hugely by 2000 A.D., unless we should destroy our own future through mismanagement.

I have no pat solution to offer to this discouraging picture. I think it justifies what I said at the outset about the crucial nature of the decisions which we must make in the next few years. We do not have long to toy with the problem. We must either face it and solve it, or reap the disastrous consequences of failure.

I have suggested some lines along which we might seek encouragement. I have mentioned the need for more and better technicians, improved use of resources and harder work through improved political arrangements, a cutback in population increase, and better export markets for less-developed-area products, all of which would increase the rate of improvement forecast above. Again I should also remind you that gross national product, even per capita, is a limited measure of progress, failing (except indirectly) to take into account such things as better education and health and government.

Favorable Developments

To add a further optimistic note, which underlines what we are capable of, if we have the will, I suggest you think back to 1945, perhaps even 1950, and ask yourselves if you then thought the bulk of the African colonies could become independent by consent by 1960. Current troubles in the Congo should not obscure the larger fact, which has been no mean achievement in statesmanship, to say nothing of what has been done in the vast Indian peninsula and in Southeast Asia.

The fact that the seriousness of this problem is recognized in ever-widening circles is also a good omen for success. I sometimes get the impression that nearly all of my economic professorial friends who 10 years ago were busy on books about the dollar gap are now turning out books on economic development. I sincerely hope that the best brains in the fields of political science, sociology, and history will also bring their contributions to bear on the solution of this crucial and difficult issue and not assume that it is one to be left to the economists.

We need help from all sources, and I think most of all from those so-called less scientific and less practical domains which deal with the relations between human beings in the realm of the mind and the spirit. But unless we Americans can, by our own actions and leadership, demonstrate and convince the peoples of the free world that there are important things in life besides the standard of living, that there are other objectives worth seeking and having, we shall, I fear, be faced with a real prospect of failure. Both our race against time for material prosperity itself and the probable need to achieve political maturity despite less-than-hoped-for material progress, as well as success in our across-the-board competition with Soviet communism for men's loyalties, depend on the growth of a belief in moral values on which day-to-day discussions can be founded.

Perhaps our major problem in promoting economic growth is that we are not in command of the situation. We are better able to transmit the fruits of growth than the seed. The process we are trying to set in motion and help to sustain requires widespread transformations in attitudes, institutions, and structure. It requires leaders committed to economic and social progress and competent to organize, administer, and inspire their own people. We cannot bestow leadership.

We can set some examples in behavior and attitudes, and we do command substantial resources that are important determinants of growth, in particular capital and technical skills. Where governments are making a determined effort to propel their economies forward, it is imperative that we help them in full measure. Where governing groups resist change in the interest of privilege or are weak, unstable, and ineffective in translating ideas into action, our problem is to try to fashion our assistance in such ways as to encourage the transformations that are needed. What is clear is that the process will be long-term and that it will require substantial and sustained effort on our part, guided by the wisest leadership we possess.

PART ONE:
HUMAN FACTORS IN WORLD AFFAIRS

Human Relations in Military Societies

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Human Relations in Military Societies

Digested from an article by Dr. W. T. V. Adiseshiah in the JOURNAL OF THE UNITED SERVICE INSTITUTION OF INDIA October-December 1959.

THE practical aim of psychology lies in discovering how a person may be helped over his difficulties. It follows that the first concern of the practical psychologist is to analyze and classify the difficulties commonly experienced by people before he offers any advice on how to resolve them. Broadly speaking, difficulties emerge from two worlds—the world of material things and the world of people. The psychological approach is nothing more than a systematic effort to meet situations effectively and to forestall developments which arouse unhappy conditions in the minds of people. In a broad sense, therefore, every one of us has to be something of a psychologist.

The Material Environment

We have all lived long enough in this world to realize how profoundly the climate, the atmosphere, the changes which take place in the world around us, and even "acts of God" affect our moods and tempers and occasionally make us feel that life is hardly worth living. At the same time, there are days of sunshine, freshness, and glowing warmth regaled by "the cup that cheers" which put heart into us on our journey through life.

The common man may well afford to close in on his troubles either by withdrawing from his environment or by abandoning his effort when he finds the strain too hard to bear. The soldier can ill-afford to do this. He has to press on, braving the inclemencies of the weather, advancing against showers of bullets, making the best of a bad bargain because he

would rather win than lose the battle. The will to fight merges with the will to survive, for survival in a perilous environment is the key to victory over the enemy.

The Social Environment

More intricate than the world of matter, against which each one of us has to contend, is the world of human beings whose ambitions and aspirations, domineering tendencies, and divergent interests cut against those of the individual. Resentments and rivalries, grudges and grousing, kindle aversions and anxieties, fantasies and fears in many an otherwise calm and contented mind.

When confronted with formidable social problems in the common run of life, people who cannot see a practicable way out of their difficulties tend to detach themselves from others or to consult specialists to find the cures for their troubles. The soldier cannot, however, afford to be an isolationist. He has to live with other people, eat with them, think with them, sleep with them, and even dream with them. That intimate personal interrelationship, which the very structure of a military unit entails, makes it necessary that there should prevail within the unit a "social climate" marked by unity of purpose, friendly understanding, healthy rivalry, and mutual regard. The problem of human relations in military societies is, thus, a problem of capital importance.

During recent years, many psychological questions relating to human relations in the fields of education, industry, and

The pattern of human relationships within a military unit is unquestionably the most important single factor which contributes to its efficacy. Without esprit no military group can achieve its purpose

public administration have been widely discussed in literature. Certain notions regarding what is neatly described as "the gentle art of managing people" have a useful application to military societies. It is, however, necessary to restrict this discussion to three problems. These are the psychology of interpersonal relations, the problem of military leadership, and the question of group morale.

No one will deny that these are matters of far-reaching significance for military commanders at all levels and, as such, they merit our serious consideration.

Psychology of Interpersonal Relations

It is common knowledge that objects of the material world become meaningful to the perceiver by virtue of their functional characteristics. Thus, a red light on the highway serves as a warning to the motorist of a danger spot. The national flag, fluttering on top of a building, brings home to the mind of the Indian citizen the sovereignty of his country. Possibilities of utilization unfold themselves to the observer as he views an object. Thus, a piece of paper might appear useful for wrapping, for writing a note, or for cutting out a figure depending on its relation to the viewer's needs and purposes. In other words, material objects also acquire a meaning by virtue of their manipulatory characteristics.

Between human beings, on the other hand, the relation of the perceiver to the person perceived is altogether different. Persons have abilities, wishes, and sentiments. They can act purposefully, watch us, or benefit or harm us intentionally because they are aware of their surroundings in much the same way as we are aware of ours. Just as the material environment bears a determinate relationship to the perceiver, there are connections between the constituents of the social environment which partake of the principle of cause and effect. These need to be discussed in some detail.

Social Perception

It is seldom realized, even by those who have proved remarkably successful in business administration or personnel management, that the pattern of interpersonal relationship depends to no small extent on what one sees in others and what others see in oneself. Healthy interpersonal relationships depend almost entirely on the extent to which social perception is comprehensive and realistic.

Two points have to be emphasized in this connection. What psychologists technically call "constancy phenomena" occur not only in the perception of material things but also of people. For example, an aircraft may appear as a tiny silhouette when it is far off, but as a huge object when seen at close quarters. Yet the apparent difference in size would make no difference to the realization that it is an aircraft. This is so because, notwithstanding the difference in size, there is a general form quality—a pattern, a body outline—which remains constant in the two conditions. In much the same way, there is, underlying the apparent differences resulting from situational influences over the same person, a constancy which is capable of becoming unmistakably evident to the perceiver. Between radically different pictures of "Philip drunk" and "Philip sober," there is inevitably a common denominator which issues from Philip himself. This is what should be identified in social perception.

Distortions in Social Perception

When something is seen from an awkward angle, it appears quite different from what it is ordinarily. Look at yourself in a mirror with a convex surface, and you will wonder what you are seeing. Much the same holds true about the way some people see others.

A common distorting factor in social perception is the "ego complex." Underlying this perverse mental disposition is an organization of false notions regard-

ing oneself, bound together by overpowering sentiments of self-regard. A person with an ego complex will tend to see others in small proportions. The prevailing sentiments will impel him to gain control over others, which will result in anything but peaceful relations with other people.

Another frequent cause of distorted social perception is imperfect isolation of what is being seen. This is a kind of illusion, rather like what is experienced when you see a moving train while in one which is standing at the platform. You might get the impression that the other train is standing and your own train is moving. Sometimes, quite unwittingly, you might allow yourself to believe that the other person is elusive or dilatory, while all the time you have been deceiving yourself. Such distortions in social perception may, as they often do, lead to feelings of disapproval, disgust, and even aversion toward others, which would be neither just nor fair.

Distortions in social perception may occur when the person seen bears close resemblance to someone else more intimately known. The resemblance may be in facial or in behavioral characteristics, or both. A strained personal relationship is capable of arising, quite without reason, when feelings of dislike or hatred are transferred from A to B. It is, indeed, curious how some trivial detail such as a hair style or, for that matter, even the color of a necktie could set up strong feelings in the mind of the beholder.

In the case of persons who readily believe what others say, distortions in social perception may be the result of an accumulated stock of adverse stories, which by constant and varied repetition could produce a bias, vitiating the impartiality of one's social perception. It is inevitable that a soft ear should, in due course, produce a soft brain.

A person would be seen in quite the wrong perspective if he is looked upon

merely as a means to gain some end. There is the old fable of the monkey who once saw chestnuts roasting on a fire and prevailed on a believing cat to get hold of the chestnuts. The cat burned his paw, but the monkey ate the chestnuts. There are many people who, like the monkey, will try to see how they can make a cat's paw of others; their social perceptions bear ample fruit where there are people who, like the cat, will pull the chestnuts out of the fire. All in all, it is psychologically desirable to realize that however well one may know another person, there is always some little thing which one may not know and which might be a matter of the greatest importance.

Practical Implications

What has been said regarding social perception carries several grave implications regarding the administrative responsibility of a military commander. Let us consider one important area, namely the Annual Confidential Report (Efficiency Report). This is highly important because of its far-reaching effects on the career prospects of the young officer.

The problem of the commander who initiates the Annual Confidential Report is, without doubt, a difficult problem indeed. On the one hand, he has to feel satisfied that due regard has been given to the interests of the service in making his assessments. At the same time, he is obliged to assess the officer or the subordinate under his command in such a way that no injustice is done as a result of false impressions, which would naturally arise if the person has not been seen in the correct perspective.

In sizing up the capabilities and limitations of the person assessed, many subjective influences will, without doubt, play a large part. To guard against these influences, especially influences which might lead to wrong conclusions, and to maintain a strictly objective standard of assessment would be a sheer impossibility in

the case of a commander who has not trained his social perception aright. The longer the association, the closer the emotional bond; or if it be the other way, the wider the cleavage. Individual differences in the capacity to neutralize distorting factors in social perception are considerable.

Military Leadership

It is now a widely accepted psychological notion that whatever one may mean by the term "leadership" the pattern of personal qualities which goes to make up a leader emerges from a social situation. One of the pioneer studies on leadership was undertaken in 1934 by the American psychologist, Professor J. L. Morneo, who observed groups of babies of various ages from birth to three years, placed close to each other in a nursery. He found that some babies were *isolationists*. They had little interaction with others. Some revealed *horizontal differentiation*. They interacted with their neighbors, but not in a dominant manner. A few revealed *vertical differentiation*, that is they soon began to command disproportionate attention from the group. Morneo came to the conclusion that leadership emerges in a group when vertical structuration develops.

Among grownups, also, one may find the emergence of leadership when a group is confronted with a problem situation. When something which the group has to achieve or attain is blocked by an obstacle, the individual who readily sees a practicable way out of the difficulty or formulates a workable solution to a problem emerges as a leader of the group. He gains his position, in other words, through a process of reorganization in which he is perceived and reacted to by other members of the group as the means to the group goal.

Functions of a Military Leader

A large variety of functions falls to the lot of a military leader whatever the size and composition of the formation may be. The leader has to coordinate the activities

of the group. He has to ensure that the policies laid down for the group are being implemented. For example, a company commander is responsible for having the orders of the day carried out.

The leader functions as a planner. When some action has to be taken, it is his responsibility to think out what has to be done, how it is to be done, and assign to members of the group various specific things which they are supposed to do.

The leader has to function as the source of readily available information regarding the technical requirements and the skills demanded of the group in the activities which it undertakes. A gunnery officer must, for instance, have at his fingertips all details pertaining to the guns under his control, so that, under his guidance, the men would fire the guns as and when they are called upon to do so.

The leader has to function as the official spokesman of the group. He represents the point of view of the group to the higher authorities. Weakness in leadership occurs when members of the group gain independent access to higher levels, bypassing the leader.

The leader has to maintain control over the internal affairs and activities of the group. He is in the strategic position where he functions as "censor" of in-group activities.

The leader's powers of reward and punishment enable him to exercise strong disciplinary and motivational control over every group member. The strength of leadership would lie in being firm but gentle, taciturn but sympathetic.

The leader plays an extremely important psychological role for the individual by relieving him of responsibilities for personal action which he would rather avoid. In return for allegiance, the leader frees the individual from making decisions. It is, however, a desirable practice in military societies that decisions affecting any vital matter concerning an individual should not be made by the leader

without giving due consideration to the viewpoint of that individual.

When things go well and the group earns praise because of its meritorious achievement, the leader shares the credit with members of the group. There is, in fact, the instance of an officer who declined to accept an honor conferred on him because he felt that his comrades in arms also had a share in his act of gallantry. On the other hand, when blame falls on the group for something which has gone wrong the leader must, of necessity, accept the lion's share of the blame. Often, indeed, he may have to function as a perfect target for the aggressive, frustrated, disappointed, and disillusioned group. Thus, it will be seen that the military leadership role is a very complex one, calling for breadth of vision and insight into the intricacies of human nature.

Group Morale

Field Marshal Montgomery regarded morale as the steadfast determination of a group to achieve a preconceived aim. It is necessary, however, to define morale in terms of certain positive criteria. Since the conditions in which military groups function may vary from the settled, secure, and well-established life in a cantonment to the inhospitable, hazardous, and unpredictable environments of forward areas, the application of these criteria has necessarily to be made with due regard to the circumstances in which military groups operate.

Morale may be regarded as high when a group of individuals is held together by internal cohesiveness rather than by external pressure. The reason is obvious. The moment external pressure is relaxed, morale would crack up. This is exactly what happened in Germany toward the end of World War II when the German war machine collapsed as the severity of Allied strategic bombing was stepped up.

In a group where morale is high, internal frictions are at a minimal level. There

may, of course, be honest differences of opinion between individuals, but these differences would not lead to frictions which would cause coworkers to work at cross purposes. All members in a group with high morale will accept a common aim, sink their personal differences, and work toward their common aim.

Within the group, different members exhibit friendly understanding of each other, which is not merely expressed in words or mutual praise but in a harmonious blending of their respective functions. A military group is not a mutual admiration society, but an organization of individuals having specific tasks to perform. They cannot possibly achieve any degree of success unless different members see how the effort of each fits in with the action pattern of the whole group.

The ability of the group to adapt itself to changing conditions is a sign of high morale. It may happen, for instance, that a unit stationed in a cantonment where life is quiet and settled is suddenly ordered off to a forward area. It is to be expected that such a change would have a disquieting effect on some members of the unit; but, in a unit where morale is high, everyone will soon get down to his job, and no one would waste his time trying to produce reasons why the move should be canceled.

Where morale is high, there is a keen desire in members of the group to stay in the group and to make their best contributions to the group. There is a saying in Hindustani that when a ship begins to sink, the rats on the ship are the first to escape. Much the same holds true of military groups. A unit in which desertions are numerous, or cases of sickness plentiful, is showing signs of low morale.

It is generally true that the morale of a unit is a reflection of the personality of its commander. Under the command of an officer whose leadership qualities are of a high order, members of the unit will not fail to develop positive attitudes concern-

ing the objectives of the group. It is, indeed, striking that under difficult conditions men will make the most unexpected personal sacrifices in the interest of the group.

Misleading Indicators of Morale

Sometimes, orderliness has been mistakenly regarded as the indicator of a healthy morale state. One might walk around the company lines in a regimental center and find everything neatly and tidily laid out, but it should not be forgotten that, in a military unit, a certain standard of orderliness is insisted upon as a matter of discipline. Orderliness and efficiency are symptomatic of high morale when they are not the result of external pressures, nor the effort to impress some distinguished visitor, but are produced by a spontaneous desire in personnel to be orderly and efficient.

High productivity is not necessarily an indicator of high morale. In fact, it may indicate a state of positive despair when it is achieved by stringent measures of regimentation. The reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (1946) revealed a remarkable ability of German workers to produce at a high level even under the desperate hardships of Allied bombing. Yet, it cannot be claimed that the morale of the German industrial worker was as strong as that which prevailed among Allied forces when they were subjected to German bombing on the shores of Dunkerque in 1940, or even the civilian population of London during the Battle of Britain. There seems little doubt from the data collected by the United States Strategic Bombing Survey that great numbers of the German people were ready to quit long before their leaders permitted them to do so. This, then, was low morale.

It is commonly thought that a high level of interpersonal tension within a group is a sign of bad morale. This would be misleading because tension, as such,

cannot differentiate between good and bad morale. Tension between the leader and other, and, for that matter, tension arising out of conflicting self-interests within the group are dangerous symptoms. But conflicts arising from a concern regarding the achievement of the aim, or tension caused by criticism of the performance of other members may be, as it often is, an indication of high *esprit de corps*.

Negative Determinants of Morale

There are situations in which negative factors contribute to a state of high morale. It is well-known, for instance, that in the face of a common danger, people who are otherwise at loggerheads will unite. Nevertheless, as has been pointed out, "fear and rational expediency are not adequate motives to weld together a people in cooperative effort even in the face of a common danger. If a people has not already some sense of solidarity, then fear is apt to result in panic rather than in common action."

This is just what happened in 1940 to France, where the internal forces of disruption were too great. The unifying forces stirred up by hostile external pressure were insufficient to outweigh the internal disruptive forces. It is, therefore, a matter of prime importance for military commanders to watch the internal disruptive forces which are at work in their units and keep them under restraint, so that in a crisis these forces would not upset the unity which it is desirable to achieve in the group.

Conclusion

To summarize, the pattern of human relationships within a military unit is unquestionably the most important single factor which contributes to the efficacy of the unit. Three factors which bear on human relations tie up closely with the military strength of any unit.

The interpersonal relations prevalent between officers and officers, officers and

men, and between men and men has much to do with the problems arising out of one individual's dealings with another. It cannot be too strongly emphasized that how one person deals with another will depend largely on how he sees the other man. Problems of interpersonal relations arise because others are viewed in the wrong perspective.

The military leader needs to possess certain essential qualities which enable him to exercise his functions truly and well. The qualities of leadership emerge as the group sets itself to solve some

problem, and leadership is indicated in the individual who provides a workable solution to problems as they arise.

A healthy morale state is, without doubt, the essential requirement for the efficacy of any military group. The outstanding fact here is that a high level of internal cohesiveness, the absence of divisive frictions, adaptability to change, and steadfastness of purpose are essentials for the spirit of fellowship and mutual cooperation, without which no military group can ever hope to achieve its common purposes.

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THE SOCIAL GROUP, INFILTRATION, AND WAR

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major Armund Bjerke in "Militær Orientering" (Norway) 10 September 1951.

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It has been said many times that strategic and tactical principles are immutable. Every time some younger officer questions this statement, recognized authorities show him the correctness of this view.

The Changing Picture of War

However, when we consider how the over-all picture of war has changed since the Franco-Prussian War - how modern warfare has developed from its simpler forms until it now includes all the individuals and institutions of a social group - it is clear that there have been many changes which affect all aspects of conducting a war.

For example, in the Franco-Prussian War the troops were able to fight in the front lines with the confidence that as long as they held their positions their homes were secure against the enemy's brutality. Even in World War I, those at home were in relative security, although there was a little bombing in England and, at the end, the food situation was rather critical in Germany. However, in World War II, the soldier at the front knew that thousands were dying every day at home from the effects of the enemy's weapons, even though the troops at the front did their best and held the enemy. And developments since that time have aggravated this situation.

Therefore, we must adjust ourselves to a new picture of war - an over-all picture which will look entirely different from the one that sufficed for World War II. The sooner we recognize this and adapt ourselves and our combat means accordingly, the better it will be for all of us.

The Social Group

The social groups of the world have now joined themselves together into two blocs, with the democratic social groups in the one (the West bloc) and the socalled "peoples' democracies" in the other (the East bloc).

In the democratic social groups we recognize certain fundamental freedoms: freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom of organization, and individual freedom, to mention but a few.

The peoples' democracies have the same elements, minus the word freedom. The latter can best be replaced by the word state; that is, state press, state organization, and so forth.

As freedom of organization is one of the freedoms found in the free democracies, nearly every activity has been organized to such an extent that they may now talk of an "over"-organization of the social groups. Labor, the arts and sciences, sports, and youth activities are organized into great associations or unions. In addition, anyone can start an organization for this or that purpose, and no one checks the activities in which it engages. The result is that an organization, social in nature, may serve as a cover for activities which do not serve the group's best interests.

In the peoples' democracies, a comprehensive control over the entire life of the social group has been established. With a strong police organization (both regular and secret), operating with methods which, fortunately, are not used in the free democracies, the population is watched to a degree which borders on persecution.

For example, the German social group was tied and bound, and declared to be incapable of managing its own affairs, politically by the Nazis from 1933 to 1945. As a result, it was impossible to influence it from the outside by ordinary political means. Germany, and the social group which had

grown up during that period, had to be crushed by force of arms before the German people could obtain peace and the chance to win back their political liberty. During that period, there was no political power in the country which could assume control and bring the war to an end, as happened in 1918.

This same type of control exists in many countries today, and the chances that the social groups or the people themselves will be able to recognize the need for co-operation with the rest of the world and cease hostilities appear equally small.

Infiltration

Since 1945, the term "infiltration" has assumed a startling reality, because the people of the Western nations have had their eyes opened to the increased activity in this field. It threatens to break up the social organization which has been built up through successive generations, and reveals a direct connection with preparations for open war. We have now come to realize this fact, and the battle against infiltration has begun with growing intensity, but it still will be a long time before it can be said that the Western nations are sufficiently armed to be able to fend off the danger which threatens.

The conflict in Korea has shown that such national infiltration may cause the outbreak of open war. Until recently, the term "infiltration" usually has been regarded as a purely military maneuver conducted by small patrols which, during darkness, slipped by the outposts of the defense for purposes of reconnaissance and limited attacks. Since the development which has taken place during the last few years, both military and civil authorities are beginning to accept the fact that infiltration is a many-sided problem which involves both the military and the political fields. To a seasoned professional soldier, many of the military operations which have been undertaken in

the conflict in Korea would seem strange, if he did not take into consideration the infiltration factor which, several times, has upset the maneuvers of the United Nations' forces. This factor can produce the same tragic results here in Europe if we are not cognizant of how a social group can be undermined and prepared for an enemy conquest.

There is much to indicate that the conflict in Korea was set in motion as a test of the effectiveness of permitting infiltration tactics in a social group to expand to include open warfare. One is moved to draw parallels with Hitler's experimentation with the means and tactics of the blitzkrieg in Spain before World War II.

Regardless of what position a statesman or officer occupies, he must understand clearly the double nature of infiltration tactics and have a clear picture of the developments and events which characterize this new form of warfare. Because of space limitations, it is not possible to go into detail here, but, to set the reader's interest in motion, attention will be directed toward a number of factors which characterize it.

As a background, the reader must understand that a modern war will be a war between, and inside of, social groups; a revolutionary war which does not begin with the first shot, but long before. It starts with infiltration tactics in time of peace, an infiltration into the social group, a "cold war" which merges directly into actual warfare.

Revolutionary War

It was Karl Marx who introduced the concept "revolutionary war" and who, in modern times, laid the theoretical foundation for this form of warfare.

Marxism was founded and developed in the preceding century following an increase in the industrialization of the European countries, coupled with an

increase in the property-less classes in the social groups. This growing segment of the population had little or no political influence in the management or administration of their particular countries. To attain this, they first had to break the domination of the then ruling classes. A revolutionary war was, therefore, the method they had to use in order to take over the political leadership of a country. However, in and of itself, it was never conceived as a means of warfare against another country.

At the end of World War I, the Communists seized power in Russia in accordance with this concept, and overthrew the government which had been set up after the Czar was forced to abdicate. Since that time, this form of warfare has been adopted as a link in the tactical instruction in the Soviet military schools and in the political schooling of the Communist Party's leaders the world over. However, it was the Germans who first attempted to put these ideas into practice with the object of conquering another country. This was accomplished by propaganda, the establishment of political infiltration in the opponents' countries, and with the assistance of military demonstrations and threats. Even though a great amount of effort and money was spent in this field, it was not sufficient to win World War II, although good results were obtained, particularly in the conquest of Austria, France, and Norway.

The Eastern bloc states have gone much further in this field and have adopted the tactics of the revolutionary war to obtain the Soviet Union's old political objectives: ice-free ports to the open sea, the security of their western frontiers in Europe, and domination in the Orient.

The contents of the bottle are the same, even if the label is new.

What is it, therefore, that characterized revolutionary war? Roughly speaking, it is the underground and infiltration activity that is set in

motion by the attacker; in order to undermine the defense's social system and knock the props from under their opponent's defense organization in time of war. Revolutionary war is divided into two main parts: peacetime activity (the cold war), and the employment of the results of the cold war in actual combat. The first is a political infiltration of the social group; the second, a military infiltration of an extent unknown to earlier, orthodox warfare. There is really no sharply differentiated line between these two elements of warfare. The transition from the cold war to actual combat cannot be defined easily, nor can the development of the cold war be controlled easily with the means that the free democracies have at their disposal.

The Cold War

The aim of the cold war is to conquer a state from within, preferably without engaging in actual warfare.

The action comprises an intense activity on the part of the attacker in the form of a political infiltration. This commonly begins by the attacker planting his own personnel in the administrative organization of the opposed state; by occupying key positions in its economic system, its political parties, its news services (press and radio), its police organization, its transportation system, its trade organizations, its schools and educational system, its youth and sports programs, and especially, in its labor organizations. Military staffs, departments, and industries are, of course, objectives, and an enemy always manages to make contacts here in spite of the best of security systems.

Alongside this activity, a strong and reliable network of agents develops, which fulfills the double mission of checking and reporting.

When this organization begins to assume form, its fields of action are

enlarged and its efficiency increased. It stirs up strikes and causes unrest, engages in sabotage and propaganda activities which sow discontent, nourishes budding dissatisfactions, and creates unrest and a lack of equilibrium in the social group.

If the attacker is able to assume control over a political party in the state which is being attacked, it is a distinct help. When it comes to the East bloc's activity in this field, there are no difficulties, because Communist Parties are found in all countries, legally or otherwise.

Czechoslovakia's tragic fate is a warning. In 1948, the Czech social group was so infiltrated that the Soviets were able to carry out a political conquest of the country without war. The Soviet occupation forces constituted the necessary threat. Afterward, the infiltration continued, and, with the undisguised employment of force and power, all possibility of opposition has been done away with and the country itself is no longer able to formulate independent policy. Only force of arms will now free that country.

The only effective means to avoid this situation is to create a healthy state, with a contented population, where the individual, the people, and the political parties are awake and on guard against the danger of infiltration. The enemy interferes in everyone's manner of thinking, determines political persuasion and views of life, and is able to make pawns of the citizens of a country. The tragic but famous "Stockholm Peace Appeal" shows how even men of opposite conviction can be used by the enemy in the cold war.

Actual Warfare

So much time has elapsed that even the picture of actual warfare is beginning to disappear. Of the two forms of war - cold war and actual war - it is natural and understandable that the latter draws the greater amount of attention from the professional soldier. The danger in this is that he

will not be attentive to the first form and the intimate connection between these two military elements. I shall, therefore, cite a few factors which may clarify the relationship.

We must regard it as a fact that the organization which the enemy has planted in the social group before the opening of actual warfare is absolutely necessary as a basis for the military infiltration which is to come. Besides conducting attacks and sabotage activities, this organization has, as its special mission, the paving of the way for a regular attack with specially trained units which are carried into the country behind the defense lines.

War materiel is, today, so highly developed that, theoretically, any part of a country can be reached. Experience shows, however, that many targets cannot be attacked advantageously by regular combat means. This being the case, it is significant to note that a well-developed underground organization in the country subject to invasion is able to conduct such attacks.

Because it is necessary to build up such an organization before the war can begin, the time factor enters the picture as a far more important element than at any previous time. A long time is required to build up an underground organization, and the side which neglects to make use of this time during the cold war loses an advantage over the enemy during the course of actual warfare. Even the atom bomb will not suffice in this case, and an overwhelming air force is not enough to counterbalance the effects of a well-conducted infiltration.

Are We Arming Ourselves?

The thought is constantly being expressed that the Marshall Plan has been the thing which has made it possible for us to hold our own in the cold

war. Why is this? Because, naturally, it provided the economic foundation for the reconstruction, industrial production, and trade between the countries affected; making possible a raising of the standard of living in Europe. Dissatisfaction, discontent, and the cold war have not gained headway with us, and, if we have not won the cold war, we have, in any case, been able to limit its effects and strike back.

The East bloc's military strength becomes continually greater and constitutes a potential threat. Therefore, the free democracies have found it necessary to engage in a rapid augmentation of their military strength. This means the assumption of a great economic burden which will affect our ability to hold our own in the cold war.

This rearmament program already is beginning to create discontent, wage controversies, political unrest, and decreasing economic stability. When these burdens hit their peak, it will mean a crisis in the cold war, for the effects of this may mean that we have lost the war before it has begun.

We can beat that crisis, and, at the same time, win in strength of arms. However, we must maintain social group solidarity by making the "man in the street" - the common citizen - aware of the intimate connection between the cold war and actual warfare. He must be made to realize the fact that he, in his civilian clothes, in his daily life, and in his work, is as much a soldier in the cold war as the armed soldier is during actual combat.

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THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEW STATES*

By EDWARD SHILS

I. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLECTUALS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

THE gestation, birth, and continuing life of the new states of Asia and Africa, through all their vicissitudes, are in large measure the work of intellectuals. In no state-formations in all of human history have intellectuals played such a role as they have in these events of the present century.

In the past, new states were founded by military conquest, by the secession of ethnic groups led by traditional tribal and warrior chiefs, by the gradual extension of the power of the prince through inter-marriage, agreement, and conquest, or by separation through military rebellion. In antiquity, the demand that subjects acknowledge the divinity of the Emperor was no more than a requirement that the legitimacy of the existing order be recognized.¹ The interests of dynasty and kinship group, the lure of majesty, considerations of power, aspirations for office, and calculations of economic advantage have been the components of political decisions and the grounds for pursuit of power in the state. It is only in modern times in the West that beliefs about man's nature, his past, and his place in the universe, and about the ethical and metaphysical rightness of particular forms of political order—the concerns of intellectuals—have played an important part in public life.

In the West in modern times, however, politics—particularly civil politics—have never been a preserve of the intellectuals. Well-established aristocrats and landed gentry with ample leisure have provided much of the personnel of politics, both oligarchical and democratic; clergymen and high ecclesiastical officials and, above all, businessmen—the former earlier, the latter more recently—have likewise added to

* This article is a revised version of a paper presented at a conference on political modernization held under the auspices of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council at Dobbs Ferry in June 1959.

¹ The maxim of the Peace of Augsburg: *Cuius regio, eius religio*, was the beginning of the specifically modern view that a political order must be based on articulately affirmed beliefs. It too, however, was more concerned with the protection of dynastic interests and the guarantee of public order. The substance of the religion was less important than its acceptance, and in this way it differed from the more intrinsically ideological orientation toward politics that is characteristic of the modern intellectual.

the pool. Retired army officers, trade unionists and, of course, mere professional politicians of diverse occupational backgrounds have also been among the incumbents of or contenders for political office and the leaders in the agitation surrounding selection and decision. Intellectuals, too—professors and teachers, scientists, journalists, authors, etc.—have had a substantial share in all these activities. Radical, much more than conservative, politics have been their province, but there too they have had to share the territory with politicians and trade unionists who were not intellectuals. Modern revolutionary politics have been a domain very much reserved for intellectuals; even those who were not intellectuals by training or profession have been almost forced into becoming so by the ideological nature of modern revolutionary politics.

The prominence of intellectuals in the politics of the new states of Asia and Africa arises in part from the special affinity which exists between the modern intellectual orientation and the practice of revolutionary or unconstitutional politics, of politics which are uncivil in their nature. But even in the small space allotted to civil politics before the new states' acquisition of sovereignty and in its larger area since then, intellectuals have had a prominent position. They have not had to share their political role to the usual extent with the other participants in the building and ruling of states.

It was the intellectuals on whom, in the first instance, devolved the task of contending for their nations' right to exist, even to the extent of promulgating the very idea of the nation. The erosion of the conscience and self-confidence of the colonial powers was in considerable measure the product of agitational movements under intellectual leadership. The impregnation of their fellow-countrymen with some incipient sense of nationality and of national self-esteem was to a large extent the achievement of intellectuals, both secular and religious. The intellectuals have created the political life of the underdeveloped countries; they have been its instigators, its leaders, and its executants. Until Gandhi's emergence at the end of the First World War, they were its main followers as well, but this changed when the nationalist movement began to arouse the sentiments of the mass of the population.

One of the reasons for the political pre-eminence of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries is a negative one. There was practically no one else. In so many of the colonial countries, the princely dynasties were in decay, their powers and their capacities withered, even before the foreigners appeared. Chiefs and princes squirmed under

foreign rule; they intrigued and schemed, and at times even resorted to arms, but they organized no political movements and they espoused no ideology. They sought only, when they protested, to retain or regain their own prerogatives. There were no great noble families producing, in generation after generation, courtiers and ministers who with the emergence of modern forms of public politics moved over into that sphere as of right, as they did in Great Britain from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The traditional intellectuals, the custodians of sacred texts, usually—with a few great exceptions like al-Afghani—had no political concerns. They were interested in keeping their traditional culture alive, and this traditional culture had little political content other than to recommend leaving authority to those who already had it. They were ready to adapt themselves to any ruler, native or foreign, who left them alone to carry on their scriptural studies, their traditional teaching, and their observances.²

Moreover, there was generally no military force either to fight against the foreign ruler once he was established or to supply the educated personnel for a modern political movement.³ There was no military officer class except for a few subalterns in the jealously guarded army of the foreign ruler. There were many professional soldiers, but they were non-commissioned officers and other ranks and had no political interest whatsoever. The movement instigated in 1881 by the Egyptian Colonel Ahmed Orabi Pasha⁴ had no counterparts until the tremors and tribulations of independence began to be felt. There was no profession of politics which men entered early, usually from some other profession, and remained in until final and crushing defeat or the end of their lives. There were very few merchants and industrialists who out of civic and "material" interest took part in politics on a full or part-time scale—although many of them contributed substantially to the financial support of the nationalist and even the revolutionary movements. Prudence and the narrowness of their concerns kept businessmen out of politics. The "foreignness" of many business enterprisers in underdeveloped countries has further diminished the

² The religious reform movements like the Brahmo Samaj, Arya Samaj, the Ramakrishna Mission, and the Muslim Brotherhood which contributed so much to national consciousness were primarily movements for the purification of religious life, and for the reform of social institutions. Their political significance was either indirect or an afterthought.

³ The practitioners of the guerrilla warfare and terrorism which have been carried on in various parts of Asia and Africa against the European rulers have always included a significant admixture of intellectuals.

⁴ It was, in any case, more of a protest against unsatisfactory service conditions than a political movement.

significance of this class as a reservoir of political personnel. There was and there still is scarcely any endogenous trade union movement which produces its own leaders from within the laboring class, and there have been practically none of those self-educated workingmen who helped to give an intellectual tone to the European and American socialist and revolutionary movements in their early years. There was no citizenry, no reservoir of civility, to provide not only the audience and following of politics but the personnel of middle and higher leadership. In short, if politics were to exist at all in underdeveloped countries under colonial rule, they had to be the politics of the intellectuals.

The intellectuals did not, however, enter into the political sphere merely because other sections of the population forswore or abdicated their responsibilities. They entered because they had a special calling from within, a positive impetus from without.

II. THE INTELLECTUAL CLASS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

What Is an Intellectual? We deal here with the modern intellectuals of the new states—not with traditional intellectuals. Whom do we regard as modern intellectuals in the new states? The answer, in a first approximation, is: all persons with an *advanced modern education*⁵ and the intellectual concerns and skills ordinarily associated with it. For a variety of reasons, the present definition of the intellectuals is a less selective or discriminating one than we would use to designate the intellectuals in the more advanced countries. This is in no way condescension toward the new states. It is only an acknowledgment of the smaller degree of internal differentiation which has until now prevailed within the educated class in the new states, and the greater disjunction which marks that class off from the other sections of the society. It is also a recognition of a means of identification employed in the new states by the intellectuals themselves and by others.

⁵ This definition is ceasing to be adequate because the extension of opportunities for higher education is changing the composition and outlook of the group of persons who have availed themselves of these opportunities. Furthermore, the increase of those with an advanced technical or scientific and specialized education is creating a body of persons whose interests are narrower than their predecessors' in their own countries, and whose contact with the humanistic and political tradition of the hitherto prevailing higher education is becoming more attenuated. They themselves will not merely be different from the conventional political intellectuals of the colonial or recently colonial countries, but will also less frequently identify themselves as "intellectuals." This will make a considerable difference. In this respect, the underdeveloped countries will begin to approximate the more advanced countries.

This definition is not intended to deny the existence of a class of traditional intellectuals, largely religious in their concerns. Nor does it seek to obscure the influence of traditional intellectuals in political life (like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Darul Islam, etc.) or of traditional ideas on modern intellectuals.

In the new states, and in colonies which are shortly to achieve independence, the intellectuals are those persons who have become modern not by immersing themselves in the ways of modern commerce or administration, but by being exposed to the set course of modern intellectual culture in a college or university. Passage through this course of study is the qualification for being regarded as an intellectual, just as the possession of the diploma is regarded as a qualification for practicing a profession which is the prerogative of the intellectual. The "diplomatization" of society to which Max Weber referred, although it exists on a smaller scale than in Germany or Great Britain because there are fewer posts available, is as impressive in underdeveloped countries as in the advanced ones. It is not, however, the diploma which makes the intellectual. It is his prolonged contact with modern culture⁶ which does so. The diploma is only an emblem, however valuable, of a part of his outlook which he and others regard as vitally important. The possession of a *modern intellectual culture* is vital because it carries with it a partial transformation of the self and a changed relationship to the authority of the dead and the living.

The Occupational Structure of the Intellectuals: The professions of the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries are civil service, journalism, law, teaching (particularly college and university, but also secondary-school teaching), and medicine. These are the professions in which intellectuals are to be found and which require either intellectual certification or intellectual skill. (There are other professions with similar qualifications of certification and skill, such as engineering and accounting, which have usually been regarded as marginal to the circle within which the intellectuals dwell.)

The occupational structure which intellectuals enter in the underdeveloped countries is notably different from that of the more advanced countries. The occupational distribution of the intellectuals in underdeveloped countries is a function of the level of economic development and of their having only recently been colonial territories. Because they were impoverished countries, they lacked a fully differentiated middle class. They lacked and still lack a stratum of authors who could live from the sale of their literary products.⁷ They have only

⁶ This does not mean that all intellectuals in underdeveloped countries who possess diplomas are intellectually equal, or that all intellectuals possess diplomas. There are a few who do not.

⁷ By very rough methods I estimated that there might be as many as one hundred professional literary men in India who are able to maintain themselves by their writings. The Director of the *Sahitya Akademi* thinks that there are only about fifty. Think then of the size of this stratum in Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, or the Sudan!

a very meager class of technical intellectuals (electrical engineers, technologists, industrial chemists, statisticians, accountants). They have lacked the higher levels of scientific and humanistic personnel, the physicists, biologists, geneticists, historians, and philosophers who carry on the intellectual work which is the specific manifestation of the modern intellectual outlook.⁸

They lacked nearly all of these latter professions under colonial conditions, and most of the underdeveloped countries still lack most of them today under conditions of independence. In the colonial era, they lacked them because poverty and the absence of a significant development of industry prevented the emergence of demand for technical intellectuals, because illiteracy prevented the emergence of a market for literary products, and because the higher levels of modern intellectual creation and enquiry received no indigenous impulse and were too costly for poor countries to maintain. As a result, persons trained in those subjects found little opportunity for employment in their own country, and few therefore attempted to acquire these skills.⁹

Under colonial conditions, the underdeveloped countries lacked the effective demand which permits a modern intellectual class, in its full variety, to come into existence. Persons who acquired intellectual qualifications had only a few markets for their skills. The higher civil service was by all odds the most attractive of these, but opportunities were restricted because it was small in size and the posts were mainly preempted by foreigners. (In India in the last decade of the British Raj, there were only about 1,200 such posts in the Indian Civil Service and, of these, a little less than half were filled by Indians. In other countries, the number of posts was smaller and the proportion held by persons of indigenous origin was also much smaller.)

Journalism, as a result of generally widespread illiteracy, was a stunted growth and provided only a few opportunities, which were not at all remunerative. Journalism under colonial conditions was much more of an unprofitable political mission than a commercially attractive investment, and most of it was on a rather minuscule scale.

The medical profession was kept small by the costliness of the course

⁸ India is a very partial exception. It is practically alone in its possession of a large corps of intellectuals, a fair number of whom work at a very high level. This is partly a function of the much longer period that modern intellectual life has existed in India. The British stayed longer in India and exercised greater influence there than any other European power did in its colonial territory, and as a result many more modern intellectual institutions came into being.

⁹ There are other important reasons, growing out of the culture of these countries, which precluded interest in these fields. We do not deal with them here since our interest lies primarily in the political sphere.

of study, the absence of an effective demand for medical services, and the pre-emption of much of the senior level of the medical service by the government and its consequent reservation for foreigners.

Teaching at its lower levels was unattractive to intellectuals because it involved living in villages away from the lights and interests of the larger towns, and because it was extremely unremunerative. Nor were there many opportunities in it. On the secondary and higher levels, opportunities were also meager. Of all the underdeveloped countries, only India had an extensive modern college and university system before 1920; after that date, the additions to the Indian system of higher education came very slowly until the eve of the Second World War and the chaos which accompanied it. Outside of India there were at most only a few thousand posts available in institutions of higher learning in all of colonial Asia and Africa, and some of these were reserved for Europeans (and Americans, in the two American colleges of the Middle East). Thus opportunities for teaching on the upper levels of an extremely lean educational system were few. Where the authorities sought to maintain a high standard, they were very particular about whom they chose to employ. (It should be added that political considerations, at this time of nationalistic, anti-colonialist effervescence, likewise restricted the chances of entry, since many able young men disqualified themselves by the high jinks of adolescent politics during their student days.)

The Legal Profession: For these reasons, many of the intellectually gifted and interested who also had to gain their own livelihood entered the course of legal study and then the practice of the profession of the law. Entry to the legal profession was not restricted on ethnic grounds, the course of study was short and inexpensive and could be easily undertaken. There was, moreover, a considerable effective demand for legal services.

The colonial powers were concerned with order and justice and, in their various ways, had attempted to establish the rule of law in the colonial territories. The wealthy landowning classes and the newer wealthy merchants were frequently engaged in litigations in which huge sums were involved and the possibility for lawyers to earn handsome fees gave an éclat to the legal profession which only the higher civil service otherwise possessed.

Furthermore, in countries like India, Egypt, or Nigeria, for example, what else could a university or college graduate do with his qualifications if he did not wish to settle for a clerkship in the government or in a foreign commercial firm? The law schools were therefore able

to attract throngs of students. Once the legal qualification had been obtained, the young lawyer went into the nether regions of the bar, where he had much time for other interests. The leisure time of the young lawyer was a fertile field in which much political activity grew.

This existence of a stratum of underemployed young lawyers was made possible by their kinship connections. The aspirants to the intellectual professions in the underdeveloped countries almost always came from the more prosperous sections of society. They were the sons of chiefs, noblemen, and landowners, of ministers and officials of territories in which indirect rule existed, and of civil servants and teachers in countries under direct rule. In some countries, they occasionally came from prosperous mercantile families, though seldom in large numbers.

These social origins, against the background of the diffuse obligations accepted by members of an extended kinship system, meant that even where the income gained from a profession was inadequate to maintain a man and his immediate family, he could still continue to associate himself with the profession. The deficiencies in his earnings were made up by his kinsmen. Unlike teaching, the civil service, and most journalism, where membership in the profession is defined not merely by qualification and intermittent practice but by actual employment, a person need not earn a living by legal practice in order to be a lawyer. This is why the legal profession in nearly all the underdeveloped countries has been, before and since independence, crowded by a few very successful lawyers and a great number of very unsuccessful ones.

These are also some of the reasons why the legal profession supplied so many of the outstanding leaders of the nationalist movements during colonial times, and why the lawyer-intellectuals form such a vital part of the political elites of the new states.

Students: No consideration of the intellectual class in underdeveloped countries can disregard the university students. In advanced countries, students are not regarded as *ex officio* intellectuals; in underdeveloped countries, they are. Students in modern colleges and universities in underdeveloped countries have been treated as part of the intellectual class—or at least were before independence—and they have regarded themselves as such. Perhaps the mere commencement of an adult form of contact with modern intellectual traditions and the anticipation—however insecure—that acquisition of those traditions would qualify one for the *modern* intellectual professions conferred that status on university and college students and, derivatively, on secondary-school students.

The student enjoyed double favor in the eyes of his fellow-countryman. As one of the tiny minority gaining a modern education, he was becoming qualified for a respected, secure, and well-paid position close to the center of society, as a civil servant, teacher, or lawyer. As a bearer of the spirit of revolt against the foreign ruler, he gained the admiration and confidence of those of his seniors who were imbued with the national idea.

Formally, the student movements in the colonial countries began their careers only in the 1920's, but long before that the secondary schools, colleges, and universities had been a source of personnel for the more ebullient and aggressive nationalistic movements. Since the beginning of the present century, students have been in a state of turbulence. This turbulence flowed more and more into politics, until the students became vital foci of the national independence movements. The secondary schools, colleges, and universities attended by the students of underdeveloped countries became academies of national revolution. It was not the intention of the administrators and teachers that they should become such; rather, the contrary. Nonetheless they did, both in their own countries and in the metropolitan centers of London and Paris, where many of the most important architects of independence were trained, and where they found the intellectual resonance and moral support which sustained them in lean years.

The London School of Economics in particular has probably contributed much more to the excitation of nationalistic sentiment than any other educational institution in the world. At the School of Economics, the late Professor Harold Laski did more than any other single individual to hearten the colonial students and to make them feel that the great weight of liberal Western learning supported their political enthusiasm.

However, it was not only in the universities of London and Paris, but in shabby clubs and cafés, cheap hotels and restaurants, dingy rooming houses and the tiny cluttered offices of their nationalist organizations that the colonial students were educated in nationalism, acquired some degree of national consciousness, and came to feel how retrograde their own countries were and what they might be if only they became their own masters and modernized themselves. Personalities like Mr. Krishna Menon, Dr. Nkrumah, and Dr. Banda were themselves formed in these milieux, and in turn formed many of those who were to play an active part in the movement in their own countries.

The political propensities of the students have been, in part, products of adolescent rebelliousness. This has been especially pronounced

in those who were brought up in a traditionally oppressive environment and were indulged with a spell of freedom from that environment—above all, freedom from the control of their elders and kinsmen. Once, however, the new tradition of rebellion was established among students, it became self-reproducing. Moreover, the vocational prospectlessness of their post-university situation has also stirred the restiveness of the students.

The Unemployed Intellectual: In most underdeveloped countries during the colonial period, the unemployed intellectual was always a worry to the foreign rulers and to constitutional politicians, and a grievance of the leaders of the independence movement. He still remains a problem in the underdeveloped countries which have had a higher educational system for some length of time and which are not rapidly expanding their governmental staffs. In Ghana or Nigeria, there is a shortage of intellectuals and all graduates can find posts; in Pakistan, which inherited only a very small part of the higher educational system of British India, the government has tried to restrict entrance to the universities, especially in "arts" subjects. In India and Egypt, however, despite rapid expansion of opportunities for the employment of intellectuals in government, there has been a more than proportionate expansion in the number of university graduates and the problem remains as acute as ever.

Yet the difficulty is not so much "intellectual unemployment" as under- and mal-employment. Most of the graduates, sooner or later, do find posts of one sort or another, but they are not posts which conform with expectations. They are ill-paid, unsatisfying in status and tenure, and leave their incumbents in the state of restlessness which they experienced as students.

III. THE POLITICAL OUTLOOK OF THE INTELLECTUALS

Intense Politicization: The nature of the political movements which preceded independence and the indigenous traditions of the underdeveloped countries both forced political life into charismatic channels. Charismatic politics demand the utmost from their devotees.

When the intellectuals of the colonial countries were ready to engage in politics at all, they were willing to give everything to them. Politics became the be-all and end-all of their existence. Those who were not restrained by fear of the loss of their posts in government schools and colleges or by the material and psychological advantages of their jobs became highly politicized. Some of the intellectuals who graduated in the years of nationalistic fervor did not even attempt seriously to

enter upon a professional career but went directly into agitational and conspiratorial politics. Their middle-class origins and the economy of the extended family system, together with the relatively few needs of charismatically sensitive intellectuals, helped to make possible this consecration to politics. For these reasons and because an autonomous intellectual life in the modern sense had scarcely taken root in any of the underdeveloped colonial countries, politics of a very intense sort had the intellectual field largely to itself.

The high degree of political involvement of the intellectual in underdeveloped countries is a complex phenomenon. It has a threefold root. The primary source is a deep preoccupation with authority. Even though he seeks and seems actually to break away from the authority of the powerful traditions in which he was brought up, the intellectual of underdeveloped countries, still more than his confrere in more advanced countries, retains the need for incorporation into some self-transcending, authoritative entity. Indeed, the greater his struggle for emancipation from the traditional collectivity, the greater his need for incorporation into a new, alternative collectivity. Intense politicization meets this need. The second source of political involvement is the scarcity of opportunities to acquire an even temporary sense of vocational achievement; there have been few counterattractions to the appeal of charismatic politics. Finally, there has been a deficient tradition of civility in the underdeveloped countries which affects the intellectuals as much as it does the non-intellectuals. Let us consider each of these aspects.

The intellectual everywhere is concerned with his relations to authority. In underdeveloped countries, where authorities have tended on the whole to be more unitary, and where alternative authorities, and the authority of alternative traditions, have not yet emerged because of the small size of the primordial community and its relatively low degree of internal differentiation, the preoccupation of the intellectual with authority is all the greater. It is difficult for him to escape from a sense of its presence and a feeling of dependence on it. Such continuous presence, and the unindulgent attitude of traditional indigenous authority, once childhood has passed, breed resentment and antipathy which are submerged but not dissolved in the obedience required for the continuance of daily existence in the primordial community.

The external air of submission hides a deeper and unceasing enmity. Distant authority which has force at its disposal, which is impersonal, as bureaucratic authority must be, and which is not suffused with any

immediately apprehensible charisma, provides an easy target for this enmity.

When one shares in authority, when one "is" authority, as a leading politician of the ruling party or as a civil servant, the antagonism toward authority is curbed by the counterbalancing need to be absorbed into it. For an intellectual in an underdeveloped country, authority is usually something into which he must be absorbed or against which he must be in opposition. It is seldom something about which he can be neutral while he goes about his business. The very structure of the underdeveloped countries, both in their primordial and in their wider aspects, both during the colonial period and during independence, is such that one can never be indifferent about authority. It cannot be overlooked, one's "business" cannot be carried on without regard to it.

Distant authority carries with it none of the compensations and urgencies of immediately present and pervasive authority. Distance does not make for indifference among the politicized, among those whose passions are strong and no longer bound down by the weight of primordiality and tradition. The distance of authority renders revolt against it psychologically more practicable. Distant authority is "alien" authority. Even when it is ethnically "identical" with those over whom it rules, this "alienation" exists in those societies which are used to being ruled by visible and proximate authorities. (When distant authority is also ethnically alien, whether it be of the same general racial and cultural stock or as alien in color, cultural tradition, provenience, and physical appearance as the colonial authorities were, the impulse to revolt is all the stronger.)

The revolt against authority cannot, however, be complete and unequivocal. The need, from which no human being can ever wholly liberate himself, to be a member of an authoritative, transcendent collectivity remains. The individual, striving to emancipate himself from his primordial collectivity, must feel himself a part of some other more congenial, alternative collectivity. It must, moreover, be an authoritative one, a charismatically authoritative one. Where, in an underdeveloped society, with its relative churchlessness, its still feeble professional and civil traditions, and in the face of persisting particularistic loyalties, both subjective and objective, can the modern intellectual find such an authoritative collectivity? It is really only the "nation" which is at hand, and that organized body which represents the "nation"—namely, the "party of national independence."

This is one reason why the intellectual immerses himself, at least for a time, in intense political activities; it is why he seeks a "cause,"

an encompassing ideal. It is also the reason for the oppositional character of the politics of the intellectuals who themselves do not share in the authority. The belief in the efficacy of political action and in the political sources of evil and the remedies of evil also finds some of its explanation here. This is why the relatively unpolitical intellectual, or the intellectual who is indirectly connected with political affairs, the more specialized intellectual who wishes to work within his own professional intellectual tradition and to exercise his influence in the public sphere over the longer run and beyond the immediate disputes of the parties, is regarded as not being a "genuine intellectual" and even as a traitor to the ideals which the intellectual is properly called to serve.

The intense politicization of the intellectual is accentuated by the provision, through politics, of opportunities for individual effectiveness and achievement. In a society where status is traditionally determined by such primordial qualities as kinship connection, age, sex, and rank order within the family, the possibility of achievement, of making a mark on events by one's own actions, is minimal. In the larger society of the underdeveloped countries, although the narrower primordial determinants of status are to some extent transcended, the possibilities of achievement remain small. The opportunities for the satisfactory employment of an educated person under conditions of colonial rule were meager as long as the most authoritative positions in the civil service and in commerce were reserved to foreigners. They remain small under conditions of sovereignty as long as the economy is backward and posts integral to the modern part of the economy are relatively few, and as long as opportunities for specifically intellectual employment or the sale of the products of creative intellectual work are restricted.

The educated person acquires some degree of emancipation from the predominantly primordial tradition of status-determination. The content of this modern education, and its dissolution of the hold of traditional cultural standards and the traditional patterns of life, arouse in him the need to determine his status and his self-esteem by his own achievements. Where can such a person make his mark in a society which gives him little room to do so?

The political movement with its demands and challenges is almost the only arena open to him. A political movement, unlike a business firm or a university or a government department, can absorb as many people as apply to it. It can give him tasks to perform and it can thereby offer him the possibility of seeing the effects of his actions. By shooting,

demonstrating, marching, agitating, threatening and bullying, fighting, destroying, obstructing, helping to organize, running errands, distributing handbills and canvassing, he can see some effects and can believe in the importance of his deeds in thwarting or coercing a distant impersonal bureaucratic authority, or in serving the will of the new charismatic authority to which he gives himself.

Especially during the period of late adolescence and youth, when the impulses of self-assertion and the striving for individuality and creativity are at their height, and before the traditional system of status has reasserted its empire over him, politics seem to be the only field in which he can act with some expectation of satisfying effectiveness.

Once independence has been attained, the need for effectiveness and achievement does not die away. Politics remain a major alternative to apathetic idiocy or regression into the acceptance of the traditional pattern of life. Politics will in fact remain a major alternative open to the intellectuals for achievement and for absorption into a wider, no longer primordial collectivity as long as the underdeveloped societies remain underdeveloped. Only when they have become more differentiated occupationally, and when they have developed a sufficiently large and self-esteeming corps of professional intellectuals, carrying on the specifically intellectual professions with their own corporate traditions and corporate forms of organization, will the passionate sentiment and energy flow into channels other than the political.

Nationalism: The nationalism of the intellectuals usually made its first appearance alone, free from the complications of socialist and populist ideas. Only in those underdeveloped countries where the nationalist movement has come more lately on the scene has it been involved in other ideological currents which are not necessarily integral to it.

The nationalism of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries emerged at a time when there was little sense of nationality among the peoples whose nationality the intellectuals were proclaiming. Its first impetus seems to have come from a deepening of the feeling of distance between ruler and ruled, arising from the spatial and ethnic remoteness of the foreign rulers, and the dissolution of the particularistic tie which holds ethnically homogeneous rulers and ruled together. The identification of oneself as a subject of an unloved (however feared and respected) ruler with others who shared that subjection was one phase of the process. The discovery of the glories of the past, of cultural traditions, was usually but not always an action, *ex post facto*, which

legitimated the claims asserted on behalf of that newly imagined collectivity.¹⁰

The assimilation of modern culture, which, historically, was a foreign culture, was an essential element in this process. The first generation of constitutional politicians in most underdeveloped countries were relatively highly "Westernized." The usual antagonism toward the older generation made the next, younger generation more antagonistic toward Western culture, and encouraged their rudimentary attachment to the indigenous traditional culture to come forward a little more in their minds. This provided a matrix for the idea of a deeper national culture and, therewith, of the nation which had only to be aroused to self-awareness. It was neither a simple attachment to their indigenous culture nor a concretely experienced love of their fellow-countrymen which made the intellectuals so fervently nationalistic. These would have presupposed a prior sense of affinity, which for many reasons was lacking and often still is. In fact, however, "fellow-countrymen" became so to the modern intellectuals primarily by virtue of their common differentiation from the foreign ruler. Fierce resentment against the powerful, fear-inspiring foreign ruler was probably a much more significant factor than either a sense of affinity or a conscious appreciation of the traditional culture.

The resentment of the modern intellectual grew from several seeds: one of the most important was the derogation implied in the barrier against entry into or advancement in the civil service. The other, closely related to this, was the feeling of injury from insults, experienced or heard about, explicit or implicit, which the foreign rulers and their businessmen fellow-nationals inflicted on the indigenous modern intellectuals. Lord Curzon's derogatory remarks about the educated Bengali in his famous Calcutta University Convocation Address were only among the more egregious of an infinite multitude of such slights, injuries, and denigrations. The belittlement extended into every sphere of life, cultural, intellectual, religious, economic, political, and personal. A sense of distress and of anticipated insult became part of the indigenous intellectuals' relationship with foreigners for a long time. Even now in independence, the alertness to insult and the readiness to perceive it persist. They were at their height in the early period of nationalism.

The situation was rendered all the more insufferable by the genuine

¹⁰ The stirrings of religious reform and the effort to rehabilitate the dignity of the traditional religious culture became political only when there was an alliance of religious leaders with a politicized modern intelligentsia.

and positive appreciation which the native intellectuals often felt for the foreign culture, and their feeling of the inferiority of their own in comparison with it. Nationalism of an extremely assertive sort was an effort to find self-respect, and to overcome the inferiority of the self in the face of the superiority of the culture and power of the foreign metropolis.

It was therefore logical that prior to independence the politics of the intellectuals, once the movement for constitutional reform had waned, should have been concerned with one end above all others: national independence. It was generally assumed by most politicized intellectuals that any other desiderata would be automatically realized with the attainment of that condition. The actual attainment of independence and of a condition in which the tasks of political life have become as demanding and as diversified as they must inevitably become in a polity where the state takes unto itself so many powers and aspires to so much, has not greatly altered the situation. Nationalism still remains one of the greatest of all motive forces;¹¹ it underlies many policies to which it is not really germane and serves as a touchstone of nearly every action and policy.

The socialistic and the populistic elements in the politics of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are secondary to and derivative from their nationalistic preoccupations and aspirations. Economic policies have their legitimization in their capacity to raise the country on the scale of the nations of the world. The populace is transfigured in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of its "collective personality." The ancient culture is exhumed and renewed in order to demonstrate, especially to those who once denied it, the high value of the nation. Foreign policy is primarily a policy of "public relations" designed not, as in the advanced countries, to sustain the security of the state or enhance its power among other states, but to improve the reputation of the nation, to make others heed its voice, to make them pay attention to it and to respect it. The "world," the "imperialist world," remains very much on the minds of the intellectuals of the new states. It remains the audience and the jury of the accomplishments of the nation which the intellectuals have done so much to create.

Nonetheless, despite the pre-eminence of the nationalistic sensibility, it does not rest upon a *tabula rasa*, cleared of all other attachments. The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are not as "uprooted," as

¹¹ Although it is by no means the chief reason, this nationalistic concentration is a significant factor in accounting for the poverty and uniformity of intellectual life of the underdeveloped countries.

"detribalized," as they themselves sometimes assert with so much melancholy, or as, with more spite, their foreign and domestic detractors often allege. They have remained attached in many ways to their traditional patterns of social life and culture. These deeper attachments include parochial attachments to their own tribes and ethnic and caste communities, and almost inevitably seek expression in public policies and in domestic political alignments. The presence of these attachments is a supplementary generator of nationalistic sentiment. It is against them, and in an effort to overcome them—within themselves and in their fellow-countrymen—that many intellectuals in underdeveloped countries commit themselves so fervently to intense nationalism.

By a similar process, the extensive use of a foreign language in daily intellectual life also feeds the force of nationalism. The intellectuals' very large amount of reading in French and English and their feeling of continued dependence on these cultures, their continuing and still necessary employment of French or English for their own cultural creations and even for political, administrative, and judicial purposes, and their awareness of the slow and painful course through which their nation must pass before its own language becomes adequate to the requirements of modern life cannot avoid touching their sensibilities. The constant reaffirmation of their nationalistic attachment is an effort to assuage this wound.

Socialism: The socialism of the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries grows, fundamentally, from their feeling for charismatic authority, from their common humanity, and from the anti-chrematistic traditions of their indigenous culture. More immediately, it is a product of the conditions and substance of their education, and of their nationalistic sensibility.

The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries are, in general, devotees of authority, even though they may be inflamed against some particular authority. They regard the existing distribution of authority as the source of present economic and social inequities and they seek a new distribution of authority as the instrument to abolish them. Their critical view of the state as it exists at present in their own country is partly a manifestation of their distrust of impersonal authority and of their faith in a more charismatic alternative.¹² They do not believe in the capacities of businessmen to increase the well-being of the nation. They have little sympathy, conscious or unconscious, with the man who is engaged in the pursuit of wealth.

None of the great traditional cultures gives a high rank to the

¹² *Vide* the Gandhian socialists and the Bhoojan movement in India.

merchant; even when they revolt against the traditional culture, or slip away from it unwittingly, the intellectuals usually retain that part of it which allots no high place to the businessman. In their mind, the life of the businessman is unheroic; it is untouched by sacredness and they will have none of it. Intellectuals very seldom seek careers in private business; when necessity forces them into it, they are ill at ease and restless. The intellectual who works for a private business firm lays himself open to the charge of having deserted his calling, even though he has deserted it no more than a civil servant or a lawyer. The notion of an economic system ruled by the decisions of businessmen, out to make a profit for themselves, is repugnant to the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries—even more than it is in advanced countries, where the businessman does not fare very well either at the hands of the intellectuals.

As long as the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries pursued the paths of constitutional reform and confined their attention to administration and representation, these deeper dispositions whose source was the traditional indigenous culture did not enter into their politics. They accepted most of the existing regime. When, however, they began to direct their attention to the society and the nation, when they ceased being politically "superficial" and began to touch on politically "sacred" things, the socialist potentiality of their fundamental orientation became more manifest.

These inner developments within the intelligentsia of underdeveloped countries coincided with the upsurge of socialist thought among the European intellectuals. To these, the intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries felt drawn. The attractive power of the metropolis was enhanced by the congeniality of intellectual socialism. From the 1920's to the 1940's, the example of the late Professor Harold Laski elicited and fortified the socialistic disposition of many young intellectuals of the English-speaking underdeveloped countries; Jean-Paul Sartre has played a parallel role among the French-speaking intellectuals from 1945 onward.

The spread of socialistic ideas was aided by the large-scale migration of Asian and African intellectuals to Europe for further study and professional training. The great stream of Asians to European educational centers began in the 1890's; their intensive politicization, in the 1920's. The stream of the African students began in the 1920's and became much wider after 1945. From the end of the First World War and the Russian Revolution, the young Asians and Africans, impelled by events in the world and at home, found themselves in an atmosphere

which gave the encouragement of a nearly universal assent to their socialist aspirations.

The association between socialism as a domestic policy and hostility toward an imperialistic foreign policy—a connection which is inherent in the postulates of socialist thought and its Leninist variant, although not all socialists have at all times shared it—made European, and especially British and French, socialism even more acceptable to the Asian and African students who came to the intellectual capitals of the European metropolis.

To these factors which made socialism appear such a bright ideal should be joined the nature of large-scale business enterprise in their own countries. In practically all instances, large-scale business enterprise in the underdeveloped countries was owned and controlled by foreign capitalists. Not just the Europeans, and latterly the Americans, owned large firms in Africa and Asia, but Chinese, Syrians, Lebanese, Parses, Armenians, Greeks, and Italians, away from their own countries, showed exceptional enterprise. Encountering few indigenous competitors, they built up extensive organizations and ample fortunes in underdeveloped countries. The ethnic diversity and separateness of the peoples, even within large, centrally governed countries, often brought about a situation in which private businessmen who were of the same "nationality" as those in the midst of whom they lived and conducted their affairs, but who were of a different "community," were regarded as outsiders who had no moral claims on the loyalty of the intellectuals. Businessmen, by the nature of their calling, could never be part of the "people"; their ethnic distinctness was a further justification for treating them as alien to the "people."

On the other side, a socialistic economic system conducted in accordance with principles which are of intellectual origin, guided by persons who are imbued with these "principles," seems to be the only conceivable alternative to a privately operated economy. The intellectuals who dare to differ from such obvious conclusions constitute a small fraction of the intellectual classes in most of the underdeveloped countries, both colonial and sovereign.

The socialism of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries, it should also be stressed, is a product of their pained awareness of the poverty of their own countries. The heightening of national sensibility led perforce to the discovery of the "people." Agitational activities brought them into contact with the "people"; the vague doctrine of nationalism, even in its liberal form, brought the idea of the "people" into the consciousness of the intellectuals. Often, too, on return from

a period of foreign study where they had encountered socialist ideas and experienced a heightened national consciousness, the sight of their impoverished fellow-countrymen had a traumatic force. Confrontation with the poverty of their country evoked anguish and desperation in many intellectuals. They have been humiliated by their sense of the backwardness of their country. They have learned how gradually the advancement of the Western countries has moved, and they have heard of the speedy progress of the Soviet Union from a backward country to the status of one of the most powerful industrial nations in the world. What could be more harmonious with their present perceptions, their aspirations, and their background than to espouse a socialist solution to their unhappy problem? And if to this is added the fact that their countries have been held in subjection by capitalistic countries and the socialist countries proclaim their hostility to imperialism, the disposition toward socialism receives another impulsion.

Populism: The populism of intellectual politics in underdeveloped countries has a familial affinity to the populism of the intellectuals of more advanced countries during the past century and a half. It is a part of a universal process consequent on the emergence of an incipient and fragmentary world-wide intellectual community. It is a phenomenon of the tension between metropolis and province which arises from the trend toward that world-wide intellectual community.

The populism of the intellectuals is German in origin. It was a critique of the pretensions of a worldly, urban, and urbane authority. It was a critique of the feebleness of the petty elites of the system of *Kleinstaaterei*, alongside the grandeur of the Holy Roman Empire, and of the Germany which could emerge if the regime of the princelings could be abolished and all of Germany unified. It was a critique of the central institutional system, and particularly of the claims of the state, of the universities, and of the ecclesiastical authorities to embody what was essential in their society and of their insistence, on that basis, on their right to rule over it. It was a rejection of the urban bourgeoisie. It was a denial that the "nation" could be found in existing authoritative institutions and an assertion that the root of the future lay in the "folk."

In Russia, populism was a product of a similar situation, aggravated by resentment against a prevailing enchantment by the West, which was more pronounced than the Francophilia of the princely courts against which the first generations of romantic German populism had been a reaction. In Russia, the intellectuals had carried on a passionate love affair with Western Europe and many had been disappointed and

had even come to feel guilty for deserting their "own" for foreign idols. Alienated from their own authorities of state, church, and university, hostile to their own mercantile bourgeoisie, disillusioned with Western European socialism after its failures in the revolutions of 1848, it had nowhere to turn except to the "people," whom it glorified as a repository of wisdom and as the source of Russia's salvation.

American populism was not very different in its general origins. It, too, was the product of a reaction against the Anglophilic intellectual elite of the Eastern seaboard and the political and industrial elites who ruled the country from the Eastern cities. In America, too, therefore, it was an effort to find a firm foundation for intellectuals who were alienated from the authorities of their society and from their xenophilic fellow-intellectuals. In America also it was a phase of the struggle of province against metropolis.

In the underdeveloped countries, the process has been essentially the same. Alienated from the indigenous authorities of their own traditional society—chiefs, sultans, princes, landlords, and priests—and from the rulers of their modern society—the foreign rulers and the "Westernized" constitutional politicians (and since independence, politicians of the governing party)—the intellectuals have had only the "people," the "African personality," the "Indian peasant," etc., as supports in the search for the salvation of their own souls and their own society.

The "people" are a model and a standard; contact with them is a good. Esteem and disesteem are meted out on the basis of "closeness to the people" or distance from them. It is a common worry of and an accusation against the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries that they are "out of touch with the people," uprooted, *déraciné*, "brown" or "black" (as the case may be) "Englishmen" or "Frenchmen," etc. Many make the accusation against themselves, most make it against their fellow-intellectuals.

Factually it is usually quite untruthful. Most intellectuals in underdeveloped countries are not as "cut off" from their own culture as they and their detractors suggest. They live in the middle of it, their wives and mothers are its constant representatives in their midst, they retain close contact with their families, which are normally steeped in traditional beliefs and practices. The possession of a modern intellectual culture does remove them, to some extent, from the culture of their ancestors, but much of the latter remains and lives on in them.¹³

¹³ Much of the intellectuals' self-accusation rests on the populistic assumption that the "people," not being distracted or corrupted by modern culture, are the bearers of the traditional culture in its fullness and its glory. This assumption is probably an er-

The experience to which the allegation of being "cut off" from the "people" refers is not to any serious extent a real result of the intellectuals' acceptance of the "foreign," modern culture. It rests rather on their own feeling of distance from the rest of their fellow-nationals, which is a product of the ethnic, tribal, kinship, and caste particularism of these underdeveloped societies and of the consequent lack of a true sense of civil affinity with the rest of their fellow-countrymen. It is the resultant of the superimposition of a nationalistic ideology, which demands fellow-feeling, on a narrower particularism, inharmonious with it and psychologically contradictory to it. There is a genuine feeling of strain; all the burden of this strain is put upon the fact that they possess some elements of an exogenous culture.

The frequent reiteration of the charge testifies to an awareness of this tension, and the choice of the foreign culture as its focus is a manifestation of a desire to find a way out which will conform to the requirements of ideological nationalism. Because the intellectuals assert it and, to some extent, believe it, they often try to make amends for it by some form of nativism, which extols the traditional ways of the people and juxtaposes them with modern and thus "foreign" ways.

This nativistic reaction accentuates demagogic political tendencies, and fosters a race among contenders for the distinction of being more "for" the "people" or more "akin" to them. It accentuates prejudice against the educated and a hostility against the modern education which the intellectuals of the new states need if they are to perform intellectual functions in a productive way, and without which they would not be intellectuals and their countries would flounder and sink.

Nonetheless, despite this preoccupation with the "people," the populism of the intellectuals of underdeveloped countries does not necessarily bring with it either intimacy with the ordinary people, a concrete attachment to them, or even a democratic attitude. It is compatible with them but it does not require them. It is equally compatible with a dictatorial regime which treats the people as instruments to be employed in the transformation of the social and economic order, and their culture and outlook as a hindrance to progress.

Populism can be the legitimating principle of oligarchical regimes, as well as of democratic regimes and of all the intermediate types. The "people" constitute the prospective good to be served by government policy, and they serve as the emblem of the traditional culture which

ror; the "people" are quite unlikely to be in more than fragmentary possession of the corpus of traditional culture.

is thus glorified even while it is being eroded and its traditional custodians disregarded or disparaged.

Oppositionism: The populism of the intellectual is a product of opposition to the authorities who rule at home and to the foreign culture which fascinates him and his fellow-intellectuals in his own country. It is one facet of an oppositional syndrome.

The origins of this inclination to oppose constituted authority seem, at first glance, easy to locate. Practically all politics in the colonial period, once the constitutional phase had passed, consisted and still consist of root and branch opposition. Whether they took the form of conspiracy, sabotage, riots, assassination, clandestine or open journalism, public meetings, boycotts, demonstrations and processions, civil disobedience or unco-operative participation in representative institutions, opposition and obstruction of the foreign ruler were the main aims. Where it was impossible to share in the responsible exercise of authority, opposition was in fact the only alternative.

The degree of alienation from the constituted authority varied but it was almost always deeper and more drastic than the opposition which exists in advanced pluralistic societies.¹⁴ It was the opposition of politicians excluded or withdrawn from the constitutional order, who accepted neither the rules nor the ends of the prevailing system. It was, therefore, the opposition of politicians who refused in principle to consider the problems of the government as real tasks needing resolution. It was an opposition which was convinced by situation, temperament, and principle that it would never share authority with the foreign ruler. The only authority to which it aspired was complete and exclusive control of the entire machinery of state. Until that point was reached, its only policy was opposition.

The oppositional attitude of the intellectuals has another point of origin far removed from the political experience of a colonial situation. In most underdeveloped countries the traditional character of the culture sustains diffuseness in the exercise of authority. Diffuse authority, omnicompetent in the tasks facing the society, at least according to legendary beliefs, derives its legitimacy in part from its comprehensive effectiveness. Even though the substantive actions performed by such diffuse traditional authorities are no longer respected by intellectuals, the older pattern of expectation persists. Specific, delimited, im-

¹⁴ Its only parallel in the West is the conduct of the Irish members in the House of Commons in the latter part of the last century and of Communistic members of European parliaments when they were a small minority and did not seek a popular front. The "Irish members" had considerable resonance in India and their influence still survives, even where its origin has been forgotten.

personal, constitutional authority gives the appearance of being a weak authority, an unloving one which possesses no inner relationship with the ruled. The diffuseness of a charismatic authority is desired, and the bureaucratic rule of the foreign power or of its sovereign indigenous successor arouses little enthusiasm or even willing acknowledgment of any deeper legitimacy. The intellectuals of underdeveloped countries, despite their immersion in modern culture and their overt acceptance of modern political principles, are at bottom averse to a relatively weak, self-limiting government, even when that government is their own, bound to them by common ethnic ties, a common culture, and comradeship in the struggle for independence.

This is one of the underlying grounds for the widespread disillusionment which overcomes so many intellectuals in underdeveloped countries after independence. It must be remembered that, whatever has happened since, practically every new state of the postwar world began as a modern constitutional regime of representative institutions and public liberties. They have all had to employ modern bureaucratic methods of administration, even when they lacked the requisite personnel. They have tried to operate the rule of law. They all began as remote impersonal machines, exercising authority without the diffuseness of charisma or tradition. Their equilibrium has depended on a great charismatic personality who, at the peak of the governmental mountain, offset the distaste for bureaucratic-legal rule.

Thus, the establishment of a tradition of opposition in political life has, as has happened so often in almost every sphere of life in underdeveloped countries, coincided with a fundamental disposition resting on an indigenous cultural tradition.

It would be wrong perhaps to claim a universal validity for a generalization which could be drawn from Max Weber's criticism of Bismarck and the paralyzing influence which his autocracy in the Reichstag exerted on the opposition parties of that body. It was Max Weber's view that the irresponsible opposition which the Bismarckian regime and its Wilhelmine successor evoked would make the opposition parties incapable of responsible, efficient rule when they were given the opportunity to govern. He also asserted—and this is more important for our present discussion—that they would become incapable of conducting themselves as a responsible opposition, working within the rules of the parliamentary game. In certain of the underdeveloped countries, this generalization does not seem to be applicable. In India, for example, certain of the intellectual politicians, and above all the Prime Minister, have shown great adaptability in turning from a condition of complete

and irreconcilable opposition to a responsible hard-headed exercise of authority, and some of the socialists and independents conduct their opposition in a most intelligent and responsible manner. The same obtains in varying degrees in Ghana and in Tunisia. Certain intellectual politicians have shown considerable capacity to rule, even though they have not been as democratic or liberal as they once aspired to be or as Mr. Nehru has succeeded in being. Not a few firebrands of the days of the independence movement have turned out to be responsible parliamentarians of the highest order.

Nonetheless, much truth remains in Max Weber's proposition. The intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries since they acquired independence, insofar as they are not in authority, do incline toward an anti-political, oppositional attitude. They are disgruntled. The form of the constitution does not please them and they are reluctant to play the constitutional game. Many of them desire to obstruct the government or give up the game of politics altogether, retiring into a negative state of mind about all institutional politics or at least about any political regime which does not promise a "clean sweep" of the inherited order.

Incivility: Although the intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries have created the idea of the nation within their own countries, they have not been able to create a nation. They are themselves the victim of that condition, since nationalism does not necessarily become citizenship. Membership in a nation which is sovereign entails a sense of affinity with the other human beings who make up the nation. It entails a sense of "partness" in a whole, a sense of sharing a common substance. This feeling of being part of the whole is the basis of a sense of concern for its well-being, and a sense of responsibility to it and for it. It transcends ineluctable divisions, softening them and rendering them tolerable to civil order, regarding them as less significant than the underlying community of those who form the nation. In political life, these dispositions form the virtue of civility.

Civility has hitherto not been one of the major features of the politicized intelligentsia of the underdeveloped countries. An intense politicization is difficult to bring into harmony with civility. Intense politicization is accompanied by the conviction that only those who share one's principles and positions are wholly legitimate members of the polity and that those who do not share them are separated by a steep barrier. The governing party in many sovereign underdeveloped states, and those intellectuals who make it up or are associated with it, tend to believe that those who are in opposition are separated from them by

fundamental and irreconcilable differences. They feel that they *are* the state and the nation, and that those who do not go along with them *are* not just political rivals but *total* enemies. The sentiments of the opposition are, *mutatis mutandis*, scarcely different. These are the fruits of intense politicization.

The incivility of the politicized intellectuals has a history which precedes their birth. Traditional societies, based on kinship and hierarchy, are not civil societies. They do not know the phenomenon of citizenship, since rights and obligations are not functions of membership in a polity determined by territorial boundaries. The primordial qualities of traditional societies—kinship, age, sex, locality, etc.—are not qualities which define the citizen. In a pluralistic society they are not by any means incompatible with citizenship. In the more unitary, traditional society, they suffocate incipient civility.

The moral structure of the independence movement has enabled this uncivil tradition to persist. The independence movement conceived of itself as the embodiment of the nation, and after its victory it became and conceived of itself as identical with the state. Given the oppositional dispositions which come to the surface in parliamentary and journalistic circles not attached to the government party, there often appears to be a semblance of justification for the belief of an impatient and hypersensitive government that the opposition is subversive of the state and cannot be reconciled to it.

This does not imply that there are not civil intellectuals in every underdeveloped country, some of them in the government, some of them in opposition, and some in journalism, the universities, and the other liberal professions. They are, however, in a marked minority. The traditions by which they are sustained, although they do exist in some of the states, are frail.

IV. THREE STAGES IN THE POLITICS OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

The First Stage--(a) Constitutional liberalism: The first efflorescence of the modern intellectual in the underdeveloped countries occurred roughly between the years when India was recovering from the trauma of the Mutiny and its repression and the First World War. In the few countries where there was anything of a class with a modern education and a certain amount of political stirring, these were the years of constitutional liberalism, eloquently and courteously argued. This first stage came considerably later to Black Africa and lasted a shorter time than

it did in British India and the Middle East. In Southeast Asia, too, the course of development was greatly telescoped. The backwardness of Southeast Asia and Black Africa in the construction of modern cultural and legal institutions, and the smaller numbers of persons who went abroad for higher studies, resulted in a much smaller intellectual class than in India, and a later, briefer, and feebler life of constitutional liberalism. Where the intellectual class scarcely existed, politics could only be embryonic.

This was the stage of the politics of lawyers and journalists. Their politics were the politics of *honoriares*. They were well-educated men, many of whom had studied in the metropolitan countries; they had absorbed and appreciated something of the metropolitan culture and the liberal constitutional political outlook, which, in the circles in which they moved in the France and Great Britain of that period, appeared to be almost unchallenged.

They were not revolutionaries and they did not always aspire to independence, at least, not in the immediate future. One of their main grievances in this earliest phase was the restriction of the right of entry of their fellow-countrymen into the civil service which ruled their country on behalf of the foreign sovereign. They also desired that legislative institutions should be a little more representative of persons like themselves. These two concerns could be interpreted crudely as a manifestation of a narrow class interest, but they were actually broader and better than that.¹⁵ There were serious grounds, in their own self-image, for their claim to share in the administration of the country and for a vote in the determination of the budget.

They had been brought up in a hierarchical tradition in which the landowning classes and the learned, in their own view and that of others, were the possessors of a "stake in the country." Insofar as it was a country, they felt it to be "theirs," and "theirs" almost exclusively. Many came from families which had in the past exercised great influence and which, in the countryside, still continued to do so. It was therefore part of their conception of the right order of things that they

¹⁵ Nor were these their only interests. They proposed the liberalization of the legal system, greater equity in its administration, and certain liberal social reforms such as the improvement of the legal position of women, the provision of more ample educational facilities, etc.

Obviously, there was some element of "class" and "self-interest" in some of their demands, such as the insistence that imported foreign manufacturers should not be allowed to enjoy any advantages over indigenously produced industrial goods. The interest of the whole society, the interest of a class and of an individual might all coincide on particular issues. This is probably the most that can be credited to the charge against the first generation made by the actors who came on the political stage a little later.

should share in the ruling of their own country, under a sovereign whom they were not in the main inclined to challenge in principle.

The liberal constitutional ideas which they acquired in the course of their mainly legal studies fitted in with their conceptions. Europe was boiling with democratic agitation—the labor and socialist movements were in process of formation. In the main, however, the very small trickle of Africans and the larger numbers of Asians who before the First World War went to the metropolis for advanced studies did not, on the whole, come into contact with these circles. They wanted a liberal governmental and legal order in the administration of which they could share.

Since they were largely lawyers, they developed the rhetorical skills and the self-confidence in dealing with authority which are an indispensable part of the equipment of the modern politician.¹⁶ The structure of legal practice also gave them the time and the resources to absent themselves from their professional activities. As the occasion demanded, they were able, while still continuing to practice their professions, to devote themselves to public agitation, to attend and address meetings, to write books, pamphlets, and articles for the press, to meet representatives of their rulers from time to time in order to argue their claims, and to participate in consultative and representative bodies.

Side by side with this form of lawyers' politics, a daily and periodical press struggled to come into existence, largely in the metropolitan language but also in the indigenous languages. The journalists were not professionals. They were often political lawyers who had either left their profession or practiced it alongside of journalism; there were also among them men who had been teachers, or who had aspired to join the government service, or had actually been in governmental employ. They were usually well-educated men, with the gravity of the Victorian and Continental bourgeois liberals whom they admired. All this gave dignity and decorum to the political life of that stage of political development.

As journalists, they were not following a career in the material sense of the word. They were not trying to become rich. They were not interested in being purveyors of news and diversion. They were not seeking a livelihood in journalism. Where they could not gain their livelihood from journalism or from their auxiliary professions, they unquestioningly relied on the support of their kinsmen and patrons

¹⁶ It seems to me not accidental that even now the highest flights of Indo-Anglian prose have the rhetorical quality of high-grade lawyers addressing a court or a parliamentary body.

They were journalists because there was a small literate public which could be reached and rendered coherent and articulate on behalf of the ideal of constitutional government in which the best-qualified of the ruled would have some hand.

These journalists and lawyer-politicians had few followers other than themselves, i.e., like-minded men in similar stations of life, such as liberal businessmen or princes, chiefs, and landowners. Leaders and followers together constituted no more than a small group. Only in India were the absolute numbers fairly large. In the Middle East they were fewer, and in the rest of Africa and in Southeast Asia their numbers were negligible. Nonetheless they created, by their activity, the foundations of a still surviving tradition of the modern intellectuals in politics.

They did not have the field to themselves, even at the time of their greatest pre-eminence. They were being challenged by a more aggressive group, less ...plaisant toward their Western rulers and toward Western culture. These new rivals claimed that constitutional tactics led nowhere. They were the forerunners of the political type which came to the center of the political arena in the second stage. During the first stage, however, there was also another trend of intellectual activity which profoundly affected subsequent political developments, though it was not in itself primarily political or even political at all.

(b) *Moral renewal*: An impassioned effort of religious and moral self-renewal accompanied the development of political life of the under-developed countries during their colonial period. It was at first a feature of the countries which possessed conspicuous evidence of great indigenous achievements in the past—i.e., of the countries with a literary and architectural inheritance which in the midst of present degradation could remind contemporaries that their country had once been great. It was therefore also a characteristic of countries with an indigenous traditional intelligentsia made up of the custodians of sacred writings. Thus it was that in India and in the Middle East, through much of the nineteenth century, protagonists of the traditional cultures, and particularly of the religions of Hinduism and Islam, sought to purify their inheritance, to restore it to its pristine greatness or to fuse it with modern elements. Both in India and in the Middle East, the aim was to reinstate the dignity of the traditional religious culture, and the society which was based on it, and thereby to establish its worth in the face of the encroachment of Western culture and religion.¹⁷

¹⁷ Movements to "re-establish" the glory of African civilization are a much later product.

This movement to evoke a national self-consciousness, through the renewal of cultural traditions which had been allowed to decay, was not directly political. There was not much contact between the modern men who represented constitutional liberalism, and the energetic, pious traditionalists.¹⁸ The two movements seemed to run almost independently of each other; there was no antagonism between them, often little mutual awareness.

The agents of moral renewal were not secular social reformers. They were not modern intellectuals in the sense of the word used here. They were men of the traditional culture who were sufficiently sensitive to the impact of modern culture to feel the need to reaffirm their own.¹⁹ Their task was the cleansing of the cultural—and this meant largely religious—inheritance of their society from what they claimed were historically accidental accretions which had brought it into disrepute among modern men and allowed their country to sink in the world's esteem and in its own and, particularly, to appear enfeebled and unworthy in comparison with Western achievements. They claimed that what was essential in their religious traditions could—by restoration and cleansing or by syncretism—be reformulated in an idiom more appropriate to the modern situation, and that if this were done, it would recommend itself to their fellow-countrymen who were needlessly and even perniciously enamored of Western culture. They were not unqualifiedly fanatical enemies of Western culture. They claimed that much of what it had to offer—particularly science, technology, and forms of organization—were necessary for the improvement of their countries and the re-establishment of their greatness among the nations. They insisted, however, that their countrymen must not lose their own souls to the West. They must instead rediscover their own essential being by the acceptance of a new and purer version of their own cultural tradition.

The older generation of modern "Victorian" intellectuals did not pay much heed to these preachments, although they were not hostile. In the next stage of political development, this effort of moral rediscovery and self-renewal had very profound repercussions. When, in the second stage, constitutional liberalism seemed to disappear or to be confined in a very narrow space, the movement of moral and religious reform was taken up and developed into a passionate nationalism. Now,

¹⁸ There were of course exceptions like al-Afghani, Mohammed Abdou, and M. G. Ranade.

¹⁹ Their influence made itself felt, however, in both India and the Middle East, primarily among modern intellectuals. They exerted little effect on their fellow traditional intellectuals, who persisted in their torpor.

Even where the religious element in the traditional culture is passed over, praise of the essence of the traditional culture has become a plank in the platform of every movement for independence and of every new state.

The Second Stage: From constitutional liberalism and religious-moral renewal, the intellectuals of the colonial countries passed to a fervently politicized nationalism. With this shift, there also occurred a shift in the mode of political action and its audience.

India was the first of all the underdeveloped colonial countries to execute this movement; it was the one in which the traditional indigenous culture was richest and most elaborate and in which that culture had developed most systematically and comprehensively. It was also the country where the foreign rulers had been longest established in a thoroughgoing way and where the contact of the indigenous intellectuals with a metropolitan Western culture had given birth to a longer and richer modern tradition than was possessed by any other country of Asia or Africa. It was the country with the largest and most differentiated modern intelligentsia. The first long phase of fascination with the West had already begun, in the India of the 1880's, to produce from within itself a reaction in favor of more purely Indian things.

This was also the time of growing strength in the socialist movement in Europe and of the growth of anarchism. Terrorism was in the ascendancy in Russia and Ireland. Tales of the Russian underground spread in Asia, together with the repute and glory of the deeds of the "Nihilists" in Russia, the Sinn Fein in Ireland, and the Carbonari in Italy. Mazzini, Stepnyak, and Kropotkin were names well known among the younger generation of Indian intellectuals. Yeats was becoming a figure of weight among the literary intelligentsia and along with this went a feeling for the Irish Renaissance and a belief in the possibilities of a comparable Indian Renaissance. The writings of these *rishi*s became known in India, imported from England; some of them appeared in Bengali translations.

The new generation which came to the surface of public life around the turn of the century was no longer content with constitutional agitation, or with such limited goals as more places in the Indian Civil Service and more consultative and deliberative institutions in which Indians would be amply represented. Indian traditional culture was being revived through the Ramakrishna Mission and the Arya Samaj, and a new Indian self-consciousness took hold of young men who, while not deeming themselves religious, were possessed by a profound resonance toward traditional Indian symbols. The Maharashtrian and

Bengali terrorists gave no thought to the kind of social or political order which they wished to see established. They wished only to have India free of foreign rule, free to be itself, in its own Indian way.

Parallel developments a third of a century later could be seen in areas as far apart as the Gold Coast and Egypt. A half-century later, they began to appear in East Africa. The same pattern was visible in more foreshortened form in Syria and Iraq. The proportions and the tone of the movements in these smaller countries, with much smaller intelligentsias, have been roughly what they were in India.

In these smaller countries, too, there was a tendency to regard the older generation of liberal constitutionalists and piecemeal reformers as excessively subservient to the foreign rulers and as excessively bemused by their foreign culture and their foreign forms of government. The later, populistic phase of intellectual politics, which in a variety of forms continues into the present, only intensified and made more complex and luminous an already established pattern. The generally socialistic orientation of the politics of the Asian and African intellectuals, which took form after the First World War and became preponderant after the Second World War, in a similar fashion only elaborated the inherent potentiality of intense nationalism.

The intensification of political concerns was the outgrowth of the earlier political interest, in fusion with the more acute sense of nationality which the heightened awareness of the traditional indigenous culture had helped to arouse. The politics of the "second generation" touched a very much deeper chord than that which the earlier generation had reached; it is a chord which still vibrates. The greater depth of the new political movement meant also that it was more passionate, more in the complete possession of politics. The fundamental politicization of the intelligentsia of Asia and Africa led to the discrediting of the first liberal generation. The politics of cultured and urbane gentlemen, speaking French or English to perfection, interested in much else besides politics, was not for this generation.

The politics of the second generation received a further powerful impetus from its participation in a cosmopolitan movement, in which *foreign*, Western countries were involved. The intellectuals of the second generation, like those who preceded and those who have followed, were also held by their attachment to Western culture. The extremist nationalist movements in Asia and subsequently in Africa had a Western legitimation for their strivings. They drew inspiration and comfort from abroad, they felt that their actions were one with a mighty surge all over the world, a surge toward a new order of freedom,

with possibilities unknown and unregarded.²⁰ This sense of being a part of the larger world infused into the politics of the second generation the permanently bedeviling tension between province and metropolis, and added, as it always does, the heat which arises from conflicting loyalties.

When the second generation was still in its youth in India, and only in conception in other Asian and African colonial countries, the Russian Revolution took place. Only a little while thereafter M. K. Gandhi established his ascendancy over the political scene in India.²¹ These two events precipitated the populistic consciousness, which had been only latent in the exacerbated nationalism which had preceded them.

The early leaders of the second generation had been deferential to "ancient traditions," in contrast to the liberal, moderate, and progressive attitude of the earlier constitutional politicians, who had not given political significance to indigenous cultural traditions. The "people" had, however, not yet acquired the eminence which was later to be their due in the political outlook of the intellectuals. Now, under the guidance of Gandhi and an attenuated Leninism, they ascended to a central position.

Socialism was no further away than a step of the imagination. The preceding generation had been neither socialist nor anti-socialist. The issue had never arisen, as long as civil-service personnel policies, the extension of representative institutions, and criticism of the "drain" had been the main objects of political debate.²² Politics now became "total politics" and its claims on those who gave themselves to it became all-embracing. Politics in colonial countries became a vocation,

²⁰ The role of exiles and expatriates living in the metropolitan centers of Great Britain, France, Germany, and Switzerland helped to maintain a continuous link between the revolutionary and radical tendencies in the metropolis and those in the underdeveloped countries. These exiles and expatriates provided a sort of training school for young Asians and Africans who had gone abroad to study, and they constituted a continuous representation of the interests of their countries before the public opinion of the ruling metropolis.

Like exiles and expatriates everywhere, they also were more "uprooted" than their countrymen who either stayed at home or returned home after a few years. This "uprootedness" did not, however, diminish the intensity of their politics. Rather, the contrary.

²¹ And with it, he began his march toward ascendancy over the Western colonialist conscience. A skeptical attitude about the rightfulness of imperialism had already existed in the West for a long time, but it was Gandhi more than anyone else outside the European Socialists and the Communist movements who impressed it on the consciousness of the Western educated classes. As a result, a body of Western allies was formed and its existence was a reassurance and a stimulus to the politicized intellectuals who continued to stand in need of a sustaining tie with modern "Western" culture.

²² In Africa after the Second World War, nationalism, intense politics, socialism, and populism came into life almost simultaneously, as if they were inseparably involved with each other.

without becoming professionalized. Many came to live "for" politics, but few lived "from" politics in the way in which professional politicians live from it. The politics of the colonial intelligentsia became in a sense more profound; that is, they came into contact with the deeper layers of the intelligentsia's existence. The politics of the intellectuals became charismatic politics.

As one might expect from charismatic politics, a tremendous pull was exerted on the youth. Leadership still lay with the lawyers and a few who had once served the government as officials and clerks²³ or had been tempted sufficiently to prepare themselves to do so. A large and important part of the following, however, consisted of students—college and university students in countries with colleges and universities and high school students where these were absent. A great deal of the clamor and volatility of the politics of the second generation of the intellectuals came from the students.

The Third Stage: The third stage of intellectual politics sees the intellectuals in power in a sovereign state, ruled by an indigenous elite.

With this stage the intellectuals who have reaped the fruits of the struggle become dissociated from the intellectual class. A schism occurs in the corps of intellectual-politicians. One sector comes into power and takes to it like a fish to water. The exercise of authority—which is not identical with the efficient exercise of authority—seems to be almost as natural as breathing to those intellectuals who are in power. To an increasing extent, they see themselves as different from the intellectuals who do not share their power, and whom they chide as nagger, unreasonable critics, backsliders from the great national cause. The intellectuals in power feel themselves less continuous with the intellectual class than they did during the struggle for independence. As the burdens and challenges of office preoccupy them, and as they spend so much of their time with party bosses and machine-men who have never been or who long since ceased to be intellectuals, their own image of themselves as intellectuals wanes and they become more sensitive to the anti-political dispositions of their old companions.

This drift toward schism is aggravated by the fact that the opposition becomes the magnet which draws the intellectuals. Although within the political elite, at the peak of government there are many who were once intellectuals by education, vocation, or disposition and who have

²³ Where there were few indigenous lawyers or others with higher education, leadership was exercised by clerks with secondary or elementary education. The educated, the *évolus*—intellectuals—have kept the lead, the highly educated when they have been available, the less well-educated where the former were lacking.

now become hardened politicians, no longer paying any attention to things of intellectual interest. Those who remain intellectuals in vocation and disposition seem to find their natural habitat on the opposite benches. There—and in common rooms and cafés—gather the intellectuals who in their outlook, in their studies and their self-identification, remain intellectuals.

The transformation of the intellectuals in power discloses the duality of the oppositional mentality. The hatred of authority is often no more than a facet of the fascination and love that it evokes. When they come to power, intellectuals who have hated it quickly allow the identification with it, against which they struggled previously, to come into full bloom. They attach to themselves the regalia of authority and feel that they and the state are now identical. Whereas during the struggle for independence, they felt that they represented the nation and that all who disagreed with them were outside the national community and had allowed their souls to be possessed by the foreigner, now when they are in power, they regard themselves and the state as identical and all those who disagree with them as enemies of the state.²⁴

On the other side of the floor, where it is allowed to exist, the oppositional mentality retains all of its old forms. Bureaucratic administration is criticized as too remote and too impersonal. The government is charged with corruption; it is alleged to be "too distant" from the people, and to be the betrayer of the national idea. It is accused of damaging the reputation of the country in the world, or of turning the country over to a new form of foreign control.

The oppositional mentality of the third stage, however, possesses one feature which the second did not possess—i.e., disillusionment. Whereas the opposition of the second generation imagined an amorphously happy condition once their antagonists were removed, the oppositional mentality of the post-colonial period has no such utopian euphoria to assuage its present melancholy.

Oppositionalism, which was so involved in an intense politicization, tends among some of those who are out of power to shrivel into an anti-political passivity. It is not that politics no longer engages the attention. It still does, but among many intellectuals it has become a source of despondent inaction.

Among others, a quite substantial bloc, it flows into a more rigid

²⁴ Mr. Nehru is something of an exception, although he too regards the opposition as an unavoidable pestilence, as an inconvenient part of the community which remains, notwithstanding, as much a part of the community as he himself is. At the other extreme is that other intellectual in politics, Dr. Nkrumah, who regards any criticism or disagreement as *staatsfeindlich*.

form of activistic extremism. In some instances, this extremist alternative to passivity takes on a traditionalistic guise; in others, it assumes a Leninist visage. Both of these foster the intense and total rejection of the muddled, compromising, and often compromised, incumbent government, in the name of a higher ideal.

V. THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE NEW STATES

Practically every new state has begun its career with a commitment to a regime of representative government and public liberties. Whatever might be the democratic and consultative elements in the indigenous tradition of government, the particular constitution which was actually chosen to give form to self-government is evidence of the role of intellectuals in the establishment of the new states. It was only through the influence of the intellectuals in contact with the modern political ideas which circulated in the larger world that this decision could have been made. This alone would be sufficient to testify to the still living inheritance of the notables who peopled the first stage of modern political life in the then colonial countries.

The fate of the new states, whether they persist and flourish as democracies, or whether they regress into more oligarchical forms of government, is as undeterminable as anything which lies in the future. As long, however, as they do not disintegrate into tribal and local territorial sovereignties, and as long as they at least aspire to be "modern," the intellectuals will go on playing a large role in the fulfillment of whatever possibilities fortune allots to their societies.

In most of the new states, the intellectuals still constitute a notable part of the ruling political elite, although their position is no longer as preponderant as when politics were a charismatic movement. Politics, as the new states were consolidated, became a profession and ceased to be a calling or a mission. The emerging professional politician, military or civilian in origin, is forced to be less of an intellectual in his outlook. The inevitability of the formation of a political machine has meant, and will continue even more to mean, that organizers with little intellectual disposition, interest, or sympathy will move into a more prominent position in the political elite. Back-benchers and party functionaries will include a very considerable proportion of place-holders, and the tasks they will have to perform will not be very attractive to intellectuals, living in the traditions of modern intellectuals.

Nonetheless, even on the government benches, if the regime con-

tinues to be more or less democratic there will remain some readiness of the professional party leaders to receive and sponsor intellectuals. The prestige of modern education will continue to be high and any political party and government will therefore wish to draw on its beneficiaries. Furthermore, the reservoir of persons available for political leadership will continue to be limited in the foreseeable future; this will force the party leaders to look in the intellectuals' direction, however reluctantly. At the same time, however, the oppositional tendencies of intellectuals and the hypersensitivity to criticism on the part of politicians of any sort—and of the politicians of new states in particular—will add to this reluctance.

Opposition parties, insofar as they are allowed to exist, will certainly draw on intellectuals for their critical ideas concerning the government and for leadership and following. Such parties are their natural home.

If the underdeveloped countries become completely oligarchical and are ruled by a military junta or a one-party state, the role of intellectuals in political life in the narrower sense will certainly decline. The diminution of public political life will tend to narrow the area permitted to intellectuals. Even then, single-party regimes are likely, because of their ideological nature, to find a place for some intellectuals within their leading circles.²⁵

Regardless of the fate of democracy in underdeveloped countries, intellectuals will undoubtedly continue to be called upon for the civil service and for higher education. There will be increasing scope for intellectuals as the governments expand the range of their activities and as the demand grows for highly qualified persons for engineering, teaching, publicity and propaganda, health and social services, and research in social and natural sciences.

If the new states avoid the fate of the Latin American countries in the first century of their independence, and progress economically and socially, then indifferently of the political regime which rules them, the intellectual classes will become larger and more differentiated, and more fully incorporated into their own cultural institutional system.

²⁵ The professional army officer in the new states is to a certain extent an intellectual since he, especially in the technical branches, is the recipient of a modern education. In fact, the intrusion of the military into politics in the Middle East, at least, may be partly attributed to their attachment to modern ideas about order, efficiency, and probity in government, ideas which are not part of the indigenous tradition of government and which come to them through their modern training. The military *corps d'état* which have occurred in many of the new states may be interpreted as, at least in part, revolutions of the technological intelligentsia, acting on behalf of modern ideas of efficiency and progress.

in a variety of technological, administrative, educational, and therapeutic capacities.

This incorporation of the intellectuals into their own societies will depend to a large extent on the establishment of an equilibrium between the demand for and the supply of intellectuals. If there always is such a surplus of university and college graduates that their salaries are low and many of them have to take posts which they regard as unsuitable, the process of incorporation will be obstructed. Instead the oppositional mentality will go on reproducing itself. Where a public political life is permitted, there they will be a perpetual source of unsettledness.²⁶

Let us imagine that the economies of the new states develop toward greater productivity and that a measure of liberal political life survives the burdens under which the new states now labor. The intellectual classes will become more diversified than they are at present, as they find employment in applied science and technology, in governmental, industrial, and commercial administration, in scientific and scholarly research, and in the profession of letters. With this diversification, there will be less unity of sentiment, less sense of a common identity among them. The "intellectuals" will become only one part of the educated class and a situation which already exists in the advanced countries will emerge.

There will be more specialization, more philistinism, and a less general cultural sympathy in the new intelligentsia than in the old. The new intelligentsia will also be much less political in its outlook and more practical and professional. Each intellectual profession will, as it has long since done in the advanced countries, nurture its own traditions and ways of working. As in the past, these traditions will draw on the more differentiated and more elaborate intellectual traditions of the advanced countries. Creativity will come to be more ap-

²⁶ This, in turn, would increase the demand for an ideological oligarchy, from outside the government, and would also impel the government itself to adopt oligarchical measures.

There is also the opposite danger of a disequilibrium in the relations between the intellectuals and the central institutional system arising from an excessive demand for intellectuals in technological and administrative roles. In countries which entered upon independence with an insufficient supply of qualified intellectuals and a very scanty complement of intellectual institutions, it is definitely possible to draw practically all of the best intellectuals into executive and technological roles, leaving too few for civil and intellectual functions. The rapid growth of the public services and the general trend toward the governmental pre-emption of so many diverse functions might well result in too small a proportion of the intellectual classes being left free for independent creative work and for vital activity in that publicistic borderland between the intellectual and the political.

preciated and one necessary condition for its realization will thus be provided. The intellectuals of the underdeveloped countries will cease in the course of this process to be as dependent and provincial as they are now. They will become, as some already are, full citizens, with completely equal status, in the intellectual community of the world.

The opportunities for fruitful and satisfying employment of the skills of the intellectuals in the various spheres of civil and economic life and the establishment of absorbing and guiding traditions of an autonomous creativity in intellectual life proper will foster an attenuation of ideological dispositions. It can never eradicate them but it can reduce the commonness of their occurrence and mollify their asperity. Many with political interests will no longer feel the urgent obligation to participate directly in day-to-day political life. More of them will be content to play an equally vital but less immediate part in the formation of the life of their countries. They will concern themselves less than they do now with the issues of the here and now, and will deal with problems which are of longer-run significance, more remote from the immediate issues of party politics and of the prospects and favors of the incumbent political elite. The indirect influence on politics which comes from the cultivation of the matrix of opinion, and from the provision of the personnel and the institutional conditions of long-term development, will bring satisfaction to a larger proportion than it now does, and politicians will perhaps learn to appreciate the equal and perhaps even greater value to the community of this kind of activity on the part of intellectuals.

Their direct participation in politics will probably continue to have a radical bent. The traditions of the modern intellectual are too deeply rooted and the tendency is too intrinsic to the exercise of intellectual powers for this to be avoided—even if it were ever desirable. The radicalism of the intellectual's politics need not however be revolutionary or ideological; it can also work within the civil order. In the espousal of this standpoint at the center of political decision, in party councils, in parliaments and in cabinets, the intellectual will continue to have a unique and indispensable role, the abdication of which cannot be compensated by purely intellectual creativity or the efficient performance of executive, technological, and educational functions. In order, however, for this possibility to exist, the political society—the civil order itself—must first come into existence.

This brings us to one of the prototypical paradoxes of political development. For the intellectuals to inherit their true estate, they must live in a political society. But this civil order cannot be achieved unless

the intellectuals, who would be among its greatest beneficiaries, help, against the greatest difficulties, to bring it about. Some of these difficulties reside within the intellectuals themselves, within the political and cultural traditions which enter into their constitution. The outcome then depends on whether those intellectuals who speak for civility in a modern society will by their talents, virtue, and good fortune be able to outweigh their own inhibitions, the dense incivility of their fellow-intellectuals, and the rocky obduracy of the traditional order.

Social Implications of the Act of Bogotá

by *Lester D. Mallory*
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I should like to talk today about the vigorous attack on sources of political unrest and on economic underdevelopment in this hemisphere that seems likely to go down in history under the name of the Act of Bogotá. This is the name popularly given the resolution signed on September 12 by the Organization of American States' Special Committee To Study the Formulation of New Measures for Economic Cooperation in Bogotá, Colombia.² As happens to all long names, the Committee's has been shortened to the Committee of 21. Actually only 20 Republics took part in the Bogotá deliberations. The Dominican Republic sent no representatives, and only 19 signed because Cuba refused to, for its own reasons.

You may remember that on August 31, 1960, the United States Congress had authorized the appropriation of \$500 million to establish a special inter-American social development fund.³ Armed with this authorization the United States delegation submitted for the consideration of the Committee of 21 a proposed new program for social development. Latin Americans hailed it as evidence that our Government had adopted a new and positive hemispheric policy, and the other delegations at Bogotá were quick to embrace it. As formalized in the Act of Bogotá it has become the policy of 19 governments of this hemisphere.

¹Address made before the World Affairs Council at Seattle, Wash., on Oct. 10.

²For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533.

³For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1960, p. 367.

The basic purpose of the act is stated in its preface, which recognizes that, if free and democratic institutions are to be preserved in the American Republics, it is urgent to speed up social and economic progress to meet the legitimate aspirations of the peoples for a better life and to provide them the fullest opportunity to improve their status. The preface also recognizes that the American Republics are so interrelated that the progress of each is important to all; that, as economic development programs may have only delayed effect on social welfare, early measures must be taken to cope with the latter; and that the countries concerned must make maximum efforts to help themselves.

The act has four main sections: The first relates to measures for social improvement, the second to the creation of a special fund for social development, the third to measures for economic development, and the fourth to multilateral cooperation for social and economic progress.

Under the heading of social development, measures are recommended for improving rural living conditions and land use. The need is recognized for better laws on land tenure, for greater agricultural credit facilities, for the review of tax systems and fiscal policies to assure equity in taxation and to encourage improved use of land, for land reclamation and resettlement projects, for increasing agricultural productivity, and for building farm-to-market and access roads. Recognition is given to the need to improve housing

and community facilities, to mobilize financial resources, and to expand homebuilding industries.

The United States' willingness to establish a special inter-American fund for social development, to be administered primarily by the Inter-American Development Bank, was announced by our delegation. The act welcomes this decision and spells out that the purpose of the fund would be to contribute capital resources and technical assistance, on flexible terms and conditions, to support efforts by Latin American countries to implement the act's recommendations in the social development field.

Under the heading of measures for economic development, the act expresses the conviction of the Committee of 21 that exceptionally broad, prompt action is needed in the fields of international cooperation and of domestic effort to hasten Latin America's economic development within the framework of Operation Pan America.⁴ This plan, sponsored by President Kubitschek of Brazil, envisages public and private financial assistance from capital-exporting countries in America and Western Europe and from the international lending agencies.

So much for the substance of the Act of Bogotá. One aspect of the act, the one I propose to concentrate on this evening, is the "new look" it takes at the hemisphere's problems. I hope it sets off a chain reaction of "new looks," because it is high time that all of us in the hemisphere make a real effort to know and understand each other and each other's problems; that we slough off lazy thinking habits; and that we revise cliches about ourselves and about each other that have long since lost their validity, if they ever had any.

Essentially the Act of Bogotá is an intensely practical mixture of idealism and earthiness. It acknowledges that the maxim "Man cannot live by bread alone" is fully as valid as—perhaps even more pertinent than—the view that the key to the hemisphere's problems lies in hastening economic and industrial development.

Mystical Misconceptions in U.S. and Latin America

Who, would you say, injected the idealism and who the earthiness in the Act of Bogotá? The answer cannot be found in the tired old cliches

⁴For background, see *ibid.*, June 30, 1958, p. 1090, and Oct. 13, 1958, p. 574.

about the countries and cultures of this hemisphere.

Take our notions about Latin America. To many, perhaps to most, Americans the 20 Republics to the south of us are the lands of "*mañana*," of siestas, of tangos and rumbas, of exotic customs, of comic-opera revolutions, of chivalrous, impractical "grand gestures" of dreamers and idealists. What is the truth? "*Mañana*," as often as not, is nothing more than practical application of the axiom that many problems will solve themselves best if they are not tackled in the first heat of emotion. Siestas or long lunch hours do not alter the fact that some of the hardest working, hardest headed businessmen I have ever met are to be found between the Rio Grande and Tierra del Fuego. The local color of the other Republics is window dressing on a par with our own, which looks just as exotic to them. Their revolutions today are far from "comic opera" in mood and meaning. As for impractical grand gestures, they distract attention from something much more basic: the intense realism of the average Latin American, which makes him tend to mistrust pure idealism because experience has told him that fighting windmills is an unproductive occupation.

Now take Latin American cliches about us. They picture the United States as a nation of materialists and robber barons. They think we are dollar mad, motivated only by a thirst for profit and physical comfort. They believe we are totally devoid of culture. They think we are always in a hurry, brush aside all that is fine and sensitive, ignore the underdog, and are arrogant toward our intellectual betters. I can remember, not too many years ago, when we believed so much of this rubbish ourselves that our clubs and luncheon groups used to pay good money to foreign lecturers to tell us just how uncouth we were. We have come a long way, but we are still reluctant to admit the real truth about ourselves.

As a few shrewd foreign observers have discovered, ours is a nation of incorrigible idealists; our hearts bleed for the underdog; we know we have found a way of life that suits us and are anxious to share our findings with the rest of the world; we are thirsty for culture; we are generous to a fault and would like to be appreciated, but we hate to admit this even to ourselves, much as a teenager is afraid some of his finer actions will get

him labeled a sissy. We can hardly, therefore, expect the truth about us to be self-evident abroad, when so many interests are bent on perpetuating the belief we are self-seeking tyrants who would enslave all peoples in their own interests.

Idealism and Earthiness in Act of Bogotá

The answer to my question, who injected the idealism, who the earthiness in the Act of Bogotá, if hammered home, may help develop greater understanding and unity of purpose. Here it is.

In the summer of 1958 President Kubitschek of Brazil formulated what has become known as Operation Pan America. Essentially it proposes an integrated, hemispherewide development program that, by combining capital investment, technical aid, and commodity price stabilization, would aim at expanding Latin American economies at a steady 5 or 6 percent a year. Its objective was to make them self-sufficient by the end of the 1970's. The proposal had wide appeal for virtually all countries in Latin America. It was, furthermore, constructive, and it merited and received serious consideration from our Government. Then Fidel Castro proposed in Buenos Aires in April 1959 that the United States ante up to the tune of \$30 billion to \$40 billion over 10 years to underwrite the industrialization and economic development of Latin America. Many of the hemisphere statesmen recognized this to be a highflying propaganda gesture intended to put us on the spot. Nevertheless, feeling ran high before Bogotá that money and economic development were the keys to the hemisphere's problems, and the consensus of our neighboring Republics was that our country could and should shoulder most of the burden.

In the Department of State we had doubts—serious doubts. The number of those in the Department who, like myself, have served long tours of duty in Latin America has multiplied in recent years. Most of us felt, on the basis of our experiences, that any purely economic, any strictly money approach to Latin America's very real and very urgent problems would provide no solid defense against Communist attack from within and without. We all had vivid impressions of the infinite variety of the Latin American character, of the sharp stratification of the social structure in virtually all the countries, and of the sins committed in the past in the name of freedom and democracy. We also recalled that communism has

made its most serious inroads in highly industrialized countries and in countries afflicted with political disintegration. We came to the conclusion—and submitted to the delegates at Bogotá—that the hemisphere's social problems demanded at least as high priority consideration as its economic. To put it another way, we felt certain that the prospect of full stomachs and lots of money in the bank or in the pocket of part of the population is not adequate defense against the Communist lure. This prospect is held out by the Communists, too, like a carrot on a stick.

The task ahead, we concluded, is to prove to the Everyman of this hemisphere that democracy is a vital force; that it can satisfy his material aspirations without sacrificing his spiritual yearnings; that he can have both under a democratic system, progressively but quickly and without giving up his personality, his individuality, or his right to grasp opportunities or to exercise initiative. We must show him that under democracy he can expect a better life within his lifetime. The approach must be positive: Democracy must prove itself a doer of deeds, not a mouthful of words.

Our responsibility is exceptionally great. Latin Americans, even those who agreed with us and our thesis at Bogotá, are appalled at the enormity of the task ahead. They wonder—from their past observation of our reactions—whether we may not soon tire of the task, lose heart because it does not progress steadily and uniformly, does not follow directions we consider to be the right directions. In short, they ask themselves whether sooner or later the United States will not abandon Latin America to its fate. Our task, therefore, is not only to provide aid and technicians but leadership with great understanding.

Developments in Latin America

Let us take a look at the lands to the south of us. They share, in varying degrees, time-honored class traditions which once included mutual respect between classes and definite social disciplines. This whole traditional structure has been crumbling for years and now is collapsing fast, to the consternation of those who have been accustomed to rule, who have long resisted the idea that things would ever change, that old prejudices and interests were not permanent and right, that their aristocracies and oligarchies were not preordained and sacrosanct. Much sympathy is due social groups whose

habits and traditions are threatened; much tact must be exercised if they are to be persuaded that they must take a hand in speeding up social evolution, in order to salvage the best of their traditions from the havoc of revolution. A joint effort is imperative. The pieces of a falling structure must be picked up and the best used to build a new one.

A population explosion is taking place in Latin America. Even more important, there is an explosion of aspirations going on. Villagers who only 10, 20 years ago seemed sleepily content to live along dusty or muddy tracks, without electric lights or running water, without schools, with no hospitals or doctors, have discovered that these things make life more pleasant—and have been assured they have a right to enjoy them. City workers have learned that bricklayers, porters, chauffeurs, washerwomen elsewhere enjoy what to them seem incredible luxuries—cars, refrigerators, travel, education and opportunity for their children. There is a world in a hurry at our door. It is no longer possible to plead, as the older ruling classes have done, that our progress of 200 years cannot possibly be duplicated elsewhere in a shorter time. Either evidence is forthcoming that it will be *soon*, or else.

How is the pace of progress to be speeded up? Any program for doing so must be tailored to meet individual social and geographic conditions, while making certain that equitable rates of improvement are maintained. Certain common denominators apply to most Latin American governments. Throughout most of the area economic development has lagged behind the rate of population growth. Old-fashioned production methods and ownership systems have hampered agriculture. Sharp drops in world prices have seriously affected the economies of one-crop countries. Politicians as a rule have dodged enacting and enforcing new income and property taxes. Yet even these common problems have special local aspects, and in recent years differences have multiplied. From country to country and between social and geographical sectors within countries, patterns of development have varied unpredictably and caused serious dislocations. Cities and towns have mushroomed, some rural areas have thrived, others have fallen badly behind. Former sources of riches have become drugs on

the market. Lack of capital or know-how has prevented potential new sources from being properly exploited.

Limitations of Term "Latin America"

The need, then, is to become and to remain acutely conscious of the complexity as well as of the urgency of the problem. Let me come back to the subject of cliches we must discard. We have long been in the habit of talking about "Latin America"—"Latin American policy," "the Latin American problem," "solution to the Latin American problem." If we must keep on using the term "Latin American"—and, by force of habit, we probably shall—let us at least be keenly aware of its limitations. As a geographic term, it is deceptive. As applied to cultures, emotions, or political, social, and economic conditions, it is dangerously misleading. Let me illustrate:

Haiti is predominantly Negro racially, and its language is French. Brazil is a vast racial, climatic, and cultural mosaic, held together by tremendous national pride and confidence in the nation's future. Its language is Portuguese. Uruguay, Chile, and Argentina are, racially, predominantly of European origin. Their political, economic, and social development has been influenced—to varying degrees in each case—by heavy immigration from non-Spanish countries, although Spain gave all three their language and their social, legal, and cultural framework, as England gave us ours. Bolivia, Peru, Chile, and Guatemala have large Indian populations that have clung to their own languages, customs, and traditions—all different not only from country to country but from valley to valley. The presence of millions of unassimilated Indians has produced and perpetuated social and economic stratifications inconceivable to us. Even small geographic areas provide sharp contrasts: tiny El Salvador is densely populated, while its much larger next-door neighbor, Honduras, is sparsely populated.

The pattern of political evolution runs the scale. The severest form of dictatorship survives in the Dominican Republic. In Mexico and Uruguay social revolutions took place before communism became militant on a worldwide scale, and their revolutions were able to consolidate and mature without pernicious foreign interference.

Guatemala suffered and is still trying to recover from the emotional shock of an abrupt political change that was perverted to serve Communist ends. In Cuba the hopes and dreams of a people are being forcibly diverted to serve Sino-Soviet imperialist designs. In many of the Republics feudalism has survived to a greater or lesser extent, and its appeal remains strong for still influential political and economic sectors.

Here is another catch phrase, another cliche: "Banana Republics." How many people who hardly remember O. Henry still use it and apply it half jokingly, half sneeringly to all Central America. It is a misnomer in most cases. Bananas in recent years have accounted for barely 8 percent of Guatemala's exports, and the world's biggest banana producer today is not in Central America at all but on the west coast of South America. It is Ecuador.

I have mentioned the cliche about "comic-opera revolutions." Let me return to it and emphasize how dangerous it would be to keep on shrugging off Latin American political revolts as "comic opera" or even as "just blowing off steam." The days of the coup d'etat, of the military uprising, of the palace revolution that replaces one group of "haves" with another, have faded fast. The trend in recent years has been toward institutionalism, toward orderly succession in office. Any new swing away from this trend would probably reflect dissatisfaction with processes that have been labeled democratic, would be a danger signal that political disintegration, on which communism thrives and capitalizes, has set in.

Perhaps the most dangerous of all cliches is peculiarly our own. I must admit to a fondness for it because it reflects my own feelings, as I am sure it does yours. It is our assumption that the United States is "God's country" and that the American way of life is the one and only. We are right, for ourselves and, let us hope, for our descendants for many generations. Let us remain fiercely proud on the subject. But at the same time let us not be arrogant, and let us remember that what is good for us is not necessarily good for another man.

If we are to help our Latin American neighbors to implement the Act of Bogotá, we must discard any notion that ours is the only true democracy and that to achieve a physically and morally satis-

fying way of life others must do as we have done. We can rightly shudder to hear totalitarian countries call their regimes democratic, because they do not and cannot reflect the will of the people. Let us remember, however, that democracy means the free expression and exercise of a nation's people. What people want and consider good depends on their racial and cultural heritage. That is why there are, all over the world, so many different concepts of law, of justice, of liberty, and of all the other abstract values. Travelers are perpetually being shocked by these differences. Yet what needs to be done is to recognize and respect these differences, to learn what pattern of life is most natural and desirable in each country and how best to help its inhabitants achieve it.

Understanding must be fostered on both sides. Our Latin neighbors should learn, for example, that the profit motive, with us, is not an end in itself but is a social mainspring that leads us to expect improving conditions (spiritual as well as material) in return for more and better services rendered. We on the other hand should not look on less technically developed nations as inefficient or incompetent; we should learn to respect ways of life based on different premises of what is desirable or ideal.

Anti-Americanism in Latin America

This brings me around to the subject of anti-Americanism. Evidences of it in Latin America have shocked us in recent years, and I warn you they cannot be dismissed as the result of able propaganda by Communists and demagogues.

Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon. In Latin America it is a state of mind that can claim to have got its start as far back as the power struggle between Elizabeth I of England and Philip II of Spain, in the days when the wars of religion divided Christendom into Protestant and Roman Catholic camps. Nevertheless, it is not, I am convinced, an inevitable fact of life, like death and taxes. It is something we can and should face up to and try to correct. We might begin by not getting jittery over the fact it exists in countries we want to be our friends and by trying to understand what it involves.

As a nation we have been able to develop a way of life to our average taste over 300 years. Nearly 200 years ago we too had a revolution to defend

our right to mature in our chosen way. World events made it possible for our forefathers to bring it to a relatively quick end and to get down to the business of consolidating our American way of life. Later we had our Civil War, and much later the self-examination and reorganization of the 1930's. Yet, over the long stretch, our country has progressed steadily toward a logical, if constantly evolving, ideal. Many nations, perhaps most, have been less lucky about developing a way of life to the average taste of their populations.

Latin American "revolutionary wars" lasted much longer than our own. Furthermore, most were undertaken by and for small, socially elite classes whose concern with the welfare of the bulk of the population was, at best, paternalistic. These elites, or their later-day counterparts, perpetuated static patterns of life and social structures. For many generations the bulk of the people, the Latin American Everyman, accepted the state of things, and political and social evolution in most Latin American countries was, by our standards, very slow. In our day, however, the question has been asked: Is the state of things right or inevitable?

By the middle of the 19th century our pattern of behavior and our standards had developed tremendous vitality and momentum, so much that they spilled over our national borders. We had acquired a pride of achievement that sometimes reached messianic proportions. We tended to look down on slower paced cultures. We were often brash, sometimes highhanded and as irritating as an older brother who thinks he has grown up and that the world is his oyster. We jarred the highly priced dignity and the touchiness of Latin America's ruling classes. Some of our nationals acted like "robber barons" long after that kind of behavior had gone out of style in the United States. Early in this century our Government indulged in military interventions, particularly in the Caribbean area, that have never been forgotten or allowed to be.

Differences in U.S. and Latin Cultures

A clash between our culture and that of Latin America was perhaps inevitable. Our outlooks, habits, and sets of values were rooted in the relatively small area—the British Isles and northwest Europe—from which our original national

stock had sprung. Some of its ingredients are relish for work, eagerness to explore by trial and error, inquisitiveness, and willingness to accept without rebelling certain discomforts and hardships when we feel they lead to desired objectives. Other ingredients are adventurousness in fields involving more than physical endeavor or courage, acquisitiveness for the sake of self-improvement and greater comfort, and an urge to share achievements with our fellows.

Such attributes are not a common human heritage but historical developments. What is good or bad, right or wrong, moral or immoral, beautiful or ugly, depends on the point of view as it develops from past experience and environment. Our pattern of life, therefore, was alien to our hemisphere neighbors. Many of its end-products look desirable to them, but their different basic values and their inbred prejudices limit their ability to duplicate them. Persons bred in the tradition of Spanish gentlemanliness could only find distasteful our admiration and advocacy of persistent work—even manual labor—of thrift, of risk investment, of corporative organization.

Anti-Americanism (perhaps, more correctly, anti-Anglo-Saxon feelings—because the British have also suffered from it) is based on a clash of traditions: on conflict between admiration for the results of our system and repugnance for the qualities needed to achieve it; on the incompatibility of wanting to share in our achievements and of being ashamed to have, often, to receive them as a gift.

The cultures of the United States and of Latin America have clashed most strongly at the level of the older upper classes that cherished Old World traditions. Their influence has been on the wane in the last two generations, and their members today tend more and more to recognize that change is inevitable if not entirely desirable. Throughout Latin America the old upper classes have made way for the new with whom the aristocratic, the "Spanish Don," tradition is less strong and to whom American ways and standards are therefore less repugnant. In most cases, however, they have been no more inclined than the old aristocracies to speed social and economic change—except, of course, during college days, when it is almost universally fashionable in Latin countries to be "radical." They have won and want to cling to power.

In all the countries a third social sector has always existed, the bulk of the population—the Everyman I have been talking about. For a long time he was only nominally a part of the nation. Recently, he has awakened, and everywhere his likes are feeling for new social patterns. What these will be will be determined largely by social and economic conditions. If the Act of Bogotá is implemented quickly, intelligently, and with self-evident good will, the democratic concept of the dignity of the human individual will prevail in the hemisphere. If it is not, the third social sector will look to Communist totalitarianism and to its assurances it can satisfy material needs.

At Bogotá a flexible program has been launched for fulfilling—not only for raising—the people's hopes. It recognizes that all must put into it what they can, in the measure of their capacities: the worker helping to build his own and his neighbor's houses, each community matching efforts with the next higher level in government, all citizens exhibiting civic spirit and pride, and each nation serving the interests of all its people and the ideal of liberty.

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, MARCH 12, 1961

CLICHES THAT FOG OUR VIEW OF THE WORLD

By Barbara Ward

We hold certain "truths" to be self-evident, but many new nations disagree sharply. The misunderstanding between the two sides results in dangerous strains.

There are troublesome signs of new strain between the Atlantic powers and the states which make up the more or less uncommitted third of mankind. At times, particularly during the continuing crisis over the Congo, the gap between the Atlantic nations and many of the ex-colonial states has seemed to come close to complete mutual incomprehension.

The gulf between the two sides in their ways of judging precisely the same events could lead eventually to an almost complete breakdown in understanding.

The Western powers are - understandably - upset and annoyed, when, as they see it, their efforts to grant independence and to underpin it economically leave the ex-colonial peoples as suspicious as before. But annoyance and disappointment are luxuries that statesmen cannot afford in the present precarious balance of world power. It is more profitable to try to understand why the tension and malaise have increased and to devise policies by which they can be dispelled.

What are the main differences in approach? Perhaps the clearest way of defining them is to pick out a number of ideas that seem self-evident to the West and then attempt to see what these stereotypes look like to an ex-colonial community.

STEREOTYPE 1: Western colonialism is so nearly a closed chapter in history that it is ridiculous and unfair to make a fuss about it.

In terms of direct territorial control, most Asian leaders could accept this statement as being true of Asia, in spite of small irritants such as Portugal's hold on Goa. In Africa, the statement is not true, even in a purely territorial sense. The Algerian war drags on. The Rhodesian situation is full of conflict. Portuguese colonies are next on the agenda of African nationalism. Over all of southern Africa falls the dark shadow of South Africa apartheid.

In ex-colonial thinking, moreover, imperialism is not confined to direct political and territorial control. Lenin created a new image of imperialism when he linked it with all forms of foreign capitalist investment. His formula is worth repeating: Since the capitalist wants to skin every cent of profit off the backs of the local people and to keep every other competitor out, he either imposes his own government's control or bribes local leaders into corrupt compliance with his schemes. The direct politics of imperialism is thus in a sense less important than the economics of colonial exploitation.

Nearly all the leaders of the new uncommitted nations spent some of their formative years in France or Britain during the Twenties and the Thirties. At that time the economy of Western Europe was, on the whole, remarkably stagnant and its politics was dominated by the rise of fascism. In the universities the dominant mood among the younger people tended to be Socialist - democratic or Fabian Socialist in Britain, Marxist and revolutionary Socialist in France.

Today most of the leaders have outgrown their early political passion. Most of them are now men of the center, but the old patterns of thought have not entirely faded, and underlying memories seem particularly sensitive over the issue of imperialism.

Given this version of imperialism, one can see that there is more in question than simply giving up direct Western political control. It is a constant refrain of Communist propaganda that in the past ten years the Western grants of independence have been phony because the underlying economic "servitude" has remained. The Western powers, the Communists maintain, are really out to keep their ex-colonies as closed preserves for continued exploitation and mean to use local puppet-leaders for that purpose.

The Cuban crisis has been manipulated to fit into this interpretation. The Batista Government is defined as the corrupt and compliant local leadership which sold out the Cuban masses to the American "monopolists." And what Castro has done since is described simply as an effort to "break the old imperialist bonds."

The Congo crisis fits the cliche even more directly. Whatever its cause, no single act was so calculated to revive every faintest Leninist memory as the decision to attempt Katanga's secession - allegedly with Belgian help and Belgian troops. The Belgian "trusts and monopolies" were depicted as breaking up the new republic sooner than lose control of Katanga's mines.

If Western leaders had wished to invent in every detail a policy designed to suggest the undercover continuance of Western imperialist penetration beneath a supposed transfer of power, they could hardly have contrived anything so convincing as the Katanga tragedy.

Of course, the Leninist analysis is faulty. Even when, in the late nineteenth century, it had most basis in fact and Western investors were jostling to put into Africa and China money they could not profitably invest at home, Lenin overlooked the fact that more than 70 per cent of the Western investment went not to colonies and under-developed areas but to the rich, developed independent lands in the Atlantic area.

Today, the whole basis of the analysis has collapsed. For today most of the capital in developed states is needed to satisfy hungry demand at home.

This is a possibility Lenin considered and dismissed when he wrote: "It goes without saying that if capitalism *** could raise the standard of living of the masses, who are everywhere still poverty stricken and underfed*** there could be no talk of superfluity of capital *** But if capitalism did these things, it would not be capitalism."

"These things" are precisely what capitalism has done in creating the welfare state. Hence the Western system today breeds few compulsions to invest abroad or secure political control in order to protect foreign investment. On the contrary, one of its gravest faults now is that it tends by its investment to make rich nations richer and to leave poor nations to get poorer still.

Nevertheless, the ex-colonial still persists in his suspicions. There was a time when foreign trade and investment were the spearhead of Western intervention, and large foreign investors so dominated local economies that nominally independent governments appeared to be in their pockets. Indeed, these times are not so very distant, and the suspicions they have aroused do not die easily.

STEREOTYPE II: Communism, not the West, is now the world's most powerful and menacing imperialist system.

As the British delegate, David Ormsby Gore, demanded hotly in the United Nations debate on colonialism, how can the West alone be accused of imperialist drives when, since the war, Russia has annexed millions to its empire, while in the West more than 650 million souls have gained enfranchisement?

But past history cannot be effaced so quickly. In Asia, in Africa, in Latin America, Russia has not seemed to local opinion to be an imperialist power, whereas Western colonialism has appeared a continuing and dominant fact. This may be illogical, since Great Russia has absorbed most of central Asia's non-Russian people. Uzbek, Kazakh, Kirghiz - all have come under Moscow's yoke. But there can be no doubt that so far Russia has avoided the imperialist stigma.

One reason is the natural cohesion of empires that spread by land. No one disputes the United States' hold on New Mexico and California or China's domination of the Cantonese. Russia's expansion eastward has been of the same type - a continental movement of almost geological irresistibility.

As for the area where Soviet control is most onerous and least excusable - in Eastern Europe - it must be confessed that so far, save perhaps among a lively and responsible minority in India, the prospect of white men oppressing white men makes little emotional impact on those who have been accustomed to see the colored man as underdog. And on the issue of racial domination, Russia at all times enjoys the clear advantage of having no Deep South, no Notting Hill and virtually no relations with the Boer racialists.

Nor does politics exhaust the Soviet Union's advantages. Its forced-draft economic expansion impresses emergent leaders who feel their problems to be closer to those of Russia in 1917 than, say, of America in 1945.

In short, few ex-colonial peoples put Russia - or China - into the category of imperialists. They may distrust their size and their pretensions. Violent suppression in Tibet has certainly had its impact in Asia. But still the Communist powers are not envisaged as steady, systematic plotters for world dominion.

STEREOTYPE III: The Communist thrust for world power is the greatest present threat to world peace, and containing it must be the first item on the free peoples' agenda of survival.

But, as we have just seen, the uncommitted peoples do not share the West's belief in Communist imperialism. Hence, they do not accept the Atlantic powers' urgent belief that barriers must be set up at all costs to prevent further Communist advance.

The cold war does not seem to them a disinterested attempt to set bounds to a dangerous trend of Communist expansion. It looks to them more like an old-fashioned struggle between great powers for influence and control. History has given them only one way of reacting to such struggles - and that is to keep out.

The reach of this reaction is due to yet another deep suspicion forged by past experience. It harks back to the origins of Western colonial control, and can best be summarized as a profound distrust of the West's supposed policy of "divide and rule."

When Portuguese, Dutch, French and British merchants arrived in Asian waters three and more centuries ago, they traded, fought with each other and rampaged about the high seas. But they controlled little land until, after about a century, a series of collapses of local authority encouraged them to take power into their own hands.

Such disintegrations frequently occurred as a result of disputed inheritances and rival claims to sovereignty. The Western merchants backed the ruler who promised most to their trading and national interests. If he came to power with their support, he was soon their puppet.

Such were the steps by which, little by little, Holland secured control of all Indonesia, and, a century later, Britain maneuvered itself into India. Another century went by, and Africa was divided up as the result of an arbitrary scramble by the Europeans in which chiefs and tribes were used by the powers as pawns in the game of keeping each other out.

Against this historical background, most of the ex-colonial states react with uncompromising distrust when they are asked to take sides in the cold war, when they are solicited as allies against a Russia they do not fear on their own behalf, when they are denounced as "immoral" for refusing to comply. Memories flood back of past Western interventions which all ended the same way - with the establishment of Western imperial control.

In this context, the cold war becomes a symbol of involvement in other people's quarrels, and neutralism the only way in which small nations can keep clear.

STEREOTYPE IV: Government aid from the West together with private investment is accepted by the ex-colonials as a great boon without reservations.

It is true that nothing has so eased the transition from colonial to independent status as the West's imaginative readiness to extend economic aid. But even here there are doubts that the Western powers would do well to note.

Military assistance to allies has far exceeded economic assistance to neutrals, and some of the brave effect of generous economic aid has been dimmed by dedicating so much of it to Western strategic aims. Even the most disinterested economic aid has to compete with Soviet loans for forty years at 2 per cent interest, and undergo a barrage of Soviet propaganda attacking it as a renewal of imperialism under another guise.

The issue of private investment is - as the case of Cuba has shown - even more ambiguous. It is, perhaps, not too much to say that most emergent governments today desire and distrust foreign private investment in almost equal measure.

Such investments lead to a general quickening of economic growth only if local people share widely in the wealth created, if manufacturing begins as a result, if it leads to a transformation of local agriculture from static to market patterns, if a large, trained professional and middle class begins to emerge as a consequence of gathering momentum. Where these conditions are present - as in Mexico, for instance - foreign investment can be carried easily on the rising economic tide.

In other circumstances, foreign investments can degenerate into isolated pockets of great wealth in generally impoverished economies. Then it is not too difficult for Communist propaganda to identify the foreign investment with the Leninist definition of imperialism and to rouse both nationalist and revolutionary anger against the local government for tolerating a co-existence of such extremes of well-being and misery.

None of the foregoing obstacles and misunderstandings is incapable of being met. The basic fact is, after all, that the West is abandoning imperialism. It is only a matter of time before Africa, as much as Asia, will be deciding its own destiny. And in Latin America each decade should consolidate the advance toward full economic self-determination. The Communists are trying to exploit an issue which is vanishing in their hands.

Meanwhile, however, existing rifts and suspicions could be reduced if Western leaders set themselves with all their energy and intelligence to understand and dispel them. Part of the answer lies in economic assistance aimed, not at military objectives, but at hastening the rhythms of growth. Part lies in foreign private investment which draws in local stockholders, trains local managers and takes its place in a general surge of economic expansion.

But above all, the answer lies with politics and here the chief need is for Western leaders to understand the deep political inhibitions of the ex-colonial lands. Genuine sympathy for the policy of non-alignment, real understanding of the emotions that lie under the surface of neutralism, even perhaps a strong challenge to Khrushchev to join with the West in effective measures to withdraw the under-developed countries from the rigors of the cold war - all these would help to sharpen the sense that the day of Western imperialism is really done and that, in its place, the Western powers wish to build a truly equal and cooperative world order.

PART TWO:
THEORY OF GUERRILLA WARFARE

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THE STRATEGY OF UNDERGROUND WARFARE

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Captain Sven Blindheim in "Militær Orientering" (Norway) 15 December 1950.

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Those who keep abreast of political developments constantly see examples of underground warfare in the struggle for world domination. All means, including civil war, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, strikes, and psychological warfare, are used in this struggle. Cold war is also waged through the spreading and developing of the fear of war itself. With these activities, a fear, on the part of all anti-Communists, has developed that persecution and death will be their fate if communism comes into power. Fortunately most people in the threatened countries now have become fully aware of the necessity for increasing their military and morale strength, which indicates a long stride in the right direction.

It is important for personnel connected with the defense of their homeland to know as much as possible about the potential enemy, particularly his means and his methods. The necessity for broadening our military and political horizons by means of information along these lines cannot be given too much emphasis. And haste must be made!

Unlike Normal Military Operations

Most people recognize the fact that underground warfare is conducted in an entirely different manner than normal military operations. They also know that great demands are made on the officers who will be their leaders in time of war. However, to be a leader in underground warfare requires entirely different personal characteristics than those required for leadership in military operations. In underground warfare, political understanding is placed first and foremost. And right here, it is the professional soldier

Conclusion

Whatever the type or character a future war may assume, it is certain that underground warfare will play an important role. It will be supported by a foreign power, and by the fighting forces of that power. In addition, the underground movement will receive political and material assistance from that power. An underground movement makes it easier for an attacker to obtain victories. Therefore, we must take this into account in our defense plans. Otherwise, most of us may be in for an unpleasant surprise the day our Country is attacked.

COMMUNIST CONCEPTS FOR REVOLUTIONARY WAR

Mao Tse-tung developed the following strategic uses for guerrilla warfare and adhered to them when he led guerrilla forces against Japanese during World War II in China and against Chiang Kai-shek before and after World War II. Ho Chi Minh, from 1948 to 1954 in the war against the French in Indochina, followed these principles. Communists will doubtlessly continue to follow them in any expansion of their aggression in Southeast Asia or elsewhere in the Far East. Mao stated that the following six principles constituted his strategic program during the entire guerrilla war against the Japanese and that these principles serve as the necessary means for preserving and expanding our (Communist) forces, annihilating or ousting the enemy, and coordinating with regular warfare to win final victory.

Six Principles of Guerrilla Warfare -- Mao Tse-tung

1. On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior line operation.
2. Coordination with regular warfare.
3. The establishment of base areas.
4. Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare.
5. Development into mobile warfare.
6. Relationship of commands.

Mao's discussion of these principles follows.

FIRST PRINCIPLE: On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to our own plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior line operations within interior line operation.

It is possible and necessary to make, in a strategically defensive war, offensives in campaigns and battles; to wage campaigns and battles of quick decision in a strategically protracted war; and to wage campaigns and battles on the exterior line within the strategic interior line.

Offensives in guerrilla warfare generally take the form of surprise attacks, while in regular warfare, although surprise attacks should and can be adopted, relatively few opportunities arise whereby the enemy can be caught unprepared.

When revolutions and revolts are to be incited, the international Communist movement has a decisive lead, for it is able to mobilize, in all countries, Communist cells which permit themselves to be used willingly. It would be naive of us not to believe that this also could happen in our country.

It is easier to set an underground war in motion in the more primitive countries than in countries which have a relatively high standard of living. On the other hand, countries with a relatively high standard of living are more sensitive to the consequences of an underground war than are the more primitive countries. In all countries in which an underground war is set in motion, an open sore will be created. The higher the country's standard of living, the more annoying and persistent is the sore.

As in the case of normal military operations, the principal objectives of underground warfare are found in the countries possessing relatively high standards of living and well-developed industrial and communications centers.

Confined Operations

A guerrilla war's operational area must be confined to the home area of the guerrilla forces. If it is to be introduced in other areas, it will be conducted in the form of raids. The farther the guerrillas operate from their home area, the more they lose the advantage of knowing the district, the country, and the people. Therefore, they will have great difficulties in effecting movements of any extent or in any strength, for they lose the element of secrecy.

Guerrilla formations have no rear areas or permanent bases. They neither conquer terrain nor hold it. However, situations may develop where they attain full control over entire districts. If this happens, the fighting develops into a sort of open warfare. This happened in Yugoslavia

during World War II, and the guerrilla forces in Indo-China are attempting the same thing at the present time.

Guerrilla warfare must be supported by the inhabitants of the country or portions of the country involved. However, in order that this may be achieved, the people first must be aroused by a political idea. It is true that all wars are fought for political ideas, but in guerrilla warfare the ideological basis may become genuine fanaticism. In the case of the Communists, the ideological basis has developed into a political religion, which provides them with a powerful advantage in conducting this form of warfare, with their political fanaticism, are first-class fighters.

Lawless Existence

Guerrilla warfare is cruel. Guerrilla units lead a lawless existence. They seldom take prisoners and often kill their own wounded. They live, to the greatest possible extent, off the country itself. When they attack, they act briefly and violently. They never fight long battles.

The communistic ideology possesses a particular attraction for those who do not own anything and, for that reason, communism has a particularly favorable place in underground warfare.

The Communist Party, which in many countries is illegal, possesses a great deal of experience in unlawful activities. The party's cell organization, therefore, is well adapted for this type of activity. History tells us that national uprisings have won great victories down through the centuries. Communism, and the Soviet Union itself, came into power through a national uprising. We are aware that they are striving to seize power by similar means in other countries. They possess a greater knowledge in this field than do the people of most countries, and so they constitute an impending danger everywhere. No defense staff can afford to ignore this danger.

who, as a rule, comes out the loser.

Underground warfare requires leaders who are capable and who know the psychological characteristics of the people against whom this type of warfare will be waged.

Generally, few professional military men were successful as leaders in underground combat during World War II. Their orthodox military training and their conception of how to conduct war were great handicaps which were difficult to overcome. They were inclined to use orthodox military methods in unorthodox situations. Underground warfare possesses a marked political background, and many military leaders had difficulty in understanding all the intrigues which were involved.

In normal warfare, the enemy is attacked in battle. To accomplish this, superiority in manpower and materiel is required in the right place at the right time. However, this does not apply in underground warfare. There is no battlefield in the usual sense of the word. Therefore, the leaders must seek to attain dispersion in time and space. It is not a matter of winning the decisive blow, but of dealing small, stinging blows. Underground warfare seeks dispersion, while normal military operations seek a concentration of strength in the decisive place.

Decentralized Action

In guerrilla warfare, command and organization must be decentralized due to the dispersed action. Since guerrilla formations are based on the actions of individuals, their operations are not conducted in accordance with military principles of strategy and tactics. Their objectives may be described as everywhere and nowhere. Regular military formations, therefore, may be exposed, continually, to the use of the most disconcerting methods. The officers of regular military formations expect their guerrilla

opponents to operate in accordance with recognized military principles.

In this lies a weakness.

Guerrilla formations may split up the fighting into a series of isolated combat operations in order to prevent their opponents from securing any advantage from their superiority in manpower and materiel. With such tactics, they may be able to knock out one military unit after another without incurring heavy losses of their own.

The strength of guerrilla forces lies in their mobility. They must be everywhere; but not where their opponents expect to find them. They always must make use of surprise. Therefore, they must strike and vanish before they are forced over to the defensive.

Offense the Best Defense

It has often been said that the offense is the best defense, and this is particularly true of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla formations do not seek to hold or occupy terrain . the same way as military formations. In addition, they do not seek to retake terrain which they have lost. Such action would lead only to their own destruction.

Guerrilla formations will alter constantly their methods and the strength of their groups. When situations, methods, and forces remain constant, the opponent's intelligence service provides a dependable working basis for countermeasures.

Underground operations, like other military operations, must be conducted at the right time and in the right place. They can only serve their primary purpose when their actions are co-ordinated with the general development of the war. It is important that the guerrilla formations be given material help, but it is equally important that they receive political support.

In guerrilla operations, concentration of the biggest possible force, secret and swift actions, surprise attacks on the enemy, and quick decisions in battles are required. Passive defense, procrastination, and dispersion of forces immediately before combat must be carefully avoided.

Although there is strategical and tactical defense to inflict attrition on the enemy and to wear him out, the basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be one of offense and its offensive character must be more pronounced than that of regular warfare. Further, such offensives must take the form of surprise attacks. Display and showiness are even more impermissible in guerrilla warfare than in regular warfare.

Although on occasion, guerrilla battles may continue for several days, as in a battle against a small, isolated, and helpless enemy force; in general, quick battle decisions are vital to successful guerrilla warfare.

Because of its dispersed nature, guerrilla warfare can be spread wide, and the principle of dividing up the forces applies in many of its tasks, such as in harassing, containing, and disrupting the enemy, and in mass work; but when a guerrilla detachment or corps is performing the tasks of annihilating the enemy, particularly when it is striving to smash an enemy offensive, its main force must be concentrated. "Gather a big force to strike at a small enemy segment," remains one of the guidelines for field operations in guerrilla warfare.

We must concentrate a preponderant force in every battle and adopt, whether in the period of strategic defense or in the period of strategic counteroffensive, exterior line operations in every campaign or battle to encircle and annihilate the enemy. We must encircle a part of the enemy, if not the whole, annihilate a part of the encircled, if not the whole, and inflict heavy casualties upon them, if not capture them.

Initiative: Initiative for an army means choice of action. Any army that loses its initiative will be forced into a passive position, be deprived of its freedom of action, and will run the risk of being exterminated or defeated. To obtain the initiative is more difficult in strategic defensive and interior line operations and easier in offensive exterior line operations.

Initiative is vital to guerrilla warfare, for a guerrilla unit usually finds itself in grave circumstance: the absence of a rear for its operations, its own weak force pitted against the enemy's strong force, and in the case of a newly organized guerrilla unit, its lack of experience and of unity. Nevertheless, we can gain the initiative in guerrilla warfare, the essential condition being the utilization of the enemy's defects.

The initiative results from a correct estimation of the situation (of both the enemy's and ours), as well as correct military and political dispositions. Pessimistic estimations at a variance with objective conditions and the passive dispositions which they entail will undoubtedly deprive one of the initiative and throw him into a passive position. Similarly,

over-optimistic estimations at variance with objective conditions and the venturesome dispositions (an uncalled for venturesomeness) which they entail will also deprive one of the initiative and eventually lead him to the same path as do pessimistic estimations.

The initiative is not the natural gift of a genius, but something achieved by an intelligent leader who studies with a receptive mind and makes correct estimations of objective conditions and correct military and political dispositions. Therefore, it is something to be consciously striven for, not something ready made.

A guerrilla unit should carry out the tasks of extricating itself from a passive position when forced into one through some incorrect estimation and disposition or some overwhelming pressure. Circumstances are often such as to make it necessary to run away. Running away is the chief means of getting out of passivity and regaining the initiative, but not the only means. Frequently the initiative and an advantageous position are gained through one's effort at holding out a bit longer.

Flexibility: Flexible employment of forces is the most important means of changing the situation between the enemy and ourselves and gaining the initiative. Guerrilla forces must be flexibly employed according to conditions such as the task, the enemy disposition, the terrain, and the inhabitants. The chief ways of employing the forces consist of dispersing, concentrating, and shifting them. When guerrilla forces are dispersed we must not incur losses through an ignorance of the situation and mistakes in actions. In employing the forces it is necessary to maintain liaison and communication and to keep an adequate portion of the main force on hand. Guerrillas should constantly shift their positions.

Generally speaking, the dispersion of guerrilla forces is employed mainly in the following circumstances:

1. When we threaten the enemy with a wide frontal attack because he is on the defensive, and we are still unable to mass our forces to engage him.
2. When we widely harass and disrupt the enemy in an area where his forces are weak.
3. When unable to break through the enemy's encirclement, we try to divert his attention in order to get away from him.
4. When we are restricted by the condition of terrain or in matters of supply.
5. When we carry on work among the people over a vast area.

In dispersed actions under any circumstances, attention should be paid to the following:

1. No absolutely even dispersion of forces should be made. A larger part of the forces should be kept at a place conveniently situated for its flexible employment so that, on the one hand, any possible exigency can be readily met and, on the other, the dispersed units can be used to fulfill the main task.
2. The dispersed units should be assigned clearly defined tasks, fields of operations, specific time limits and rendezvous, and ways and means of liaison.

Concentration: Forces are concentrated largely for the annihilation of an enemy on the offensive but sometimes for the annihilation of certain stationary forces when the enemy is on the defensive.

Concentration of forces does not mean absolute concentration, but the massing of the main forces in a certain important direction while retaining or dispatching a part of the forces in other directions for containing, harassing, or disrupting the enemy, or for work among the people.

Shifting of forces: Although flexible dispersion or concentration of forces is the principal method in guerrilla warfare, we must also know how to shift our forces flexibly.

When the enemy feels seriously threatened by the guerrillas he will send troops to suppress or attack them. Guerrilla leaders should ponder the situation and:

1. If possible fight on the spot.
2. If not possible to fight, shift rapidly to another position.

Sometimes the guerrilla units for the purpose of smashing the enemy units separately may, after annihilating an enemy force in one place, shift immediately to another to wipe out another enemy force.

Guerrillas, finding it inadvisable to fight in one place, may sometimes have to disengage immediately from the enemy at that position and engage him elsewhere.

If the enemy's forces at one position are particularly strong, the guerrilla units should not engage him there for long, but should shift their positions as speedily as possible. In general, the shifting of forces should be done secretly and swiftly. Ingenious devices such as making a noise in the east while attacking in the west, appearing now in the south and then in the north, and hit-and-run, and night action should be constantly employed to mislead, entice, and confuse the enemy.

Planning: Without planning it is impossible to win a guerrilla war. The idea of fighting a haphazard guerrilla war means nothing but making a game out of it, the idea of an ignoramus.

Operations within a guerrilla area must be preceded by the most comprehensive planning possible. Guerrilla leaders must consider how to grasp the initiative, define the tasks, dispose the forces to carry out military and political training, procure supplies, make arrangements for equipment, and how to secure the help of the people. These steps should all be carefully worked out by the leader and rechecked. Without this there could be no initiative, flexibility, or offensive. The conditions of guerrilla warfare do not permit so high a degree of planning as in regular warfare; consequently, to attempt highly comprehensive planning in guerrilla warfare is a mistake, but it is still necessary so far as objective conditions permit to make plans as comprehensive as possible.

The initiative can be gained only after success has been scored in an offensive. All offensives must be organized on our own initiative and not launched under compulsion. The flexible employment of forces centers around the endeavor to take the offensive; likewise, planning is necessary chiefly for victories in offensives. Tactical defensive measures become meaningless when divorced from their roles of supporting an offensive directly or indirectly. Quick decision refers to the tempo of an offensive, and by the exterior line is meant the scope of the offensive. The offensive is the only means of annihilating the enemy as well as the principal means of preserving oneself; pure defense and withdrawal can play only a temporary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in annihilating the enemy.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: Coordination with regular warfare.

There are three kinds of coordination between guerrilla warfare and regular warfare: in strategy, campaigns, and in battles.

Strategy: The roles played by guerrilla units behind the enemy's rear, i.e., crippling and containing the enemy, disrupting his supply line, and raising the morale of both the regular army and the people, all point to the need for strategic coordination with the regular army. In coordinating with the regular army, the guerrillas will play a strategic defensive role when the enemy is launching a strategic offensive; will handicap the enemy defense when the enemy concludes his strategic offensive and turns to defend the areas he has occupied; and will also repulse the enemy forces and recover all lost territories when the regular army launches a strategic counteroffensive.

Campaigns: When participating in a campaign, the leader of each guerrilla base in the enemy's rear should properly dispose his forces and adopt different tactics according to prevailing local conditions. So that he may succeed in crippling and containing the enemy, he should take positive action against the enemy's most vital and vulnerable points, disrupting his transport and raising the morale of our own armies engaged in interior line campaigns. By so doing the guerrilla leader thus will fulfill his responsibility of campaign coordination. To attain the end of coordination in campaigns it is absolutely necessary to equip all larger guerrilla units with radio equipment.

Battles: Coordination of battle actions is the task of all guerrilla units in the neighborhood of the battlefield on the interior line. In each case the guerrilla units should take up the tasks assigned by the commander of the regular force, usually tasks to contain part of the enemy, disrupt his transport, spy on him, and act as guides. Without any direction from the commander of the regular force, the guerrilla units should carry out such tasks voluntarily. There must be no sitting back and watching, or moving about without fighting.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: The establishment of base areas.

Base areas are the strategic bases on which a guerrilla unit relies for carrying out its strategic tasks as well as for achieving the goals of preserving and expanding the unit and annihilating or expelling the enemy.

Without such bases there would be nothing to depend on for carrying out all the strategic tasks and fulfilling all the war objectives. Operating without a rear area is a characteristic of guerrilla warfare behind the enemy line, for it is detached from the nation's general rear. Guerrilla war could not be maintained and developed for long without base areas which are indeed its rear.

Types of base areas: Bases are mainly of three types: those in the mountains, those in the plains, and those in the river-lake estuary regions.

We must develop guerrilla warfare and set up base areas in all mountain regions behind the enemy lines. Mountain base areas are places where guerrilla warfare can hold out for the longest time. Plains are inferior to mountains, but one must not rule out the possibility of developing guerrilla warfare or establishing some sort of base area on the plains. The establishment of base areas that can hold out for a long time is not confined, but the establishment of temporary base areas has been proved possible and that of base areas for small units or for seasonal use ought to be possible.

The possibility of developing guerrilla warfare and establishing base areas in the river-lake estuary regions is greater than on the plains, but less so than in the mountain regions.

Conditions for establishment of base areas: The basic condition for the establishment of base areas is that there should be an armed force employed to defeat the enemy and to arouse the people into action. Leaders in guerrilla war must exert their utmost to build up one or several guerrilla units and in the course of the struggle must develop them gradually into guerrilla corps and eventually into regular units and regular corps. Without an armed force or with one that is not strong enough, nothing can be done.

The armed forces must be employed in coordination with the masses of the people to defeat the enemy. If we do not repulse the enemy's attacks and defeat him, those regions under our control will become enemy controlled, and then the establishment of base areas will become impossible.

All power should be employed to arouse the people to struggle against the enemy. We must arm the people, organize self-defense corps and guerrilla units. We must form mass organizations. Workers, peasants, youths, women, children, merchants, and members of the free professions, according to their political consciousness and fighting enthusiasm, should be organized into the various indispensable public bodies which are to expand gradually. We must eliminate the collaborators in the open or under cover, a task that we can accomplish only by relying on the people. We must arouse the people to establish or consolidate the local organs of enemy political power. Where the original organs of political power have not been destroyed by the enemy, we must, on the basis of the support of the masses, proceed to reform and consolidate them. Where destroyed by the enemy, we must rebuild them.

Consolidation and expansion of base areas: If we only attend to expansion and forget consolidation in guerrilla warfare, we not only lose territory gained but the very existence of vast areas is endangered. Conservation due to love of comfort or an incorrect estimation of the enemy's strength can only bring losses and harm guerrilla war.

The correct principle is expansion through consolidation. Choose a base area where we can be on the defense or offense as we choose.

As tasks of expansion and consolidation are different in nature, military dispositions and the execution of our tasks will differ accordingly. To shift the emphasis from one to the other according to the time and the circumstances is the only way to solve the problems properly.

Guerrilla areas as opposed to base areas: In guerrilla war conducted in the enemy's rear, guerrilla areas are distinguished from guerrilla base areas.

Guerrilla areas: Areas which the guerrillas cannot completely occupy but can only constantly harass and attack, which are recovered by the guerrillas only when they arrive and are lost to the puppet regime as soon as they leave and which consequently are not yet guerrilla base areas but are only guerrilla areas. Guerrilla areas will be transformed into base areas when they have gone through the necessary processes of guerrilla war; that is, when a large number of enemy troops have been annihilated or defeated, the puppet regime destroyed, the activity of the people called forth, the people's government formed, and the people's armed forces developed. To develop a guerrilla area into a base area is therefore a painstaking process. Whether a guerrilla area has been transformed into a base area depends on the extent to which the enemy is annihilated and the masses of the people are aroused.

As a result of our erroneous leadership or the enemy's strong pressure, the guerrilla base area may change into a guerrilla area and a guerrilla area may become an area under the relatively stabilized occupation of the enemy. This may occur sometimes and deserves the vigilant attention of the leaders of guerrilla war.

As a result of guerrilla warfare and the struggle between the enemy and ourselves, any of the enemy occupied territories falls into one of the following three categories: (1) areas controlled by our guerrilla forces and our organs of political power. (2) areas in the grip of the enemy and the puppet regime, and (3) areas contested by both sides or guerrilla areas.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: Strategic defensive and strategic offensive in guerrilla warfare.

After a guerrilla war has been started and considerably developed, especially when the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us on a nationwide scale and has adopted instead a policy of defending the areas under his occupation, he will inevitably attack the guerrilla base areas. It is essential to recognize this inevitability for otherwise the leaders in a guerrilla war will be caught unprepared, will certainly fall into panic and confusion, and will be routed by the enemy.

To eliminate the guerrillas and their base areas, the enemy will resort to converging attacks. When the enemy is launching a converging attack in several columns each consisting of only a single unit, big or small, without reinforcements, and if he is unable to man the route of advance, we should then construct fortifications, or build motor roads. In our dispositions we should contain a number of enemy columns with our supplementary forces and use our main force to attack a single enemy column by springing a surprise attack on it in campaigns and battles (mainly ambushes) and striking at it while it is on the move. The enemy weakened by our repeated surprise attacks will often withdraw halfway. By then the guerrillas may spring more surprise attacks during their pursuit of the enemy so as to weaken him further. We should encircle the town or towns which the enemy occupied before he stops his offensive or begins to withdraw, cutting off his food supply and communications. When he fails to hold out we should pursue and attack him. After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, thereby shattering separately the enemy's columns taking part in the converging attack.

In an operational plan for coping with a converging attack, our main forces are generally placed on the interior line. In the case when we are superior in strength, it is necessary to use supplementary forces such as county or district guerrilla units and sometimes even detachments from the main forces on the exterior line to disrupt the enemy's communication lines and to contain his reinforcements.

In the case when the enemy remains for a long time in our base area, we may reverse the scheme, that is, leave a part of our forces in the base area to besiege the enemy while employing the main forces to attack the region whence the enemy came and to intensify our activities there, so that the enemy long stationed in our base area may be enticed to come out and engage us.

During retreat the enemy often sets fire to the houses in the villages and towns he has occupied and in the villages along his route, with the

purpose of destroying the base areas for guerrilla warfare. In so doing he is depriving himself of shelter and food in his next offensive, and the damage will recoil upon himself.

A leader in a guerrilla war should not think of abandoning his present base area and shifting to another unless many attempts have been made to smash the enemy's converging attacks, and it is conclusively shown that they cannot be smashed there. In such an event he must carefully guard against pessimism. So long as the leader commits no blunder in principle, it is generally possible for the guerrillas to smash the enemy's converging attacks and to hold on to the bases in mountainous areas. It is only on the plains that the guerrilla leader, confronted with a vigorous converging attack, should consider temporarily shifting the main guerrilla corps to some mountainous region. If a shift is made, numerous small units should be left to operate in dispersion, thereby facilitating the return of the main corps when the main forces of the enemy move away.

After we have smashed the enemy's offensive and before his new offensive starts, the enemy is on the strategic defensive and we are on the strategic offensive. At this time, our operational direction lies not in attacking enemy forces holding stoutly to their defensive positions, which we may not be able to defeat, but in annihilating or expelling small enemy units and puppet forces which our guerrilla units are strong enough to attack. In expanding the areas under our occupation, we must annihilate small enemy units and arouse the people into action.

The difficult problems of provisions, of bedding, and clothing are usually also tackled at this time. It is necessary to give the troops rest and training, and the best time for this is when the enemy is on the defensive.

During the strategic offensive, the leaders in the guerrilla war should not be so elated with success as to underrate the enemy and forget to strengthen internal solidarity and consolidate the base areas and the troops. They should watch carefully every move of the enemy and see if there is any sign of an offensive against us, so that the moment it comes we can properly bring our strategic offensive to close, turn to the strategic defensive, and smash the enemy's offensive.

FIFTH PRINCIPLE: Development into mobile warfare.

It is necessary for guerrilla units to change gradually into regular armies in a protracted war. The development of guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare does not mean the abandonment of guerrilla warfare but the gradual formation in the midst of an extensively developed guerrilla warfare of a main force capable of conducting a mobile war, round which there should still be numerous guerrilla forces carrying on extensive guerrilla operations.

To raise the quality of the guerrilla units we must improve them politically and organizationally. We must improve their equipment, military training, and their tactics and discipline, gradually remolding them on the pattern of the regular army.

Organizationally it is imperative to establish step by step such military and political setups as are required in the regular corps. All regular armies have the responsibility of assisting the guerrilla units in their development into regular armed units.

SIXTH PRINCIPLE: Relationship of commands.

Guerrilla units are armed bodies on a lower level than a regular army and are characterized by dispersed operations. The high degree of centralization in directing regular warfare is not permitted in directing guerrilla warfare. A highly centralized command is opposed to the high degree of elasticity of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare, however, cannot be developed steadily if centralized command is done away with altogether. When extensive regular and guerrilla warfare go on at the same time, it is essential to coordinate the operations of both by unified command.

The principle of command in a guerrilla war demands a centralized command in strategy and a decentralized command in campaigns and battles. Centralized strategic command includes: planning and direction of the entire guerrilla war by the state; coordination between guerrilla and regular war in each zone; and unified direction of all the armed forces in each guerrilla area or base area.

If centralization is not effected where it should be, it would mean a neglect of duty on the part of the higher echelon and usurpation of power on the part of the lower ranks--neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in military matters.

If decentralization is not effected where it should be, it is monopoly of power on the part of the higher echelon and lack of initiative on the part of the lower ranks--neither is permissible in the relationship between the higher and lower bodies, especially in the command in a guerrilla war. Such a principle is the only correct directive for solving the problem.

MAO TSE-TUNG AS A GUERRILLA

A SECOND LOOK

(Reprinted from an article by Walter Darnell Jacobs,
Military Review, February 1958.)

There is no shortage of commentary on the value of Mao Tse-tung's theory of guerrilla warfare. By some sort of tacit agreement, westerners now accept Mao as the father or at least as the perfector of guerrilla warfare in its modern application.

This agreement deserves a second examination.

First, it should be noted that what Mao was writing about in most cases was not guerrilla warfare but yu chi chan. This expression is derived from the root words for (1) travel, road, (2) strike, attack, rout; and (3) war, battle. The translation "guerrilla warfare" may be a convenient one but it can hardly be viewed as completely accurate.

Association With Chu Teh

Second, it should be noted that Mao's reputation rests on the later success of the Chinese Communists and on Mao's association with Chu Teh. The success of the Chinese Communists is due to a number of factors, not excluding, but not exclusively, guerrilla warfare.

Mao's collaboration with Chu Teh is the basis for a great number of western commentaries on Chinese concepts of guerrilla warfare.

Chu Teh's early history includes training at the Yunnan Military Academy, a sojourn in Germany (from where he was expelled by the government), a period as an opium addict, and a habit of selling his sword to the highest bidder.¹

In May 1928 he combined forces with Mao Tse-tung. The Chu-Mao combination did much to put the Communists in power in China. It provided history with an elaborate example of the supposed unity of theory and practice in that Chu and Mao not only articulated a theory of irregular warfare but executed that theory.

It is suggested that the picture of Mao (and of Chu) as father of a new or universal theory of irregular warfare is as erroneous as the earlier acceptance of Mao and his band as agrarian reformers.

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These summary remarks on Chu Teh are based on The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh, Agnes Smedley, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1956, *passim*.

Historical Influences

Western writers have indicated that a number of historical influences had a bearing on the framing of the Chu-Mao concept of irregular warfare.

In her book, The Great Road: The Life and Times of Chu Teh, Agnes Smedley cites the influence of Sun Tzu, of the Chinese and Mongol armies of ancient times, and of the Taipings. She recalls that Chu Teh quoted with approval the advice of an old Chinese bandit, who was known as Old Deaf Chu, to the effect that "You don't have to know how to fight; all you have to know is how to encircle the enemy." Miss Smedley maintains that there was little or no Russian influence on Chinese Communist strategy and tactics.

According to Robert Elegant, "the first textbook on large-scale partisan warfare" which was used by Chu was "a short work on the tactics employed by General George Washington."² Mr. Elegant continues that Washington's example was particularly apt, because Chu Teh, too, was fighting with inferior forces for the establishment of a new form of government against an unenthusiastic enemy. Since Washington and his Continentals had modeled their tactics on those of the American Indians, presumably of Asian origin, the lesson had come full circle.

According to Haldore Hanson, the fabulous T. E. Lawrence exerted his influence. Mr. Hanson visited the headquarters of General Lu Cheng-ts'ao, the commander of the Central Hopeh guerrillas. In Humane Endeavor, the Story of the China War, Mr. Hanson reports that General Lu had a Chinese translation of Seven Pillars of Wisdom in his tent and that General Lu and other commanders in China considered Lawrence's work "one of the standard reference books on strategy."

Robert Payne says that Mao Tse-tung and Lawrence of Arabia are the only scholar-soldiers who have fought and won extensive guerrilla campaigns in recent history. In his book, Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China, Payne adds, however, that:

"When the Chinese Communists were told of his (Lawrence's) exploits, they were tempted to disbelieve their informant, as though guerrilla warfare was their own invention, the legacy of the 222 wars fought in the 'Spring and Autumn Period' and the countless Chinese wars which followed."

Washington, Lawrence, and Old Deaf Chu all may have influenced the Chu-Mao concept of irregular warfare although there is no readily discoverable evidence to indicate that any of them had an overriding influence. A study of the writings of Mao and of the imitative writings of other Chinese Communists prominent in military affairs--such as Chu Teh, Nieh Jung-ch'en, P'eng Teh-huai, Kuo Hua-jo, and others--indicates that the important influences on the Communist concept of irregular warfare were the situation and the terrain. These influences are clearly evident in the writings of Mao.

Guerrilla Warfare and Environment

Mao emphasized the peculiar Chinese character of his concept in an essay, "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," in Volume I of his Selected Works. He criticized three groups which did not understand that China's revolutionary war "is waged in the special environment of China."

The first group "declare(s) that it is enough to study merely the laws of war in general...." Mao maintained that the laws of war in general should indeed be studied, but "although we must cherish the experiences acquired by people in the past at the cost of their blood, we must also cherish experiences at the cost of our own blood."

The second group suggested that "it is enough to study Russia's experiences of revolutionary war...." "They do not see," said Mao, "that these laws of war and military directives in the Soviet Union embody the special characteristics of the civil war and the Red Army of the Soviet Union." He added that "there are a great number of conditions special to the Chinese revolution and the Chinese Red Army."

The third erroneous group wanted to base its theory on the Northern Expedition of 1926-27. Mao rejected this theory as he contended "we should work out our own measures according to our present circumstances."

Mao summed up the peculiarities of his concept and its design for the situation and terrain in China as follows:

"Thus the difference in the circumstances of wars determines the difference in the guiding laws of wars: the differences of time, place, and character."

* * * *

"In studying the guiding laws of war of different historical stages, of different characters, of different places, and of different nations, we must keep our eyes on their respective characteristics and their development, and must oppose a mechanical approach to the problem of war."

Basic Principles

Mao stresses that the basic principles of guerrilla warfare can be summarized in the famous slogans of the Chinese Communist Forces:

1. Enemy advances, we retreat.
2. Enemy halts, we harass.
3. Enemy tires, we attack.
4. Enemy retreats, we pursue.

These slogans consist of four Chinese characters each. In an attempt to capture a similar pattern in the English translation, this somewhat awkward form has been produced.

These statements--as well as the influence of time, place, and character--have been elaborated by Mao in "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War," Volume II, Selected Works. This essay is presented as an effort concerning the anti-Japanese war and is not intended as positing general rules for guerrilla warfare. There are, in fact, six specific problems of the anti-Japanese war which are discussed as problems peculiar to the time and place considered by the essay. In addition, Mao, from time to time in the course of the essay, permits himself to speak of warfare in general terms. Since Mao is at such pains to distinguish between the specific and the general, it is only fair that the two not be confounded and a sincere and continuing attempt has been made in that direction in this study.

Specific Problems

As pointed out by Mao in Volume II, the specific strategic problems of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war are:

- "1. On our own initiative, with flexibility and according to plan, carry out offensives in a defensive war, battles of quick decision in a protracted war, and exterior-line operations within interior-line operations.'
2. Coordinate with regular warfare.'
3. Establish base areas.'
4. Undertake strategic defensive and strategic offensive.'
5. Develop into mobile warfare.'
6. Establish correct relationship of commands."

While describing and developing these six specific problems in the essay, Mao elucidates the following general principles:

- "1. Conservatism in guerrilla warfare must be opposed.'
2. The principle of preserving oneself and annihilating the enemy is the basis of all military principles.'
3. Guerrilla warfare is different from regular warfare only in degree and in form of manifestation.'
4. The basic principle of guerrilla warfare must be one of offensive, and its offensive character is even more pronounced than that of regular warfare.'

5. The offensive is the only means of annihilating the enemy as well as the principal means of preserving oneself, while pure defense and withdrawal can play only a temporary and partial role in preserving oneself and are utterly useless in annihilating the enemy."

Undoubtedly, P'eng Teh-huai thought he was reproducing Mao's thoughts when he told Edgar Snow, "Partisans must not fight any losing battles."³

Analysis of Specific Problems

Mao's statements and their mirrorings by such as P'eng are more than blandness. For example, the first specific strategic problem places the task of carrying out offensives in a defensive war and of conducting exterior-line operations within interior-line operations. In an exterior-lines situation less space is held, the forces are usually encircled, they are more centralized, and hence more easily concentrated.

The anti-Japanese war was purely a defensive one from the Chinese Communist viewpoint and the Communists clearly were weaker than the Japanese. Had the Communists adopted a defensive approach under such conditions, one of two situations would have resulted--the adoption of positional defenses, or the abandonment of opposition to the Japanese. Either situation would have been fatal to the political and military plans of the Communists.

The problem of coordinating guerrilla warfare with regular warfare is viewed by Mao as a problem peculiar to the time and area of the anti-Japanese war. In earlier situations there had been no regular warfare with which to coordinate. In later situations, when guerrilla warfare had transformed itself into mobile warfare and into regular warfare, there would be no guerrilla warfare to be coordinated. The concurrent existence of regular warfare and guerrilla warfare made such coordination possible and, being possible, necessary at this specific time.

The establishment of base areas seems, at first glance, to be incompatible with the concept of guerrilla warfare (or to be more nearly exact, *yu chi chan*). Mao maintains that guerrillas without base areas are roving insurgents and can have no connection with the political aspirations of the indigenous population. The thoroughly political character of Mao's theory makes such a concept anathema. While serving a political purpose, the base area also serves a definite military purpose. They usually were located in the mountains, for obvious military reasons, although Mao did not rule out plains areas. Chu Teh has given a description of the military role of the base areas in his remarks concerning the Wutai mountains area. He said:

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Edgar Snow, Red Star Over China, Random House, New York, 1938
p. 276.

"Our regulars can return to such bases for rest, replenishment, and retraining, guerrilla forces and the masses can be trained in them, and small arsenals, schools, hospitals, cooperative and regional administrative organs centered there. From these strongholds we can emerge to attack Japanese garrisons, forts, strategic points, ammunition dumps, communication lines, railways. After destroying such objectives, our troops can disappear and strike elsewhere."⁴

In counseling the guerrillas to undertake strategic defensive and strategic offensive, Mao merely is saying that there will be an alternation of periods during which the guerrillas will be now on the defensive, now on the offensive.

The injunction to develop into mobile warfare goes to the heart of the Mao concept. He views guerrilla warfare as a prelude to regular warfare. The guerrillas will be transformed into regulars. In the best Marxian sense, Mao holds that by increasing their numbers and improving their quality guerrillas will transform themselves into "a regular army which can wage a mobile war."

Discipline Required

The establishment of the correct relationship of commands is synonymous to the establishment of discipline. Guerrilla units traditionally have been notable for their lack of discipline to the disdain and discomfort of commanders at successively higher levels. Mao has maintained elsewhere⁵ that "it (discipline) should increase with the size of the unit." Mao is calling for better command control while, at the same time, trying to avoid the restriction of the very essence of the guerrillas--their mobility.

The elimination of the six specific problems of the anti-Japanese guerrilla war leaves little of a universal nature in the famous Mao essay. The general principles listed here are of such a nature as to make further discussion redundant. Most analyses of Mao's writings on guerrilla warfare give a prominent place to "Strategic Problems in the Anti-Japanese Guerrilla War." This is as it should be for this is Mao's most important work on yu chi chan. However, they almost uniformly ignore Mao's own caution that the principles discussed apply to a distinct historical moment and to a definite geographical location. If the strategy and tactics which Mao adopted in the anti-Japanese war are applicable elsewhere, that applicability would seem to contradict Mao's reiterated warning that every historical stage and every geographic site must be considered separately. It is not Mao Tse-tung who urges that Chinese Communist concepts of guerrilla warfare be imitated elsewhere.

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Smedley, op. cit., p. 360

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Quoted in Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Rigg's Red China's Fighting Hordes, The Military Service Publishing Co., Harrisburg, Pa., 1951, p. 226.

Basis of Theory

Mao's contribution was not so much in providing war with "scientific" schemata as it was in recognizing the peculiarities of the time and place in which he operated and in adapting his theory of irregular war to the existing situation.

His theory of war, as outlined in Volume II, was based on the statement that "Every Communist must grasp the truth: 'Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun'." He maintained that "In China, without armed struggle the proletariat and the Communist Party could not win any place for themselves or accomplish any revolutionary task." His concept of irregular warfare evolved from these assumptions.

Guerrilla warfare was never suggested by Mao as a desirable or eternal form of war. He freely and frequently deprecated it. In 1936 he said:

"(T)his guerrilla character is precisely our distinguishing feature, our strong point, our means for defeating the enemy. We should prepare to discard this character, but we cannot yet discard it today. Someday this character will definitely become a thing to be ashamed of and therefore to be discarded, but today it is invaluable and must be firmly retained."

Conclusion

Mao made a virtue of necessity. His theory of warfare, in general, and his theory of irregular warfare in particular, were adapted to the circumstances of his time and place. The success which crowned the efforts of Mao and the Chinese Communists should not induce observers to discover elements which are, in fact, not there. Mao's theory has universal applicability only in its repeated warnings that every situation must be considered in the frame of its historic development and geographic setting.

PART THREE:

PART THREE: THEORY AND TACTICS OF COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS

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BEATING THE GUERRILLA

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This article is in consonance with current instruction at the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

THE spectacular successes scored by Communist guerrillas in the Soviet Union, Albania, and Yugoslavia in World War II, and in China and Indochina subsequently have fostered the myths that somehow the Communists enjoy a monopoly on this type of warfare and that Communist guerrilla forces are almost impossible to defeat. The truth is that the Communists merely recognized the value of this relatively cheap method of warfare and that conditions in some areas favored its adoption. The Communists themselves, governing by oppressive tyranny, are vulnerable to guerrilla warfare, particularly in all of the satellite nations.

Basis for Guerrilla Warfare

That Communist guerrillas can be defeated has been demonstrated in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Burma, and Iran; Communist guerrillas in Malaya are slowly being defeated. Moreover, during World War II successful non-Communist guerrilla forces operated in France, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, China, Burma, and the Philippines. Lawrence led the Arab revolt during World War I; Mosby and Forrest successfully carried out guerrilla warfare in the American Civil War; and Francis Marion fought guerrilla tactics during the American Revolution. The very name guerrilla came from the resistance of

Spanish patriots during the Napoleonic campaigns.

A guerrilla force or resistance movement must enjoy the support of at least part of the civilian population in which it operates, and render most of the rest impassive, to survive. There must be good leadership, a strong will to resist, a willingness to endure great hardships, and favorable terrain—such as mountains, jungle, forests, or swamps—in which to establish secure bases.

The other conditions which favor the adoption of guerrilla warfare differ according to the situation in each country. There may be two contending factions, as in China and Korea, or the issue might be national resistance to a ruthless invading aggressor, as in the Soviet Union. Opposition to the re-establishment of colonialism could be used as the rallying point, as in Indonesia and Indochina. The guerrillas or partisans might be used as auxiliary forces to the main armies, as in the Soviet Union. The guerrillas operating in support of all Communist parties are the militant arm of the political party which will seek to rule the state. In some areas guerrilla operations can be assisted by geographical propinquity to the friendly bases of the sponsoring power, as was the case of the Greek, Indochinese, and Chinese Communists. In other areas the guerrilla must fight without ready access to supply from a sponsoring power and not in conjunction with any regular forces, as in Malaya and the Philippines.

Communist guerrillas can be beaten if prompt, aggressive action is taken and relentless pressure vigorously applied. The plan must coordinate political, psychological, economic, and military operations

The guerrillas may be aligned with a foreign army on their soil, as the *maquis* were with the Allies in France, or against as the Soviet partisans who opposed the Germans.

Communist Guerrilla Strategy

Communist guerrilla strategy is simple. For a small investment in political and military leadership, and limited quantities of small-arms ammunition, a weak government is compelled to commit sizable security forces to a costly campaign. Communist political influence is expanded as elements of the population are alienated from the government. The population is terrorized into passive inaction. Various pretenses are used to cloak the real motives—revolt against colonialism, opposition to a corrupt regime, and resistance of oppression have been tried. Captured World War II weapons are furnished and satellite states act as sponsors while the Soviet Union poses as a neutral.

After sufficient area and population are seized, the guerrilla army is reorganized into a regular force, as in China, Yugoslavia, and Indochina. As soon as this force seizes a substantial part of the country, a government controlled by the Communist Party, ordinarily adorned by a few non-Communists in innocuous positions, is established as a "People's Republic" and

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
recognized by the Communist bloc and its dupes. Alliances are then announced by the Communist bloc and agitation to remove the old government is commenced. After the new regime consolidates its position, it purges itself and drops the pretenses it used to gain power.

Early Guerrilla Efforts


The Republic of Korea was particularly vulnerable to subversive and guerrilla attack. Expecting immediate independence and unity as a nation after the defeat of Japan, the Koreans were appalled to find their nation divided along an unnatural boundary at the 38th Parallel, and occupied by the two major powers emerging victorious from World War II. It soon became apparent that the Soviets were unwilling to unify Korea unless on Communist terms. The Soviets at once began the creation of a North Korean puppet state and a modern North Korean Army. They also fostered Communist political agitation in South Korea.

Unprepared for these events, the United States Government was slow in evolving a Korean policy. Various factions were jockeying for position when the Communists made their first attempt to gain political dominance in South Korea. A Communist uprising or riot was staged in Taegu and vicinity on 1 October 1946. The number of rioters was estimated to be nearly 70,000. This Communist-instigated riot, ostensibly based on objections to certain occupation policies, was abortive and failed.

It was apparent by 1948 that no agreement with the Soviets on Korea was possible, so the United States ended her occupation and turned over South Korea to the newly formed Republic of Korea on 15 August 1948, under the leadership of Dr. Syngman Rhee. President Rhee headed a young, politically immature Government which lacked experienced administrators and rested on a shaky economic base. The Government had a small, newly organized,



Specialized and refresher tactical training are essential to satisfactory results in antiguerrilla operations. Above, members of a South Korean officer refresher training class attending an open-air session. Below, a Korean National Police outpost in an area frequently raided by guerrillas. The woven bamboo fences were ineffective.



inexperienced constabulary force to defend it.

On 20 October 1948 a Communist cell estimated variously as from 40 to 300 in strength mutinied in the Korean 14th Constabulary Regiment while the unit was in Yosu preparing to move to Cheju Island to suppress insurgents there. The mutineers killed many of their officers and noncommissioned officers, seized an arms depot, and, joined by Communist civilians, commandeered a train and moved to Sun-chon, a city of 50,000. After seizing Sun-chon, the Communists fanned out in southwest Korea. By 27 October Yosu was recaptured and the Communists had fled into the Paegun Mountain area near Sun-chon. Another uprising at Taegu during the period 2 to 4 November 1948 was suppressed easily. The North Korean flag was flown and it was evident that the Communist regime in North Korea had sponsored these attempts to seize power.

The Communist guerrilla organization in South Korea was now established in the rugged mountains of southwestern and eastern Korea. The infant Republic committed its embryonic Army to operations against these guerrillas and on 25 June 1950, when the North Korean People's Army attacked across the 38th Parallel, three Republic of Korea divisions were deployed in operations against an estimated 1,700 hard-core Communists who were directing the operations of an estimated 5,000 guerrillas. These guerrillas were supported by civilian Communist sympathizers and were in communication with North Korea by overland and sea routes.

Guerrillas Aid Main Army

The Republic of Korea Army suffered from this diversion in two ways: its units were not properly trained owing to the operations against guerrillas, and the Army was not strategically or tactically deployed to meet the North Korean onslaught.

The North Korean People's Army enjoyed such easy, early success that there was no apparent need for guerrilla assistance to the main forces, and the guerrillas were relatively inactive. However, after the United States Eighth Army stabilized a defense on the Nakdong River line, the guerrillas became more active. Communist sympathizers, believing a victory was imminent, came out in the open.

The guerrilla threat required the Eighth Army on 19 July 1950 to designate an officer to coordinate the defense of the rear areas. He coordinated the efforts of Korean police and United States Military Police to protect railroads, highways, bridges, and signal communications against sabotage and guerrilla activity. It was also necessary to divert tactical units to secure rear areas. National Police battalions and Republic of Korea Army security battalions were formed to combat guerrillas in rear areas and to guard fixed installations.

Growth of Guerrilla Forces

The Inchon landing on 15 September 1950 broke the back of the North Korean attack on the Pusan Perimeter. The Communist Army withdrew under heavy attack from United Nations units which frequently knifed through an enemy unit and bypassed the cut-off remnants. Apparently the Communists had made no provision for this eventuality. As it was, thousands of Communist troops fled into the mountains of South Korea and joined the guerrillas there. They were also joined by many of the Communists who had come out in the open during the North Korean occupation of the area. The guerrillas were in control of large areas during the fall of 1950, and rear area travel was unsafe. Many villages were terrorized. A minimum of 40,000 guerrillas were estimated to be in the South Korean mountains in November 1950. That there may well have been more is indicated by the National Police claim that during the period from 25 June

150 to 31 August 1951 they killed more than 65,000, captured nearly 25,000, and an additional 44,000 enemy surrendered, for a total in excess of 135,000. This figure probably includes bypassed enemy troops rounded up in North Korea during late 1950, and may not be entirely accurate.

By mid-November 1950 a substantial part of the Republic of Korea troop strength was engaged on security missions. The newly organized Republic of Korea 11th Division drove through the guerrilla base area in southwest Korea to open the main highway routes, but many thousands of guerrillas remained active in the area.

The tempo of guerrilla activity increased during the autumn but the pattern indicated no coordinated effort. Most of the raids were for food and clothing. Survival was the objective; tactical operations declined.

Operations

The Chinese Communist intervention brought new patterns to guerrilla operations. The guerrilla organization was strengthened, new leaders were infiltrated to take charge and carry out new orders, and specific missions were assigned each unit. As the Communist armies pushed southward, the guerrilla activity increased. In January 1951 nearly half of the raids were on United Nations troops. United States Army and Marine troops, together with three Republic of Korea divisions, conducted almost continuous operations during this period to keep the guerrilla activity in hand.

The United Nations counteroffensive which began 25 January 1951 was accompanied by a new stability and increased antiguerilla activity; many guerrillas were killed or captured and many others were forced underground. Thus firm and continuous pressure on the guerrillas before they had time to complete effective reorganization curbed guerrilla strength as the United Nations counteroffensive rolled the Communists back along the

battleline. The severe winter, disease without adequate medical care, desertions, and lack of resupply contributed to a reduction in guerrilla strength. By 31 March 1951 guerrilla strength was estimated to have fallen to 15,000—a reduction from the 37,500 estimated in January. Later operations indicate this figure was a substantial underestimate, or the guerrillas were able to recruit considerable numbers to replenish their losses.

Organization

The guerrillas in South Korea were composed of the following elements:

1. Specially trained guerrillas, both as individuals and units.
2. Locally recruited Communists from provincial, county, and township organizations.
3. North Korean People's Army remnants.
4. Communist sympathizers and opportunists who were obliged to flee when the South Koreans recovered their areas.
5. Criminal elements.
6. Kidnapped citizens and prisoners intimidated by threats and force who frequently deserted at the earliest opportunity.
7. Non-Communists motivated by a desire to avenge some harsh or unjust Government action or to escape the misery and poverty of their existence.

The guerrilla organizations were under firm Communist military and political control. In the North Korean Armed Forces Defense Ministry, which is responsible for all military activities of the People's Republic, an agency known as the 526th Unit and also as the Guerrilla Guidance Bureau exercised control over guerrilla units in South Korea. The Communist Korean Labor Party also had a Guerrilla Department; this department controlled the Labor Party in South Korea, which exercised political control over guerrilla activities within the Republic of Korea area. In the Communist hierarchy,

the political chief is dominant, so the structure was based upon a political party supported by a military arm. Guerrilla units operated within their assigned areas under control of the 526th Unit which operated directly under General Headquarters, North Korean People's Army.

The original plan of the North Korean Government, as outlined in a 1949 publication, provided for military coordination between local guerrilla forces and Communist armies driving down from the north to facilitate the conquest of the country. The 526th Unit dispatched hundreds of infiltrator guerrillas singly or in small groups to South Korea where they were to infiltrate various United Nations and Republic of Korea organizations and engage in underground activities. Most of these were former South Koreans who were Communists; they were specially trained and returned to work near their homes.

Secret police agents were attached to conduct investigations and to check on the political reliability of guerrilla leaders and individual members. Agents were trained and politically indoctrinated at training schools in North Korea. Military subjects such as the care and use of weapons, map reading, camouflage, and guard duty were taught.

No firm table of organization existed. Units varied greatly in size—from half a dozen up to several hundred members. Units frequently reorganized and changed their names. The units were identified by local area designation, by numerical designation, by the name of the leader, or by a name with propaganda or Party significance.

After the front stabilized in the spring of 1951, communications and supply problems became increasingly difficult and control was exercised regionally in the major mountain hideouts in southwest Korea. Guerrilla headquarters for all of South Korea was set up in the Chiri Mountain area under the leadership of

Lee Hyung Sang. Ironically, Lee was removed by the Party following the purge of his sponsor in North Korea as a reper- cussion of Beria's downfall in the Soviet Union. Lee was killed by a member of a special antiguerrilla unit of the Republic of Korea Army shortly thereafter during a patrol action on 17 September 1953.

A word should be said about the infiltration of guerrillas, agents, and enemy soldiers among the hordes of refugees during the war of movement in 1950 and 1951. Screening 5 million refugees was an almost impossible task; and, therefore, many guerrillas were thus able to move through the United Nations lines and join guerrilla units in the mountains. The Communists also sought to exploit the opportunities to recruit members from among these homeless and destitute wanderers. Their number was beyond the ability of the shattered Republic of Korea Government to resettle at once.

Guerrilla Missions

The missions of the guerrilla forces can be described broadly as political and military. Their political missions included the support and strengthening of the South Korean Labor Party cells; the dissemination of Communist propaganda; the creation of dissatisfaction among the Republic of Korea citizens toward the Republic of Korea Government; the fostering of resentment toward the presence of United Nations troops in South Korea; the disruption of Government control over the people; the ruin of economic life in the area; the infiltration of the Republic of Korea Government, especially the National Police and Armed Forces; espionage; and finally bringing about the downfall of the Republic of Korea Government and the control of the entire nation by the Communists.

The principal military missions of the guerrilla forces were to drain United Nations manpower from the front; destroy

arms, equipment, and supplies; furnish precise military intelligence of the dispositions, strength, movements, weaknesses, plans, and activities of the United Nations and Republic of Korea forces; impede the Republic of Korea war effort; cut the lines of communication by sabotaging the railroads, ambushing motor transport, cutting telephone and telegraph wires, and attacking very high frequency and repeater stations; disrupt utilities; interdict roads and trails with small-arms fire; lay antitank mines; attack isolated United Nations installations; raid supply and other installations; destroy bridges; crater and block roads; make surprise attacks on command posts, artillery positions, and Korean Military Advisory Group personnel; terrorize the local population to intimidate them and prevent their supporting the Government; assassinate local officials and political leaders; and raid police stations and isolated army units or villages for food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, and other necessities. The local inhabitants of guerrilla-infested areas were given the choice of leaving their homes and means of livelihood and fleeing from the guerrillas or cooperating with the guerrillas and remaining in an atmosphere of ruthless terror and constant jeopardy. More than 5 million South Koreans lived under these conditions during the period from 1948 to 1954.

On 9 February 1951 the Soviet news agency, TASS, broadcast in Russian over the Moscow Radio an order of the day signed by Kim Il Sung, Commander in Chief of the North Korean People's Army, defining the duties of partisans (guerrillas) as follows:

Partisans and women partisans must render any desired kind of support to the advancing People's Army and to the units of the Chinese Volunteers, exterminate the headquarters of the enemy, and disorganize still more the rear of the enemy.

Owing to the energetic action of the United Nations Command during the fall and winter of 1950-51, the guerrillas never realized their potential and, although they continued to constitute a serious threat to internal security and the stability of the Republic of Korea, they were actually only a minor harassing threat to the military operations of the United Nations Command. Prompt aggressive action had prevented the formation of strong and effective guerrilla forces.

Principles

A thorough understanding of the principles of guerrilla warfare is essential if we are to combat the guerrilla successfully. The North Koreans, like other Communists, follow Mao Tse-tung's writings which can be stated briefly as follows:

1. Guerrillas recognize the superior strength and better supply system of the enemy. The guerrillas must, therefore, try to prolong the war, avoid major engagements, seek local numerical superiority, and select objectives for attacks within their capabilities to ensure victory and obtain weapons.
2. Guerrilla campaigns must be adjusted to suit political requirements.
3. Guerrillas must wage a war of extermination, seize arms, expand their forces, and destroy the enemy.
4. Guerrilla warfare must be a war of movement. Positional warfare must be avoided, although it is possible to establish and defend permanent bases.
5. Guerrillas must retain the initiative in both the attack and the retreat, and maintain great flexibility in massing, dispersing, and shifting their forces.
6. Guerrillas must conduct a defensive war but maintain the initiative by conducting a series of coordinated tactical operations, including limited objective attacks.
7. Local superiority should be sought

by infiltrating small units into a major unit when desirable.

8. A favorable attitude toward the guerrillas on the part of the civilian population is essential and close coordination with Party workers in the area, especially in regard to propaganda, agitation, and help to needy local people, is necessary.

9. Finally, guerrilla strength must be increased so that permanent bases can be established. These bases are the first steps toward establishing a rear area and demonstrate a relative readjustment of combat power since bases can only be established when the guerrillas are strong enough to deny the area to the enemy.

Training and Tactics

In Korea, guerrilla training varied from specially trained soldiers and political officers, who were well qualified to lead their forces, to boys who had little or no training. Training literature consisted of North Korean combat doctrine for guerrillas and translations of Chinese Communist doctrine. Mao Tsetung's guerrilla doctrine was the basis of training. Open combat with superior forces was to be avoided. Quick action by small units was emphasized, to be followed by rapid withdrawal, dispersal, and subsequent reassembly and redeployment as a unit.

Tactical operations included ambushes, raids on army and police outposts and small settlements, harassing actions against Government forces and selected townspeople, hit-and-run terror raids, agitation and propaganda, and infiltration into Government forces.

The bulk of guerrilla incidents were raids and ambushes. Ambushes of vehicles were usually laid in a mountain pass where the road passes through a steep defile on an uphill grade and where the ambush party could take cover protected by steep banks, boulders, and forest. A road bend was a favorite place.

Small-size friendly patrols were frequently ambushed from hiding at close range with devastating effect. Patrols in column are particularly vulnerable on their flanks when cover is dense.

Most raids were against towns and villages or isolated military or police installations. Raids against towns and villages usually were to loot for food, clothing, and money, and to terrorize the local population. They usually occurred at night. Police boxes along the roads were frequent targets. Towns as large as 10,000 and 20,000 population were being raided as late as the fall of 1953.

Raiding groups usually operated in groups of about 50 men, but sometimes in strengths up to 300 men. The parties were broken into two echelons. The first echelon secured the approaches and exits from the raided area, and covered the withdrawal. The second echelon, the main body, followed shortly thereafter, closed on the objective, and accomplished the mission. Withdrawal frequently would be by a different route—cross country into the mountains or across a major river. Police boxes erected on the approaches are of little value, for they can be avoided or surprised and eliminated. Similarly, bamboo and sapling woven fences around villages, costly in time, effort, money, and materials to erect, proved ineffective as antiguerilla barriers.

Sabotage was employed to a surprisingly small degree. Apparently, a lack of mines and explosives saved the numerous and vulnerable bridges which were seldom mined or blown. Public utilities were seldom damaged, nor was there much damage to military equipment. Telephone and telegraph wires were frequently cut and trains were sometimes derailed, but the effect upon operations was negligible. The most important sabotage was arson, often in connection with terrorizing the civilian population, and sometimes—as in the cases of the great fires which swept Pusan in

1953—with huge military supply bases as the targets.

Harassment was used as a weapon of militant and propaganda operations. It was intended to lower the morale of opposing forces and intimidate the civilian population. This usually took the form of "visits" to the households of persons co-operating with the Government—threats, looting, kidnapping or murder, arson, and circulation of propaganda were the tools employed.

Propaganda disseminated by the guerrillas emphasized dissatisfaction with the Rhee regime, alleged that corruption of Government officials had contributed to ruining the impoverished people, assailed high taxes, decried police terror, and fomented anti-American sentiment.

The Communists asserted that they would ultimately win, warned the people not to support the Government, and promised a better livelihood for the people and the correction of various local grievances. Much of this propaganda was effective. The people were afraid to denounce the Communists among them or to give information until 1954, when it was apparent that the guerrillas were no longer able to take reprisals against them.

Although no longer a serious threat to military operations or supply installations, the Republic of Korea recognized that even during the course of the war it would be necessary to attempt to destroy the guerrillas who were terrorizing an area inhabited by more than 5 million people. Accordingly, a series of operations was commenced which ended on 30 June 1954 with the guerrilla menace eliminated as a material threat to peace, internal security, or stability. Less than 200 remained at large in scattered leaderless small groups at the close of the last operation. The morale and organization was broken. The remnants were surrendering and the civilian population was supporting the Government. It was then consid-

ered time to return the problem to the civil authorities as one of law and order.

Offensive Operations

The first of the special operations, Operation *Ratkiller*—employing a force of two Republic of Korea divisions, together with the equivalent of another division in security battalions and police—bagged the largest number of guerrillas. More than 11,000 guerrillas were killed, and more than 10,000 captured, including 50 major leaders. Approximately 4,300 of the prisoners were released after screening. This operation was conducted during the period 1 December 1951 to 16 March 1952 in the mountainous area of southwestern Korea.

Ratkiller was followed by Operation *Ferret*, from 17 March to 12 July 1952. Only security forces in approximately division strength operating under the Sonam (Southwest) Command—later redesignated the Southern Security Command—were employed. Several hundred guerrillas were killed and captured.

Operation *Mongoose*, conducted with a force of approximately two divisions, operated for only a little more than a month in the same area—southwestern Korea. Nearly 500 guerrillas were killed or captured.

Operation *Bloodhound*, conducted with approximately division strength in security forces under the Southern Security Command, continued from August 1952 to the end of November 1953. During this period the guerrilla strength had been whittled down to about 1,000 in South Korea.

The final operation, *Trample*, was conducted in approximately 2-division strength from 1 December 1953 to 30 June 1954. This operation succeeded in killing or capturing all the remaining leaders of significant guerrilla bands and breaking up the units. Many were entirely destroyed. The guerrillas knew the end had come,

and many were induced to surrender. Propaganda was directed at the civilians as well as the guerrillas, and with good effect. The population began to cooperate with the Government and to furnish information concerning the guerrillas. The reign of terror had ended. Hundreds of villages were reoccupied, land was placed back in cultivation, economic assistance was given to the relocated families, and life resumed its normal course.

Antiguerrilla Objectives

The destruction of the Communist guerrillas in Korea again proves that successful operations can be conducted against guerrilla forces. Military operations alone are not sufficient, for there are actually two objectives: the destruction of the guerrilla force, and the elimination of Communist influence on the civilian population. An over-all plan at the Government level, embracing political, psychological, economic, administrative, and military action, designed to prevent the formation of a guerrilla force, or to weaken it if it is already formed, must be adopted.

Purely defensive measures will permit a guerrilla force to grow and become strong. The initiative must be taken from the guerrillas. Limited offensive operations are better than none. Continuous, unrelenting pressure on the guerrilla must be maintained. Defensive measures are employed, of course, to protect supply and communications installations.

The major political and psychological mission is to win the active and willing support of the people and to deprive the enemy of that support. Skillful propaganda aimed at the people and the guerrilla can do much to help discourage support of the guerrillas, discourage others from joining, and induce others to surrender. A thorough knowledge of the needs, customs, and beliefs of the people is essential. The old principle of reward and punishment is still applicable. The people

should be given real incentives to oppose the guerrillas in the form of economic and other benefits such as rewards for information. Punishment must be meted out to those who support the guerrillas. Propaganda and persuasion geared to local issues and in readily understandable form should be employed. The attitude of the Government officials, police, and Army toward the people must be exemplary at all times. Harsh, unjust, arbitrary action or the mass punishment of innocent people for the misdeeds of a few will drive the people into the guerrilla ranks.

The Military Campaign

The military campaign should be in harmony with the political, psychological, and economic policies. Not only must the guerrillas be isolated from the civilian population, but they must be broken into small units isolated from each other. If the guerrillas are based in an area adjacent to or near a friendly or sponsoring power, then that base must be seized and the guerrillas cut off from contact, supplies, and support of the sponsoring power. This should drastically affect their supplies of arms, ammunition, and explosives, and should impair their communications and lower their morale. Finally, the campaign should attempt to cut off their food supply. These are the vulnerabilities of the guerrillas. The campaign plans should exploit them fully.

Intelligence

Military operational plans must also be based on complete and detailed intelligence. To this end a comprehensive intelligence net should be established with emphasis on transmitting information of guerrilla activity by the most rapid means available. All intelligence collection agencies must funnel their information in to the G2 of the antiguerrilla force commander without delay. It is especially important that police and other civil agencies understand and comply with this requirement.

Also, agents must be developed among the civilians who normally pass through or live near guerrilla base areas. The judicious expenditure of funds to purchase information can save many weary, fruitless reconnaissance missions, although properly planned reconnaissance is also essential.

The intelligence collection effort should be complete. A detailed study of the weather, terrain, the local conditions, history of the guerrilla movement, reasons for the guerrilla movement, factors favoring the guerrillas, and guerrilla vulnerabilities and weaknesses must be made. Complete order of battle information on each unit to include each member of each unit is desired. Personality files should include all local connections; frequently a mother can persuade her son to surrender, or a guerrilla leader can be captured while visiting his wife or girl friend. Special efforts must be made to kill or capture guerrilla leaders and seize their communications equipment. Aerial reconnaissance is often helpful in locating hidden camps, and ground reconnaissance by trained units should also be employed.

Combat Operations

Counterintelligence plays an important role in antiguerrilla operations. The enemy ordinarily has excellent intelligence. It is essential, therefore, to preserve the secrecy of operational plans so that the guerrillas do not escape before the trap is sprung. It should be remembered that guerrillas also attempt to infiltrate antiguerrilla organizations. The Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) must check all indigenous personnel carefully, especially any who are taken into confidence. Finally, the CIC may be able to assist in infiltrating our own agents into the enemy area, in preparing cover and deception plans, and in the collection of intelligence.

Combat operations against guerrillas follow this sequence: The antiguerrilla force commander establishes his head-

quarters near the guerrilla area, moves his troops in, establishes bases of operations, takes appropriate security measures, obtains essential intelligence, prepares operation plans, and launches combat operations against the guerrilla forces. Continuous pressure is maintained to seek out, gain contact with, and destroy the enemy. The guerrillas must be given no opportunity to rest, reorganize, rehabilitate, recruit or prepare for future operations. The operation is over when there are no guerrillas remaining—not when the guerrillas have been disorganized and dispersed.

Antiguerrilla Tactics

Guerrillas normally avoid contact with superior forces. They rely heavily upon their intelligence and security warning agencies in order to avoid surprise. Nevertheless, surprise should be sought in the offensive to get an opportunity to destroy them. Deception, speed of maneuver, ruses, ingenuity, and aggressive leadership offer the best possibilities of attaining surprise. Excellent mobility—on the ground as well as by vehicles—is essential to overcome the guerrillas' superior knowledge of the terrain and their intelligence system.

Encirclement is the most favored maneuver in antiguerrilla operations, but it requires very large numbers of troops if the objective is large or in rough terrain, as it normally is. There is a strong possibility that the enemy may escape through gaps in the ring of encircling troops. All troops should arrive at the line of departure simultaneously, preferably just before dawn, deployed on a skirmish line in continuous close contact. Reserves are placed in depth blocking the most likely escape routes to apprehend any guerrillas who escape. The ring is tightened as the units close on the center. The enemy must be flushed out into the open. In areas of heavy cover, skillfully camouflaged and hidden guerrilla caves and bunkers are almost impossible to detect. The recon-

naissance must be thorough and painstaking if results are to be obtained.

Another maneuver is a drive across a suspected guerrilla hideout area. This may be accomplished with fewer troops than encirclement. Again secrecy and speed of execution are essential. The guerrillas should be driven toward a blocking force which will destroy the guerrillas as they seek to escape. Additional blocking forces should cover other escape routes.

Once contact is gained, the basic fundamentals of fire and maneuver, aggressive and rapid closing on the enemy's flanks, and vigorous pursuit are followed as in any other tactical engagement. The objective must be the killing or capture of the entire guerrilla force. Guerrillas will attempt to hold off pursuit by a rear guard delaying action while the main body escapes. The rear guard would then disperse and hide or attempt to outdistance the pursuers.

Organization and Leadership

Special antiguerrilla forces—composed of experienced woodsmen, hunters, rangers, foresters, or other men at home in the guerrilla's habitat—organized, equipped, and trained to beat the guerrilla at his own game will permit minimum forces to engage the guerrilla and often achieve greater success than conventional forces many times their size. They specialize in surprise, deception, and night movement and fighting. Such forces gain in effectiveness as they gain familiarity with the enemy and the terrain, and should not be removed from an area until the guerrillas have been destroyed.

In Korea there was little occasion to employ armor, artillery, or tactical air support against guerrillas. Air reconnaissance is of value, and was not used enough. Air observers can be helpful in directing troops toward escaping guerrillas during an attack. Engagements are

usually fought with small arms. Light infantry mortars are capable of delivering all the heavy weapons support needed. Light recoilless rifles are of some value. The mobility of the attacking troops must be given priority over heavy fire support. In most guerrilla warfare this means foot mobility.

Leadership, tactical ingenuity, perseverance in the face of repeated frustration, professional skill, physical endurance, and the maintenance of morale under conditions of great hardship are severely tested in conducting operations against guerrillas.

Communist guerrilla warfare can succeed if the danger is not recognized, if the character of the action is underestimated, and if only conventional military action is employed. At the lower tactical levels, the unskilled, complacent, and superficial commander is rewarded by ambush, sabotage, defeat, and failure. At the national level, the result can be catastrophe and national defeat—as the Germans in the Soviet Union, the French in Indochina, and Chinese Nationalists on the mainland learned.

The Communist guerrillas can be beaten if, at the Government level:


1. The nature, objectives, tactics, and vulnerabilities of the enemy are recognized.

2. A broad policy, combining military action conducted by adequately specially trained forces under dynamic leadership employing political, economic, and psychological measures designed to gain the support of the civilian population, and isolate and destroy the guerrillas, is adopted.

This has been demonstrated in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Iran, and Burma.

Guerrilla Balance Sheet

What did the guerrillas accomplish in Korea? They diverted combat units and manpower from the front. They supplied intelligence to North Korea until their communications failed. They terrorized



Sharp ridges characterize the rugged Korean Mountains. Above, Chiri Mountain, which was the principal guerrilla stronghold for all South Korea, has a perimeter of 125 miles at its base. Below, South Korean Army troops attired in the quilted winter uniform assemble after completing an antiguerrilla operation in a mountain area.



large areas and kept millions of people in turmoil. They prevented effective Government control over large areas for several years. They prevented the cultivation of some land. They engaged in minor harassing actions against the lines of communication. However, after the front was stabilized early in 1951, they failed to constitute a real threat to the rear area or to combat operations.

What were their vulnerabilities? They suffered decreasing civilian support due to their cruel and terrorist tactics. They had no secure bases. They had no reliable, effective contact with North Korea for supply and communications. They lacked supplies, good arms, ammunition, medical service, adequate communications, sufficient training, and finally, they lacked a belief in ultimate victory.

Lessons Learned

Many mistakes were made in conducting antiguerrilla operations in Korea. At first the political, psychological, economic, and military policies were not adequately coordinated; that situation improved substantially by 1953 and 1954. Sometimes there was a lack of unity of command. This promoted rivalry and jealousy between the police and the Army; at times the two forces were operating in the same area and because of lack of coordination they engaged each other. The situation was corrected late in 1953 by subordinating the police to the Army for antiguerrilla operations. The troops used in antiguerrilla operations frequently were not adequately trained for this mission. Other units were kept continuously engaged on antiguerrilla missions until they became stale and ineffective and they needed retraining desperately. Small unit leadership was often poor and lacking in aggressiveness, as was evidenced by the fact that repeated contacts with guerrillas were made without results.

Political, psychological, and economic

measures were not well coordinated until late in the campaign. The national economy suffered from inflation, the inevitable result of the war. Propaganda was not directed at the civilian population intelligently and, therefore, often lacked appeal. The offering of substantial monetary rewards for information leading to the apprehension of guerrillas would have been an effective incentive, and would have been much less expensive than the operational methods used—moreover, rewards would have actively aligned the people on the side of the Government. The police—who were too numerous and too poorly paid and trained—were ineffective and too oppressive in their dealings with the people. This helped swell guerrilla ranks by creating resentment toward the Government and a desire for vengeance.

Another serious omission was the failure to organize, equip, train, and charge local governmental units with responsibility for local self-defense. There were so-called volunteer police, but they were ineffective. The local citizens should have been given responsibility to organize recognized vigilantes to cooperate with Army units operating in the area.

There were too few specially trained antiguerrilla forces. More should have been trained to fight the guerrilla on his own terms.


Intelligence was not as effectively coordinated as it should have been. The police often failed to report information of guerrilla incidents in time for competent Army units to take counteraction.

Many of these defects were remedied or improved during the conduct of operations—others were not. To the extent that they were not, the over-all antiguerrilla campaign was impaired.

That the campaign was successfully concluded is a tribute to the untiring efforts and perseverance of thousands of Republic of Korea Army officers and men, and to many conscientious National Police



Superior mobility and communications and the movement of reserves are required for successful antiguerrilla operations. Above, South Korean Army troops detruck as the ring is tightened on the Lee Yung Hae guerrilla unit following the Uiryong raid. Below, part of the weapons seized in Operation Trample.—Department of Defense photos.



officers. Many local citizens and officials who braved Communist threats to continue to do their duty and support their country also deserve credit.

Conclusions

Communist guerrillas can be beaten if prompt, aggressive action is taken. The plan must coordinate political, psychological, economic, and military operations. The initiative must be seized; relentless pressure must be applied.

The guerrillas must be deprived of civilian support, and the active cooperation of the civilian population must be gained. The guerrillas must be cut off from the support of their sponsoring power and their sources of supply.

Specially trained antiguerrilla forces utilizing qualified local men employing guerrilla tactics are much more economical in cost, numbers, and results than large forces employing conventional methods. Local governmental units must be given the means and charged with the responsibility of combating guerrillas in their areas.

Adequate incentives to support the Government and oppose the guerrillas must be provided. Propaganda should be addressed to the local population and deal with local problems. The people must be reassured that it is in their interest to support the Government.

A comprehensive, effective intelligence net, utilizing all collection agencies and sources available, operating under centralized direction, is essential in antiguerrilla operations.

Tactics should emphasize encirclement, wherever possible, surprise, deception, speed of execution, thorough reconnaissance, mutual support of patrols, aggressive closing with the guerrillas on gaining contact, fire and maneuver, maintenance of contact and vigorous pursuit until the enemy is destroyed, and relentless pressure to flush out the guerrillas and keep them on the move so that superior forces, co-ordinated by excellent communications and taking advantage of superior mobility, can close with and destroy the guerrillas.

Operations against guerrillas should be continued without interruption until the guerrilla force is completely destroyed.

Current United States Army doctrine on antiguerrilla warfare as enunciated in Field Manual 100-5, *Field Service Regulations—Operations*, Field Manual 31-15, *Special Operations—Operations Against Airborne Attack, Guerrilla Action and Infiltration*, and Field Manual 31-20, *Special Operations—Operations Against Guerrilla Forces* is sound and adequate.

Recommendations

It would appear desirable to give more instruction in antiguerrilla operations in service schools, and more training in this subject to units.

Antiguerrilla plans should be prepared by every command faced with the possibility of a guerrilla threat. Recommendations for the adoption of political, psychological, and economic policies designed to prevent the rise of a guerrilla force or to minimize its effect should be pressed vigorously on the government concerned.

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Authors submitting materials to the MILITARY REVIEW are requested to forward manuscripts through the Security Review Branch, Office of Public Information, Office Secretary of Defense, The Pentagon, Washington 25, D. C.

An Effective Counterguerrilla Procedure

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Captain André Souyris in "Revue de Défense Nationale" (France) June 1956.

DURING the early post World War II period in Cambodia, an instability of government due to violent internal dissensions and growing insecurity on the frontiers presaged general anarchy—a bad outlook for the future.

Today, far from showing signs of imminent decadence, a new Cambodia assumes an increasingly important place in southeastern Asia.

This change was effected by means of a regroupment of the populations which permitted including the inhabitants in a system of self-defense. This procedure proved its effectiveness in the fight against subversion, which had won over the majority of the Cambodian population.

1951-52

During the years of 1951-52 the methodical action undertaken by the Vietminh and its accomplices was increasingly successful throughout Cambodia. The rebellious territorial organization enjoyed popular support and, in spite of all the efforts undertaken against them, held governmental authority in check.

In conformity with the principles of revolutionary war, the action of the rebels

was aimed, first of all, at conquering the population. To this end, all the means of revolutionary technique were utilized, from propaganda and terror to guerrilla actions destined for strengthening the movement.

As soon as the locally responsible individuals were instructed, a solid, territorial organization was established. Each village constituted a rebel cell, and each village had its politico-military committee under the committees of the superior echelons of the cantons and provinces. A people's police force was charged with seeing that prescribed measures were applied. Moreover, organizations which grouped the inhabitants in accordance with their professional activities, and in accordance with their age and sex, were employed for the indoctrination and the conquest of minds. Trapped, thus, in a complex system of both physical and moral effects, the population collaborated in the expansion of the rebel system.

Alongside the zones of obedience certain sectors of the national territory were occupied by the organization of the *Khmers-Issarak*s or "Free Cambodians." More or less allied with the national organization, they employed the same meth-

ods of clandestine administration destined for maintaining the population in strict obedience.

In the midst of a population organized in this way, the rebel forces were shielded from all surprises. With easy means for obtaining supplies, with a security organization and a permanent intelligence network at their disposal, they could allow themselves either to fall back before hostile forces, or to attack by surprise when possible and without too many risks.

The French and Cambodian civil and military authorities realized that nothing of any actual value could be accomplished as long as the rebels enjoyed the support of the population.

Various systems of pacification based on the construction of fortified works destined for the protection of the governmental authorities and the axes of communication were instituted. These did not obtain satisfactory results due to the extreme dispersion of the inhabited places. By day, the rebels seemed to be nonexistent, but night favored their activities of propaganda and terror. It was the permanent presence of the rebel administration and the fear of reprisals which tipped the scales in favor of the rebellion.

Thus during the years of 1951-52, in spite of all the administrative and military efforts, governmental authority over the population decreased and the influence of the rebels correspondingly increased.

The Solution

The actual problem "boiled down," therefore, to taking away from the rebels the support of the population. To accomplish this the widely dispersed inhabitants had to be shielded from the reprisals of the rebels.

After many gropings and hesitations, the solution of following the precedent of the rebels was tried. The population was to be organized in such a way as to oblige it to side with the legal government,

thereby ensuring its coordinated self-defense. To this end the habitations were to be regrouped in order to constitute large inhabited places in locations where they could be easily watched over by the government forces.

This solution had been tried with success in a frontier province in 1946. This province had been the victim of the Vietminh fury—at that period, *blind fury*—which burned the frontier villages. Rebuilt along the sides of the roads and highways, organized in accordance with a plan of defense and included in the frontier defense disposition, these villages were thereafter rarely disturbed. After that time this province was almost impermeable to the infiltrations and subversion which little by little extended over the rest of Cambodia.

Like methods were employed, with success, in the province of Kandal to protect the populations living along the banks of the Mekong and Bassac Rivers.

Regroupment of the populations seemed, therefore, to be the only method capable of dislodging the Vietminh without leaving the possibility of a return and, at the same time, shielding the inhabitants from its influence.

In spite of these examples, there was no official policy of reassemblage of the inhabitants. The initiative in the matter had been the responsibility of teams of men, civilian and military, and the action of the government was felt only in the form of relatively small material aid. It needed only the personal impulsion of the sovereign (who had become the chief of the government) for regroupment to be studied and carried out.

A Directorate of the *Autodefense of the Populations* was created in the Ministry of the Interior. Established on the basis of the particular situation in each province, the plan they evolved determined the zones where the regroupment would be accomplished.

The method, as finally settled on, was based on the following three principles:

The regrouped inhabitants must be able, without too many difficulties, to work their cultivated terrains.

The basic rule was to regroup the houses in such a way as to leave the inhabitants within normal operating distance of their sources of livelihood: rice fields or fishing areas. On the average the changes of locale of habitation extended from a few hundred meters to three kilometers, with the exception of certain forest hamlets which were regrouped at greater distances.

The locations of the new villages must be in accord with the requirements of their collective life with respect to sources of water, health, and hygiene, and must be sufficiently large to accommodate the intended inhabitants.

In each province special administrative teams were constituted to direct the operations. The locations were chosen, as far as possible, on state land, and when the land did not belong to the state, their owners exchanged those under cultivation for other pieces of land.

The new villages must be included in the defense disposition of the canton and province.

To this end the villages were regrouped close to a route or connected with it by a road either built or reconstructed to accommodate motor vehicles. Moreover, each village constituted a part of the network of defense. Surrounded by ditches and barricades, provided with protective blockhouses at its corners, the village constituted a strong point, all of whose men made up the local militia.

In addition, the security of each village was incumbent, militarily, on a counter-guerrilla command. Located in the center of its zone of action, this trained and mobile unit continually made rounds outside of its base. Stopping in each village it brought the comfort of its presence to the

inhabitants, and by means of the detachments which it constituted occupied itself with the instruction of the peasant militiamen who themselves defended their families and the terrains in which they labored.

It was recognized that the period of time between the harvesting of the rice and the rainy season was the most favorable for the regrouping of the populations. The other months of the year served for the preparation of the operations.

The regroupment zone, comprising several villages, was protected by the French Army from the beginning of the operation. Its units stationed themselves there permanently while the administrative teams, aided by propaganda specialists and specialists in medical assistance, gave themselves over to their particular work.

The peasants who were destined to assume posts of responsibility or to form armed groups were regrouped and underwent a period of civic and military instruction lasting two or three weeks, then returned home to their normal occupation. The soldiers took part in preparing the village and, at the same time, maintained security. They remained there until the stage of advancement reached by the defense works made it possible for local forces to resist the attacks of the rebels.

In the meantime, the permanent setup, composed of the village or canton authorities, provincial police, and the personnel of the counter-guerrilla commands, was installed and took charge of the new defense zone.

The Results

In 1952 this method was applied everywhere where the situation required it: in a thorough manner in the worst frontier provinces, and in a sporadic manner in the provinces of the interior. This crowding together of the population brought about a veritable revolution in the interior of Cambodia.

During a single season close to a half

million of the inhabitants of the frontier provinces of Kampot and Takeo were ranged solidly on the legal side. They were sheltered from the influence of the Vietminh which had utilized their area for several years as an important zone of transit for the equipment and armament purchased in Thailand. The rebel war treasury, which had been largely fed by high duties on the abundant products of these provinces, found itself seriously reduced.

In the face of the new situation the rebel committees and their people's police either departed for the zones which were still rebellious or, more simply, submitted and became, in the majority of instances, excellent defense elements. Transformed into sufficiently strong defensive organizations, the new villages held their own against the armed bands which formerly had kept the inhabitants in permanent terror.

The collective labor occasioned by the regroupment created a sense of solidarity, of confidence, and force which is given by mass and numbers. It gave birth to the indispensable conditions for engaging the population in the struggle.

The regular Vietminh forces, left to themselves, no longer benefited from popular support—the basic condition for their action—and rapidly disappeared from the defense zones of the populations. The government forces, now well informed, found it an easy task to surprise them and crush them before they were able to reach their place of refuge where the forest permitted them to escape. Several of their bands suffered heavy losses in this way.

From that time on, the army units, now freed from their mission of domestic protection, could be used for operations in the zones still held by the rebels. No longer giving them the initiative, they were able to push them farther and farther, destroy their bases, and progressively widen the pacified zones.

The active solidarity of the population has permitted the creation of actual communities, the indispensable basic cells of political and social life. The new heads of the villages, of the defense militias, and of the various organizations have acquired a new conception of their responsibilities. A new elite, conscious of responsibilities toward their compatriots, has been constituted.

The drawing together of the populations thus created the conditions for an amelioration in the economic and social domains as well as in the political domain. It represents an important factor of its progress for the new Cambodia. A domestic revolution is being realized.

Objectives of Revolutionary War

This Cambodian example contains some very valuable lessons which merit special study.

It is certain that the factors which permitted the success of the defense actions of the Cambodian populace are peculiar to the country considered. This example, therefore, cannot constitute a cut-and-dried mode of combat against the classical methods of revolutionary warfare. From the study it appears, as a matter of fact, that the results were obtained through an adaptation of the system to each different region considered.

Nevertheless, such an experiment carried out on so large a scale demonstrates that a country of modest dimensions with but small material resources can solve its own particular problem of insecurity. It presents, in addition, general and specific information concerning a system which represents an efficacious counterguerrilla procedure—on this basis it merits further consideration.

The failure of police techniques in the fight against terrorism in the urban centers and the ineffectiveness of the methods of a regular army in the neutralization of the rebel bands in the rural areas are demonstrated in the results obtained. These

failures are occasioned, in the main, by the widespread influence of the rebel organization on the local population.

When the forces of law and order run up against the barrier of the active or passive complicity of the inhabitants, their initial strength progressively diminishes until the moment when the dominance changes camp. On one hand, the mass of the population participates more and more in the rebellion; on the other hand, the government elements continuously lose support.

The origin of such movements must not be attributed to traditional, economic, or social motives. The real causes are of a political nature: the objective being the seizure of power.

This is accomplished mainly through

control of the population. Experience shows that when the inhabitants are drawn into the system of territorial organization of the rebels, the official side loses its authority.

The transformations observed in Cambodia as a result of the application of the methods used in the various political, economic, and social domains show that, far from restricting the development of a people, the system of the self-defense of population centers contributes powerfully to its evolution.

It is not one of its least merits that such a solution, while satisfying the need for security, at the same time gives the inhabitants new opportunities for development in accord with their legitimate desire for progress.

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DUAL STRATEGY FOR LIMITED WAR
by Captain Boyd T. Bashore
(Extracted from Military Review, May 1960)

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Lieutenant General James M. Gavin, Retired, in his book, War and Peace in the Space Age, predicts:

In fact this is the most probable nature of "future war, a slow, almost imperceptible transition of a bad economic and political situation into internal disorder. Arms will be provided by the Communists to the side they choose, and sometimes which side they choose is not very important. They will throw out the original leaders and substitute their own, including their own revolution of the 'proletariat' at a time of their choosing. Thereafter, sufficient force will be used, until combating it no longer seems worth the effort to the West, or until the West is decisively defeated.

This is, in effect, one important phase of the classic Communist concept of "protracted war" as formulated by Mao Tse-tung. This is almost what happened in the Philippines.

STUDY DESIRABLE

Americans should study the Communist campaign which was waged in the Philippines because it may be a harbinger of a type of warfare to come, a classic example of one type of limited war. In addition, it should be studied because Magsaysay won his war and thus became the only democratic leader in Asia, and one of the few in the world, who for all intents and purposes completely defeated an overt communistic armed rebellion in his country.

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SIGNIFICANCE

It may be significant that the government which won this particular war was neither a true nor a constitutional monarchy; neither a "democratic" dictatorship nor a colonial government controlled from a distant parent nation. This war was won by the only nation in Asia, and perhaps the world, which as a republican government that is somewhat like our own, modified only by the realities of the country itself, its geography, and the heritage and temperament of its people.

Political, economic, technological, psychological, and sociological factors, of course, are all extremely important, and must be considered in any realistic appraisal of the history of the Huk campaign. These are the

strategic factors of the cold war. Unless each individual government, no matter what its form, can offer the majority of its people something better than communism, then the bitter seeds of communism will continue to nourish and grow. Under our concept of government and world aid these internal factors, no matter how important they may be in the outcome of the struggle, cannot be controlled by the American statesmen and military men whom we entrust with the responsibility of winning this cold war. Essentially, we are pledged to support the status quo. As differentiated from the Communist in their protracted war, we are not committed to the principle of making over other nations and governments in our own image.

Robert Strausz-Hupe has stated:

The West has neither a doctrine of protracted conflict nor an international conspiratorial apparatus for executing it. What is more, we do not want such a doctrine or such a political apparatus, for it would be a tragic piece of irony if the men of the Free World, in trying to combat the communist, should become like them.

Thus these most important factors remain only the internal responsibilities of the people of a nation themselves, their political, economic, and religious leaders. As Americans we must concern ourselves not so much with these strategic factors, as with the tactical aspects of winning this type war. Unfortunately, we will see that in Magsaysay's kind of war the strategy and tactics sometimes become so intermingled that they cannot be considered separately.

BITTER WAR

The Huk campaign was a war as bitter, unglamorous, and thankless as any ever fought. It was guerrilla warfare at its worst. Countryman was pitted against countryman. It was a war in which the rules of land warfare and the Geneva Convention were unknown. Often it showed itself only in criminal acts such as extortion, kidnapping, and murder. It was fought by an enemy who varied from a single sniper in the cogon grass to battalion-size organizations--an enemy who seldom wore uniforms or markings, only the local civilian dress, and who one minute could appear to be a peaceful farmer or worker, and then the next minute could become a dangerous killer. No neat order of battle showed on the map with the traditional armies, corps, and divisions squared-off symmetrically against each other. It was certainly a hot war, but one in which at times all the expensive machinery of modern warfare--the airplanes, the tanks, and the heavy artillery and trucks--stood by idle. They were not worth the services of a single planted informer who would empty his carbine into the sleeping bodies of the Huks who mistakenly might have accepted him as one of them.

Militarily this was initially a war of company and battalion-size units. Patrols and check points were spread out a great distance from one another, searching for and sometimes finding and fighting an illusive enemy who

usually had all the advantages of fighting or not depending on his whim--an enemy who further chose his own time and place for the scrap with infinite care. In its later phases, in between small unit clashes which became less and less frequent, it degenerated primarily into a war of intelligence and psychology.

A student of today's changing military doctrine immediately will see certain sketchy similarities between the spread-out fluid war that the Filipinos fought initially and some of the tactics that are beginning to emerge as the accepted techniques of the United States Army in nuclear warfare. Certainly, there were no new "principles of war" developed in the Huk conflict, but the emphasis that was laid on the various time-worn principles is interesting and unique in many cases, as were the methods of applications.

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HUK'S ORGANIZED

On 29 March 1942 the CPP formally established a guerrilla force called Hukbalahap--Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon: (People's Army Against the Japanese.)

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Eventually, the Huk strength rivaled that of the guerrilla units that were organized and supported by the United States Armed Forces Far East (USAFFE). (MacArthur, in a far-seeing decision, refused to give arms to the Huks. The Huks, in turn, refused to join or accept orders from the USAFFE.)

The growth of the Huks at this time can be attributed as much to a popular patriotic desire to fight the Japanese, as to any true understanding or acceptance of the principles of communism by a majority of the guerrillas. No matter under what guise, the Huk leaders, in the eyes of many Filipinos, now had skillfully welded their cause with both nationalism and the patriotic battle against the Japanese.

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At first the new Philippine democratic government considered the Huk military actions to be primarily a "police matter." During this same period many non-Communists, who were more outlaws and bandits than ex-guerrillas, fell into the embrace of the Huks because they lacked anywhere else to turn. Because of this association with criminals, the Huk depredations in so many instances looked like an upsurge of the lawlessness that sometimes flourishes after any war. There have always been bandits and outlaw bands in the Philippines.

A trial and error police-style campaign of combating the dissidents was initiated. The former Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, summed up those early attempts by saying:

A remedy would be applied, and when it did not seem to work out, it was revised or discarded for another. In this we were fortunate that the situation allowed for a certain degree of experimentation.

"MAILED FIST"

When Manuel Roxas became the president of the newly created Republic in 1946, he tried to persuade the Huks to disband their military units, surrender their arms, and return to peaceful living. The Huks defied Roxas and continued their reign of terror. To counteract this display of force, Roxas implemented his "mailed fist" policy in September 1946.

Troops from the National Police Force, the Philippine Constabulary, were deployed in the areas of maximum disturbance. But what was already a festering situation was made worse by committing untrained military police units to an extremely delicate mission. This first use of troops afforded little security to the people. Depredations continued. Farms, and in some cases entire barrios (villages), were abandoned. This further weakened an already strained national economy. Travel on highways became dangerous.

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They were sent into a battlefield that was both military and socio-logical. With little firm guidance other than "use force," some returned abuse for abuse, frequently treating their own countrymen as people of an occupied territory. The "mailed fist" often was indiscriminately applied to civilian friend as well as military foe. Soon many Filipino farmers and civilians feared the Constabulary troops as much as or more than the Huks. This destroyed the respect and confidence in many of the people, not only in their armed forces, but in the central government. In many areas of Luzon the people now openly supported the Communist troops.

At this point a reaction against brute force occurred and the government, now under President Quirino, decided to attempt a new policy of amnesty. After months of fruitless naive negotiations, rampant with Red duplicity, this amnesty policy collapsed and in 1948 the government again resumed the "police action." The respite had given the Huks an opportunity to reorganize, rehabilitate, replenish, and stockpile critical items such as ammunition and medicine.

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The CPP now changed the name of the World War II Hukbalahap. The new army took the more appropriate revolutionary title of "People's Liberation Army," Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB). No longer was there any question about the basic intent of the renewed Huk conflict--this was revolution!

The year 1950 was the most critical for the young Republic. The HMB's were at the peak of their power. They stepped up their rampage of terrorism with kidnappings, murder, arson, and looting. Although the HMB guerrillas

were only moderately well-equipped with light weapons, and certainly were not well trained in anything above individual and small unit tactics, they had on their side the greatest advantage in combat--they were on the offensive.

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Filipino estimates vary, but most agree that the Communist strength consisted of around 19,000 active Huks, supported by 54,000 sympathizers. By 1952 the Reds felt they would have an armed strength of 173,000 Huks supported by a mass base of 2.5 million active sympathizers to carry their revolution.

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The Huks now successfully staged large-scale raids near Manila, and plundered several important towns in central and southern Luzon. Fertile fields and towns were deserted. HMB's controlled other major portions of the countryside, governing towns and barrios, collecting taxes, tributes, and ransoms, occupying the farms, and running military and civilian schools. They rode high on the hostility that was inherent in the tenant-landlord relationship in central Luzon, and the fear that had been instilled in many places for the Philippine Constabulary forces.

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These were dark days for "The Showcase of Democracy" in Asia.

Secretary Vargas said:

About the only redeeming aspect of the situation was the realization by the officials of the government and later by the nation that the solution of the problem was well beyond the reach of normal police action and that a more integrated national effort had to be exerted--The Armed Forces were called upon to spearhead the antidissident campaign, which originally was entrusted to the Philippine Constabulary alone.

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As the newly appointed Secretary of Defense, it was Magsaysay's job to cut out the Huk cancer and prescribe the cure. His first step was to reassess the Communist problem and determine why and where the government had failed in the past. Although technically his field of responsibility was restricted to the military, Magsaysay quickly saw that the military tactics of the antidissident campaign were unavoidable chained to the entire spectrum of the strategy of national internal policy.

In his research, the strategic crux of the entire fight against communism was discovered--or rather again realized--by Magsaysay. Simple stated it is:

Any 'democratic' government is neither of necessity nor automatically better in the eyes of the common man than a communistic government. In order to stamp out communism, the local government must clean its own house. A status quo that has bred virulent communism cannot remain unchanged. Communism seldom flourishes where the people are content and prosperous basically.

Magsaysay decided that popular support for Philippine communism existed for the following reasons.

1. In high circles the new democratic Philippine Government had drifted slowly toward what some people term the "traditional" Asian acceptance of inefficiency, graft, and corruption as the prerogatives of those in power.
2. The people had received abusive treatment from some of the military.
3. A lack of any national socioeconomic reforms, compounded by the people's almost universal poverty, caused great masses to feel that the national government was not interested in them, while the Communists were.

NATIONAL POLICY

Communism showed itself most dramatically in the Huk military campaign. Magsaysay realized, however, that in order to combat it there had to be, in addition to military action, a many-faceted political, psychological, technological, and socioeconomic operation in the Philippines. Magsaysay implemented a sweeping national policy. His tools were the "left hand" and "right hand" efforts. The government extended its left hand in friendship, while the right hand was used to deal ruthless military blows. All-out forces and all-out friendship were combined. Simply stated, the government promised mercy and help to those misguided elements who voluntarily sought peace and renounced communism; it promised all-out force against those who continued to defy the government. Each of these policies was to be emphasized on a priority basis. First, of course, a military victory was needed through the application of all-out force.

The Filipinos now realized that if their armed forces were going to counter this small unit hit-and-run type of Huk guerrilla warfare, they needed to be reorganized and revitalized completely. The company-size military police units that had been bearing the brunt of the Huk fighting had proved weak and ineffective.

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The solution was the activation of 26 self-sufficient battalion combat teams (BCT's). The combat elements of the BCT's consisted of three infantry rifle companies, a heavy weapons company, a field artillery battery (whose members doubled in brass as infantrymen), and a reconnaissance company. The administrative and service portion consisted of a service company, a headquarters and headquarters company, an intelligence section, a psychological warfare section, and a medical and dental detachment. The table of

organization and equipment strength stood at a high of 1,047 officers and men, although actual strength varied from full to reduced strength depending on the tactical missions of the unit.

The BCT's were under a unified sector command which had a small tactical headquarters. Two or more BCT's were attached to sector as needed based on the situation. The sector commander was capable of massing units for larger scale operations similar to a combat command of armor. When the Philippine Constabulary was integrated into the reorganized armed forces, the total strength of the military establishment was about 30,000 officers and men.

STRATEGIC RESERVE

Small mobile Scout Ranger teams were the army's "strategic reserve." Flown or driven into a critical area, the rangers backed up the BCT's when and where needed. In splendid physical condition, these squad-size units were capable of sustained scouting and patrolling for as long as seven days without resupply. They carried the battle to the Huk in the jungle wilderness of the Sierra Madre Mountains and Candaba Swamp, the heart of their final bastions.

Detachments also were stationed throughout the country to secure key terrain features that did not justify the use of a BCT, such as water holes, road junctions, and small barrios. Liberal experiments were conducted with every type military unit that might help in the fight, from scout-dog platoons, horse cavalry, and close air support to airborne troops. Their further use depended on proved results. Most of the sophisticated methods of modern combat, it was found, could not do the job of the "traditional infantryman" and they were dropped.

"Civilian commandos," able-bodied armed civilians representing a menaced community, were led by regular servicemen and equipped to fight back against the Huks. Their mission was mainly defensive, to secure a community, thus freeing the regular troops for offensive combat operations. To settle the inevitable misunderstandings, Civilian Advisory Committees were established.

As in any warfare, the mission of this right hand effect was to destroy the HMB army. To facilitate this, tactical training was improved. Constant conventional patrolling and small unit combat were initiated. An effective all-out drive to eliminate the HMB sources of food and supply was started. Every conceivable type of unorthodox operation was combined with the "conventional" guerrilla warfare: sniping; ambushes; surprise raids on HMB schools, camps, and supply points; individuals and entire combat patrols disguised as Huks infiltrated the HMB areas; periodic surprise patrols by civilian commandos; and total screening of entire barrios when the HMB's mingled with the civilian populace.

FAVORABLE RESULTS

These plans gave quick and noticeable results. Fatalities in fire fights began to average eight to one in favor of the BCT's and Scout Rangers. Within months it became difficult to find dissident concentrations in sizable numbers where before battalion and company-size bivouacs of 100 or more Huks could be found, they now split into itinerant groups of from 20 to 30 and avoided conflict. Later the groups shrunk even further. By 1957 bands of three to five men became common, vainly trying to exist, finally acquiring the instinct of the hunted animals they had become. This is the situation today with less than a few hundred armed diehard HMB's still roaming the jungles and swamps.

As the following figures indicate, the Huks had sustained heavy casualties by 1954:

9,695 killed in combat
1,635 wounded
4,269 captured
15,866 surrendered

By various means, 43,000 assorted firearms and 15 million rounds of ammunition had been rounded up; in contrast, only 1,578 Philippine armed forces personnel had been killed and 1,416 wounded.

An important lesson appeared during this period of gradually dwindling enemy strength. As it becomes more and more difficult to make combat contact with the enemy guerrilla units, a needle-in-the-haystack stage is reached where the effectiveness of "conventional" military antiguerrilla operations becomes unproductive budgetwise in simple terms of dollars spent to support the combat forces in the field, graphed against the number of enemy killed or captured. By conventional military intelligence means, such as scouting and patrolling, it is no longer possible to find a worthwhile concentration of enemy against which to commit combat units. At the same time, a deceptive feeling of security pervades the government and people.

Unfortunately, at this point, the guerrilla is not beaten. The classic military mission of destroying the enemy's forces and their will to fight has not been completely accomplished. In fact, the guerrillas who remain now probably have the most dangerous potential of any in the entire span of the fight. These are the die-hards, the Moscow-trained leaders, the dedicated Communists around whom a new uprising can spring if they are permitted a respite.

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When the needle-in-the-haystack stage is reached, combat troops gradually should be drawn out of their unproductive combat mission, and set about other tasks or demobilized, retaining only a mobile reserve, such as the Scout Ranger Regiment for emergency missions.

SCALE OF REWARDS

The psychological and covert war is most important throughout the anti-guerrilla campaign. But it becomes predominant in the latter "final crushing" stages. A graduated scale of rewards for the capture or for information leading to the capture, dead or alive, of ranking leaders of the movement is continued and emphasized. This makes the hard core and their units even more wary of exposure at the very time they should be able to relax because of the slackening of conventional military activity. The payment of informers and rewards must be decentralized to the lowest field commanders. In order to motivate the flow of current useful information, immediate full payment, or at least a partial payment, must be made wherever possible. The rewards also must be worthwhile, and should approximate cash sums for which the average citizen would work months--and in important cases years--to acquire and save in ordinary labor. In the Philippines, rewards ranged from a high of \$65,000 down. Even rewards of this magnitude were not entirely successful due to red tape, slowness of payment, and conflicting claims.

This phase of the operation obviously begins to depend less on pure military strength and more and more on the mass support of the people, on the civilian citizens of the country itself. It is virtually impossible to destroy the complete combat potential of the guerrillas by military force alone. If, as in the Philippines, the guerrillas are supported extensively by the civilian population, a winning over of the people must occur. This is the goal of the "left hand effort."

One of the keys to winning the support of the people, and to the success of both the "right hand and left hand" policies in the Philippines was a thorough housecleaning not only in the armed forces but in the entire government. Magsaysay attempted to eliminate corruption and abuse wherever he found it. This he considered as important as the hot war against the HMB. Initially, in the military, broad powers were given to field commanders to discharge or otherwise discipline men under them. Spot decorations, rewards, and promotions were made. Commanders also were summarily relieved and demotions made. Personal leadership and frequent field inspections of troops and units were stressed by all military authorities. A positive attitude was instilled in the armed forces, replacing the defeatism that had been present.

OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE

Early in such a fight a decision must be made as to who will do the fighting. Is outside help needed? This is an extremely important decision and, of course, depends entirely on the situation within the country itself. It has much to do with the winning over of the people. The Filipino leaders had to decide whether the situation was serious enough to ask the United States to send in troops. They decided against this action.

Whatever the initial requirements for outside help, every effort should be made to require the nation itself to take over the fight completely at the earliest possible moment. Lieutenant Colonel Villa-Rial in his article Huk Hunter says:

Foreign troops are certain to be less welcome among the people than are the regular armed forces of their own government. Local populations will shelter their own people against operations of foreign troops, even though those they shelter may be outlaws. For this reason, native troops would be more effective than foreign forces in operations against native communist conspirators. It would be rare, indeed, if the use of foreign troops would not in itself doom to failure an anti-guerrilla campaign.

Also to be considered is the need for lesser degrees of aid than foreign physical intervention in a threatened country. These opportunities appear primarily in the fields of advice, and in economic and material aid. The United States gave generously to the Philippines in all of these fields, and the place of this aid in winning the Huk campaign cannot be gauged accurately in black and white percentage figures. Needless to say, without the means to wage war, no battle can be won.

Certainly, the Joint US Military Advisory Group in the military field and the International Cooperation Administration in the economic sphere did splendid jobs and contributed immeasurably to the defeat of communism in the Philippines. The Free World was indeed fortunate that the geographical location of the Philippine Islands made it unrealistic for Red China or Russia to give similar economic and military aid to the Communist government on the Philippines. If the Reds had helped the CPP as they did in other Asian countries, the story in the Philippines may not have had the same ending.

When the combat situation became relatively quiet, reduced strength BCT's still were stationed throughout the critical areas. Major General Joseph H. Harper, the last US Military Advisor to President Magsaysay, compared their mission to that of the US Army units stationed at the cavalry and infantry posts throughout Indian country during the opening of our Western frontier. The Filipino troops could not be sent home or demobilized immediately due to the possibility of a resurgence of communism. The detachments spread a feeling of security to the people.

To counteract the ill feelings of the "mailed fist" that had turned the people against the military in the early stages of the campaign, these units were given semi-military public works projects. Assured that the soldiers would stay in their localities as long as the threat to their lives and property was present, and that the HMB could not retaliate, the people began to have trust and confidence in and cooperate with the troops. The stock in Magsaysay's armed forces began to rise.

It must be remembered, however, that the "left hand" effort was initiated and for the first few years carried out almost entirely by the Philippine Defense Department. Certainly the Department of Defense of the Philippines, because of this, was unique among defense establishments throughout the world. It made itself felt in every corner of the "civilian" government. It controlled or participated heavily in such seemingly non-military fields as: agrarian reform; economic aid; public works (in the rural development program); medical aid; justice (it provided "Courts on wheels" to arbitrate agrarian problems and institute harmonious landlord-tenant relationship); ferry and transportation service; and the conduct of many mercy missions.

* * * * *

On the governmental level he further stole the thunder from the Communists' slogans, like "land for the landless" and "equality for all." Counteracting each of the CPP rallying cries, he continued the far-reaching economic and sociological programs of the Defense Department. Where the fulfillment of the Communist promises were years away, Magsaysay offered the people something tangible and immediate.

He offered land to the reformed Huks and landless peasants. He backed this up with government loans to aid them over the rough initial period of becoming independent farmers. A commission was appointed to arbitrate the tenant-landlord problems. New farm settlements were established in the jungles supported by government funds, made up of ex-Communists and peasants from the congested areas. He required the armed forces, when they were not fighting, to build such public works as bridges, barrio roads, wells, and school houses. Aids to small businesses and farmers were established, such as the Land Tenancy Commission, Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Association, and the Farmer's Cooperative Marketing Association. He outlawed the Communist Party. And to counter Communist charges, he did his best to ensure that all elections were free and honest. "Positive Nationalism" was his answer to the distorted brand of Red nationalism.

OUR ENEMY - THE MOB



ARTICLE FROM THE
JULY ISSUE OF ARMY

"WHEN WE FIGHT SMALL WARS"-
BRIG GEN DAVID W GRAY

REPRODUCED WITH THE PERMISSION OF
THE ASSOCIATION OF THE US ARMY

U.S. ARMY SPECIAL WARFARE SCHOOL

Fort Bragg, North Carolina

WHEN WE FIGHT
A SMALL WAR

Extracted from article by Brigadier General David W. Gray in Army Magazine, July 1960


THE U. S. Army faces a wide variety of potential missions, ranging from all-out nuclear war to the dispatch of relatively small forces to protect American interests or to bolster friendly governments. Maybe we know as much as we ever will about nuclear war, short of fighting one, and our training texts bearing on the subject are fairly complete. We also know much about small wars, but here our training manuals are not nearly so complete, and our doctrine is scattered through many texts. This article will examine some of the tactics of small wars and offer solutions to some of the problems they pose for us.

First, let me define the type of small war I am talking about. Not one like Korea or Indochina, where organized forces fought each other. We have a fairly good idea of how to fight such wars. I mean the kind the British have fought in Malaya [see page 35] and more recently in Cyprus, and the French in North Africa. In this type of war the fleeting and elusive enemy does

not employ modern, uniformed, well-equipped troops that meet you in open combat. Nevertheless, he has a tremendous advantage in his anonymity, his knowledge of the terrain (and you), and his native cunning. That is the type of war about which we know least, but not because we haven't fought them. Our Indian campaigns, the Philippine Insurrection, and the interventions in Central America were small wars. We simply haven't written very much about them, and we haven't given them enough serious thought in terms of modern organization and equipment. It's time we did.

FRIENDLIES AND HOSTILES INTERMINGLED

I think it best not to use as an example any specific country or area of the world. There are many, many places where we could conceivably become involved. Let us assume that the government of Graustark has asked our assistance in maintaining control. This means that some of the



populace will be friendly to us, while those in opposition to the government will be hostile. In the most likely situation our assistance probably will be requested on short notice based on an emergency that gave the government little or no warning. Under such circumstances, Army forces initially would be sent by air, with reinforcements following by air or sea, depending on where they must come from. This means that the first elements to reach Graustark would be relatively small, and would expand as lift capabilities permitted or as the need developed. In any event, the total force eventually employed probably would not be large.


ORIENTATION OF TROOPS

Naturally, troop information before entry into Graustark includes the usual subjects such as nature of the terrain, climate, customs of the people, unusual health hazards, and details of any immediate intended operations. In addition, in opera-

tions like these, it is important that troops be prepared mentally for the conditions under which they will have to live. This particular orientation should stress these points:

- Because their numbers will not be large, our troops must make up in quality what they lack in size. They must impress the natives with their soldierly ability from the very beginning. Uniforms must be worn correctly, military courtesy properly observed, and camps neatly maintained. The whole atmosphere must be one of business-like efficiency.

- Troops must be told that from the very beginning they will have to live under the strictest discipline and controls. Every task must be performed scrupulously and to the letter, for the enemy will study how our forces operate in order to determine weakness or laxness which he can exploit. The troops should also be warned that from the very beginning any breach of discipline will be severely punished. There should not be,



BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVID W. GRAY

as often happens, an initial laxness during the first flurry of deployment, followed by a tightening up later. Each soldier must thoroughly understand that the initial phase is critical, that first impressions are highly important, and that the conduct of our forces must be exemplary from the start.

● Our soldiers must also be told that their attitude toward the natives must be correct and neutral. There can be no display of either friendliness or hostility, since initially it may be difficult to distinguish friends from enemies.

● Last, but by no means least important, we must explain the mission to our men. This must not be done in terms of high-sounding service school English, but in simple, down-to-earth soldier talk.

SECURITY MEASURES

We all know that in any military operation security is vitally important. However, in this type of warfare it is doubly important, since the enemy can be all around us and we must expect him to strike in ways that are most unusual or unorthodox. Therefore, special precautions must be taken. The fundamental principle should be to avoid fragmentation and the exposure of individuals or small groups to hostile action.

We are accustomed to dispersing our bivouacs in order to protect them against air attack or long-range artillery or missile fire. In the type of war we are discussing, such attacks are relatively rare. If they do materialize, then we have a type of war different from the one we are discussing. So rather than disperse, troops establish themselves in very tight, administrative types of camps. This practice offers many advantages. First of all, it simplifies local security since the area to be protected is relatively small and clearly defined. It also facilitates quick assembly of troops and the issuance of instructions. An additional but important benefit is that it also facilitates administration and discipline. The camp can be easily inspected and the men are always under the eyes of their leaders.

A second basic principle is that of collective security. Men must never leave the base camp separately. Even in seemingly friendly areas, they must travel at least in pairs. If the area is at all hostile, troops should move only in groups large enough to defend themselves against hit-and-run attacks. Trucks move in convoys, and commanders never travel without an armed escort. Above all, forces should not be scattered in small groups in an attempt to set up a cordon type of secure area. This only invites defeat in detail, as the French learned so bitterly in Vietnam. Such tactics merely immobilize forces, and surrender the initiative to the enemy. It is interest-

ing to note that in North Africa the French have not repeated this mistake.

UNCONVENTIONAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING

In major wars, intelligence usually is credited with playing a slightly less vital role than operations. This does not hold for our type of war. Intelligence is all-important and, by the same token, more difficult to acquire. This is because the enemy is dispersed among the populace, is ever changing, and is so hard to identify. Quite often his units will be fragmented, and his personal politics will shade through extremes of those who are merely uncooperative to those who are fanatical in their opposition. Under such circumstances, a normal type of military intelligence unit will not do. Political specialists must be added, and a covert intelligence network established that makes use of trustworthy citizens. There is also a use for those who are not necessarily trustworthy but who will sell information.

In addition, all normal means of gathering military intelligence must be exploited to the utmost. Every soldier must become an intelligence agent. He must be taught to be extraordinarily observant and alert at all times, not only for his own safety but so that he can report to his commander anything unusual he might observe, on or off duty. Troops stationed at fixed posts must have a lookout equipped with field glasses. The lookout not only observes, but records every move he sees. This serves a dual purpose. It insures that some seemingly trivial bit of information is not overlooked, and it has a telling effect on the populace. It reassures friendly citizens of the competence and vigilance of the troops who are helping them, and it is disconcerting to the unfriendly to be under constant close scrutiny.

Other sources of intelligence likewise must be tapped: U. S. government agencies established in the country as well as American businessmen and local officials such as mayors and the police. From all these sources a pattern can be developed. We can learn who the resistance leaders are; where their headquarters and sub-headquarters are located; their methods of operating; occasionally their plans. Based on this intelligence, offensive operations can be planned and undertaken. I stress this because it is only through the offensive that these wars, like any others, can be won. The British learned that during their struggle in Malaya.

ALERT FORCES, QUICK TO RESPOND

We have already seen that under no circumstances should forces be fragmented. A necessary corollary to this principle is that a system of alert forces should be established which can quickly respond to any threat, or take immediate advan-

tage of intelligence gathered by the means described to strike offensive blows or counter attempted moves by the enemy. The size of these alert forces should vary from reinforced platoon to reinforced rifle company. They should be centrally located and be on such alert status as conditions demand. This could vary from a ten-minute response to one of thirty minutes. Alert forces must be able to move out on foot, in trucks, or in helicopters. So that the response is almost instantaneous, each platoon's equipment is kept in ready racks in its area.

To facilitate rapid deployment, the estimated area of operations is thoroughly studied so as to locate possible targets at which the enemy might strike. These might include road junctions, defiles and bridges, homes of important persons, government buildings, public utilities, and U. S. commercial establishments. Each is numbered. A series of rendezvous points is then selected, each of which is so sited as to facilitate tactical movement against a group of targets. Sometimes these rendezvous points are the helicopter landing zones or the truck release points, or a common point might serve both purposes. Each rendezvous point is lettered. If practicable, all targets and rendezvous points are photographed and, where feasible, reconnoitered from the ground. This type of operation is given some simple alert designation.

DEPLOYMENT MUST BE RAPID

Let us say Firefly is the alert signal, that Target 9 has been attacked by a hostile party. Target 9 is half a mile from Rendezvous Point W, which is both a helicopter pad and a truck release point. The alert force needs only a simple order like this: FIREFLY, ONE PLATOON, W, 9, HELICOPTERS, 10 MINUTES. This means that an alert force of one reinforced platoon will prepare to move out in 10 minutes by helicopter to Rendezvous Point W for operations against Target 9. As more details of the situation reach him, the alert force commander can formulate his course of action. As companies are rotated on alert force duty they rehearse their procedures both by helicopter and ground vehicle so that execution becomes automatic.

We cannot overemphasize the importance of this alert force. In this type of war the initiative can never be allowed to rest with the enemy. Our forces must be able instantly to strike and recoil, harry and harass, so that the enemy's actions are thwarted or minimized.

In addition to its normal requirements, the alert force must act as a central ready reserve that can quickly respond to any emergency. There are many special operations which this force might be called on to perform. Current training manuals describe some but not all of the tactics

required in these special operations. However, those that are treated are not fully described or are not sufficiently detailed. In addition, although our soldiers undergo some training along these lines, it is not extensive. Certainly it is not geared to the unconventional situations we may encounter in operations of this nature.

Now let us look into the features of some of these special operations.

ROADBLOCKS THAT FILTER TRAFFIC

Here is a good example of a variation from normal tactics. Usually we think of a roadblock as a tactical measure in which the use of a road is barred by the presence of mines, craters, logs, or abatis, with the block covered by fire to deny the enemy access to it. However, our discussion concerns the establishment of a block which closes the road but still permits traffic to filter through after being inspected. Although sometimes these blocks will be fixed, in many instances they will be mobile, so that surprise checks of traffic can be made on different highways at any hour. The location of such a roadblock should be so selected that detained vehicles can be pulled off to the side and parked. The area should include a place suitable for troops to rest when off duty. The block should consist of two parallel barriers placed across half of the road some 50 to 100 yards apart. The area between barriers is used for inspection and control.


Barriers can take a variety of forms: saw horses, knife rests, chevaux-de-frise, or simply a roll of concertina. However, the barriers should be portable enough to facilitate quick set-up and dismantlement. Soldiers guarding the block are stationed in covered positions at a convenient distance on each side of the block. From here they can observe all approaches and apprehend persons who attempt to avoid the block by turning back.

Training for this type of operation should include planning for organization, equipment, communications, and reconnaissance for establishing positions. Troops must be taught how to quickly set up the block, to control traffic, and to inspect, search, and detain people. They must thoroughly understand that their attitude must be impersonal and correct, because many of the people they inspect may be friends, or at least neutrals.

Whenever possible, these blocks should be erected in cooperation with friendly local officials, and the actual searching of vehicles and people left to them. This is particularly important when it becomes necessary to search women. As a general rule, women and girls should be searched by native women. Usually, native women can be found and easily trained to do the job.

Another extremely important operation often necessary in this type of small war is very aptly

FIGURE 1. SWEEP OF AN AREA



called a sweep (*Figure 1*). A sweep is used where troops must thoroughly comb a relatively small, well defined area which may harbor rebels. For this maneuver troops are divided into a blocking force and a sweeping force.

HOW TO SWEEP AN AREA

Depending on the configuration of the area to be swept, the blocking force is divided into sub-forces. Thus, if the area is roughly square, three sub-forces are organized, and these seal three sides of the square. If the area is triangular, two sub-forces are formed. In specifying the area to be swept, boundaries are selected that can be clearly identified on the ground. Roads, streams, power lines, fire breaks, and ridge lines best serve as boundaries. This is highly important because the troops involved may not have had an opportunity to reconnoiter beforehand. Landmarks therefore should easily define the line along which they must block. Each blocking element must be large enough to be able to physically seal its side of the area, both visually and by fire. It should also include a small reserve for pursuing hostiles who slip through the cordon.

In the same manner, the sweeping force is divided into several elements. The sweep itself is so organized that it can physically cover the width of the area. Behind it, mop-up elements have the dual role of carefully checking out specified areas and of securing prisoners taken. A third element is a reserve with the mission of pursuing any enemy who evades the initial sweeping force.

In executing its sweep, the force assembles at a point far enough away from the area to avoid disclosing the purpose of its mission. Taking separate routes, the blocking forces and the sweeping force take off at such times as will enable all to arrive at their prescribed positions and to effect the block simultaneously. Naturally, this demands careful selection of routes and a highly accurate calculation of time and space factors. When they are available, helicopters are ideal for rapidly positioning both blocking and sweeping elements.

The key to the success of a sweep is to avoid the premature flushing of the quarry. The enemy must be surrounded suddenly, on three sides, and then be faced with the sweeping force which steadily compresses him into a net. If you think this is a difficult operation to execute correctly, you are right. It is difficult. Troops who have not previously conducted sweeps must practice them. SOPs must be adopted which will enable troops to carry out such an operation silently, speedily, and with little prior warning, because the targets for sweeps develop rapidly and just as swiftly fade away.

A search is quite similar to a sweep except that it is directed at a village or a built-up area,

whereas a sweep is executed in generally open country. Depending on the purposes of the search, it may or may not include a blocking force. If certain persons are being sought, the area must be blocked. If the search is for weapons or other contraband, a blocking force may not be necessary.

The search force is divided into search parties, and each party is assigned a specific zone. A search party is divided into two elements. One actually conducts the search, the other maintains external security and seizes persons who are to be detained. Before the search begins, the populace should be told about it and its purpose explained. They should be warned to clear the streets and that force will be used only against those who resist the searchers. This announcement is best by loudspeaker, but it can be done by posting notices or dropping leaflets from aircraft.

SEARCH OF A BUILT-UP AREA

At each house the search party asks the head of the house to assemble all occupants in one ground-floor room. To forestall charges of vandalism and looting, the head of the house is required to accompany the search party. A uniform system should be used for marking buildings already searched. In general, the basic philosophy of a search is to conduct it with a measure of controlled inconvenience to citizens. They should be irritated to the point where they will discourage dissidents from remaining in their village, but not to such an extent that they will be driven to collaborate with rebels as a result of their resentment at the search.


Neither the sweep nor the search is intended for use when resistance may be fully organized and expected to be severe. In such instances—depending upon the situation—normal offensive tactics will apply, whether you are fighting in the open or in a village. The sweep or the search may follow as an aftermath of such fighting.

OPERATIONS IN CITIES

In almost any small war of the type we are discussing, the area of operations most likely will include cities of considerable size. Major centers of resistance will probably develop in cities. Therefore, it becomes necessary to examine some of the situations that may arise in them.

As a rule, these cities will be a combination of the new and the old. They will have modern areas with large, well-constructed Western-style buildings, broad streets, and up-to-date facilities. They will also include slum areas where dilapidated buildings are primitive, with few conveniences. In some areas of cities both the old and new are completely intermingled. Usually, it is

FIGURE 2. ATTACK ON A CITY'S CENTER OF RESISTANCE



SCHEME. Single cross-hatched area is center of resistance. Surveillance cordon and screening check point located one block out. Sub-sectors A-E designated. Sub-sector F attacked from north and east to seize highest buildings (1 and 2). Remainder of F cleared. Other sectors attacked in order of D, E, C, B and A.

in these last-named areas where centers of resistance will develop. Here the rebels can draw support from all classes. The polyglot nature of the area affords protection, while modern facilities so essential in today's small wars are also available. These include newspapers, radios, telephones, and printing presses, all of which are used in the all-important propaganda battle that is waged relentlessly.

If the rebels seize control of an area such as this, their first action is to establish barricades at street intersections bordering the area of resistance. They use sandbags, building materials, furniture, rubble, or anything else that comes to hand. Then they establish control over persons entering or leaving the area, and resist with force any attempt of the legal government's army or police to enter the area.

Although it might seem a simple matter to surround and starve out the rebels in such an area, in practice it is not so easy. The physical problem of completely sealing such an area is considerable. However, this is not the principal reason. The fact that the rebels are in control does not mean that all the inhabitants are active participants or even sympathize with them. The legal government therefore is loath to take active measures of a nature that in the long run could react against it.

Once committed in such a war, our forces might find it necessary to reduce all or part of such an area of resistance. If seriously resisted, the operation in some respects assumes the character of normal city fighting, and also combines some features of the sweep and search already discussed. We can visualize that the operation might follow the pattern shown in Figure 2.

Sealing the area. To facilitate observation and control, a cordon is thrown around the area, generally a block away from the rebel barricades and preferably along fairly straight, open streets. In order to screen people evacuating the area, check points are established, using local police and gendarmes to the utmost.


Public announcements. Loudspeaker vehicles begin a program of perhaps 24 hours' duration. The people are warned that the area will be occupied and protection is promised those who temporarily evacuate the area while the operation is in progress. This announcement is supplemented by leaflets dropped by plane. Evacuees are cleared through the checkpoints. Those having no place to go are assembled at holding areas where all possible food and shelter are provided them.

The attack. The area of resistance is divided into sub-sectors, so determined as to facilitate attack. Depending on the size of the force available, one or more of these sub-sectors is assaulted. In each sector, the principal objective is seizure

of the highest building, from whose roofs all other structures can be swept by fire. Although this operation could be accomplished by the usual method of fighting up the building, from bottom to top, helicopters are useful. From a relatively high altitude outside the area of resistance, armed helicopters can direct suppressive fires on adjacent buildings. At the same time, a medium helicopter can move in at housetop level to drop a specially trained squad onto the roof of the objective. This squad, equipped with demolitions, rope ladders, and special wooden ladders that can be bolted together to extend to the roofs of other buildings, then assist in reducing the sector.

If armored units are available, special platoon-sized mixed task forces of tanks and APCs are formed for reducing barricades. To facilitate

FIGURE 3. SCREENING CAGE



clearing the street, these forces should include a bulldozer tank. In the absence of a tankdozer, ordinary bulldozers will do.

As successive sectors are cleared, citizens are allowed to reoccupy their homes. But the cordon is drawn tighter and tighter, until eventually the whole area of resistance is eliminated.

SCREENING THE POPULACE

Screening of people to seize rebels, agents, or persons merely bearing arms is always a must in connection with the special operations just described. To a great extent, the system to be used should follow that prescribed in the field manuals dealing with prisoners of war. (Figure 3.)

A compound should be established which includes a pre-investigation holding area, one where

the actual investigation is accomplished, and a post-investigation holding zone. In addition, in this type of operation, there must be separate inclosures for women. This last is becoming increasingly important, because the tendency seems to be growing to employ women as agents, in acts of mass passive resistance, in manning barricades, and in active combat.

SHOW OF FORCE

In disaffected areas where trouble may be brewing, often it is essential to engage in activities which might be termed show-of-force operations. Although it may be necessary to restrict the direct contact of troops with natives, it is also essential that our soldiers be seen by natives frequently enough to impress upon them the fact that we are completely ready for action if the need arises.

Show-of-force operations can assume many forms. They may be foot or motorized patrols which move about the area at varying times and by diverse routes. They may be roadblocks we have described, security posts along principal streets or roads. Or they may be training sessions which stress the special types of operations we have examined. Whatever form they take, the greatest possible emphasis must be placed on speed and precision of execution. Even if it be but a motorized patrol, all men must be uniformly attired, sit erect with lookouts in all directions, rifles held vertically between knees, and throughout an air of watchful readiness.

CIVIL AFFAIRS ACTIVITIES

In a small war like ours, civil affairs activities play a very extensive part. Since civil affairs concern most commanders only to a limited degree during peacetime, it is important that from the outset he give them his close and immediate attention. This is highly important because unless someone has acted with unusual foresight in preparing the troop list, his civil affairs section probably will be small and not too well trained as a team.

An initial and essential function of civil affairs is to establish close liaison with the specialist of the U. S. embassy who is delegated to coordinate problems in civil affairs. This liaison office should be the means of establishing initial contact between members of the military staff and their counterparts in the local government and economy, with whom they will have to work. Thus, G4 arranges for water supply, local procurement of food, and use of railroads, ports, and storage facilities. G1 contracts for the hire of local workers, and establishes feasible morale and welfare services for our troops. But because the entire force probably will lack understanding of civil

affairs activities and problems, one of the chief initial functions of civil affairs is to guide commanders of all units in instructing their troops. If these matters are neglected, the enterprise of local merchants anxious to profit from the presence of our troops and the natural desire of our commanders to properly care for them, will lead to all sorts of arrangements among lower headquarters which may not be in the best interests of the over-all mission. I realize that I have merely outlined the civil affairs problems, not fully explained it. Civil affairs can be handled smoothly once the commander faces the problems and in his efforts to solve them makes full use of his staff and existing U. S. and local government agencies.

THE NEED FOR A MANUAL

As with civil affairs, there are other aspects of such a small war that I have omitted or not fully explained. One of these is public information. The many headaches of logistical support are another. Actually, in none of the aspects discussed have we tried to do more than outline the problems and indicate that there are many special considerations. As we have seen, pertinent training material either does not exist or is buried in a library of manuals. Most of this literature is written in the context of a major war, where the atmosphere and the conditions are not quite the same.

I know we cannot hope to compile a manual that treats of every possible type of operation that may develop. It is also true that we have already engaged in such operations, and may have to do so again. Everyone knows we have forces in being that have been assigned such roles as a secondary mission. It seems highly desirable that we publish between two covers some approved principles to guide us in a situation which we might call "short of small war."

You may contend that such operations are not sufficiently serious, that even without such detailed guidance an able commander can feel his way, profit by early mistakes, and then carry out his mission. You may be right, but one truth stands out over all: If not skillfully handled from the very outset, these minor operations can beget false starts and a series of mistakes that might wind up in a much more serious affair, the ultimate consequences of which would be beyond prediction. Even if a major war does not materialize, the stigma of a small war badly bungled may haunt our statesmen for years, and return to hurt us in many ways. Therefore it behooves us to thoroughly study this unglamorous and distasteful mission, to the end that we can accomplish it swiftly and effectively if the need ever again arises.

Riot in Singapore

Typical of outbreaks short of small war, which the preceding article urges us to study, was this uprising in Singapore. Here, skillful tactics brought order out of what might have been chaos

Brigadier R. C. H. MIERS

IT WAS about one o'clock in the morning when the telephone rang by my bedside. I struggled from the depths of a deep sleep, fought my way out of the mosquito net, and picked up the receiver.

"Hullo, sir. It's Tony here," said the voice of the Adjutant.

"Hullo, Tony. Got something interesting?"

"I'm afraid not really, sir. Sorry to disturb you, but we've just had a signal putting us on twelve hours' notice for internal security duties in Singapore."

I thought for a moment. "That's all right. Just send a warning order to all companies. And I suppose we had better have another look at the internal security scheme in the morning."

"Right. Good night, sir."

NO REASON TO PANIC

I settled myself for sleep again. There was nothing much to worry about. Singapore was less than a hundred miles away and, in any case, at twelve hours' notice the earliest we could be asked to move was lunch-time. There would be plenty of time to get organized in the morning. Besides, I thought as I fell asleep, there had been nothing in the newspapers or elsewhere to suggest real trouble in Singapore—only that a number of defiant schoolchildren had barricaded themselves in their schools, and refused to come out. Surely there were more satisfactory ways of dealing with unruly schoolchildren than by calling in soldiers?

At 1100 I was in the process of wading through a ponderous tome bearing the soporific title *The Singapore Internal Security Scheme*. Before me, pinned on the wall and obscuring the map of our normal operational area, was a street plan of Singapore. On it were marked the locations of what are known as vulnerable points: the central telephone exchange, the electric-power plant, the radio station, and all the other installations which, if they were to fall into the hands of saboteurs, could cripple the life of the city. Also marked on the plan were a large number of cross-roads where in the event of riots we were required to set up sandbagged emplacements.

I knew Singapore imperfectly, but even were it otherwise I would hardly have liked to have admitted my knowledge. For by us, whose job it was to hunt down terrorists in the jungles of Malaya, Singapore was regarded in much the same light as was Cairo during World War II by those who fought in the Western Desert, or as was Calcutta by those of us who took part in the Burma Campaign. All soldiers on active service enjoy, as one of their principal forms of relaxation, poking fun at their comrades confined among the flesh-pots in the rear areas. So it was that the staff officers who, from the gray eminence of Fort Canning, labored to direct the activities of the Singapore base were referred to (and with equal injustice) in much the same terms as were the former Gabardine Swine of Cairo, or the Chowringhee Warriors of Calcutta, or the USO Commandos.



A few minutes earlier Yellow Shirt had been pickaxing curbstones for mussels, but now he was an industrious young laundryman

No; except for brief periods of leave we seldom visited Singapore, and now I was having a struggle to find my way about the maze of streets and alleys represented on the plan.

Tony came in hurriedly with a message which he placed on my desk. It was brief and to the point: **OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE. MOVE AT ONCE TO SINGAPORE.**

Now this sort of thing was meat and drink to me. I thoroughly enjoyed being told to move my Battalion "at once." It implies that there is something urgent, important and, possibly, exciting to be done. It sets a challenge to ingenuity, and allows us to see how quickly we can get going in an emergency. The message was, of course, right outside the Queensberry rules of warning orders—there was still some time to run before even the twelve hours' notice expired. Moreover, quite a number of our patrols had not yet come in from the jungle and the rubber estates and, finally, the motor transport sent to lift us was still a long way off. But this was no time to wait on official arrangements. Jack Anderson, who commanded our friends, the Rhodesian African Rifles, was operating close by, and I rang him up. In half an hour he had sent us every truck he could lay hands on.

The local Public Works Department man produced four more assorted trucks—one a squat and bulky five-ton dump truck, which the troops christened Bertha, and even the NAAFI [Navy, Army and Air Force Institute, somewhat resembling the U. S. post exchange] cashed in with a van or two. It was a scramble, but within the hour I and the bulk of the Battalion were rushing down the main road in our borrowed transport with Bertha, now crammed with soldiers, swaying along in the rear.

SHUFFLING OFF TO SINGAPORE

Our curious collection of vehicles, bumping and rattling their way down the road, gave us, we were bound to acknowledge, an air of abandon. It was uncomfortably reminiscent of some hurried retreat, rather than of a battalion moving to the relief of a riot-torn city. For all that, we were making good progress and now began to meet other regiments on the same mission. All the world seemed to be heading south. As well as British soldiers we came on two battalions of Gurkhas—neat rows of brown little men sitting bolt upright in their trucks, cheerful smiles on their faces. But no one we met could tell us what was going on in Singapore, though everyone agreed that the school children must have been inspired by Satan himself if they could cause all this bother.

Then, with sirens pouring out a ghastly banshee wail and fire bells clanging continuously, the

police Riot Squad from Kuala Lumpur overtook us in a swirl of dust. It was too good an opportunity to miss. Quick as a flash, Corporal Wiltshire, my driver, pulled out of the convoy, and with my armored scout car following close behind we careened along in the wake of the Riot Squad's wash—startled drivers obediently pulling their vehicles off the road in answer to the combined din of siren and bell; pedestrians in the villages scuttling to the safety of their doorways; dogs and chickens flying for shelter; bullock carts near stampeding. We came into Johore Bahru in spanking form, dashed over the causeway and, ignoring red traffic signals and speed limits alike, arrived in the heart of Singapore. There, slightly breathless, we left the Riot Squad to clang on to its destination while we set off for ours.

There was time to look around and take stock. I had never really seen widespread rioting before and the scene was interesting. Down the street, steel lamp posts had been bent into grotesque shapes (what fun that must have been!); traffic signal lights, smashed and disfigured, drooped drunkenly from their stands; broken bottles, half-bricks and chunks of masonry strewed the roadway. A row of three burnt-out automobiles still smouldered where they lay turned over on their sides. The impression of desolation and destruction was heightened by the absence of people; by the empty cafés; and by the shop windows, shuttered and boarded. We drove on quietly. Now there were rather more people, but no one attempted to interfere with us—the scout car behind, with Private Williams up in the turret, slowly traversing the Browning automatic, hardly invited bottle- or brick-throwing.

Then, up a side street, we saw a larger, definitely hostile crowd waving a banner bearing red-painted Chinese inscriptions, and shouting abuse at a party of police rapidly dismounting from a Black Maria. The police, holding wicker shields in one hand and truncheons in the other, formed up in a small, tight pack and with heads slightly lowered advanced upon the yelling mob. A hail of missiles greeted them. The police, unperturbed, plodded on. One or two youths started to run away shouting abuse over their shoulders. A few others discreetly followed. But the main body, truculent as ever, stood their ground. Two or three of the nasty-looking Eastern equivalent of juvenile hoods moved to the front. One swung a bicycle chain over his head. Another brandished a short iron bar. Suddenly the police charged. There was a flurry of flaying batons. The crowd scattered, shrieking, down the side roads. One hood, I was not sorry to see, held a hand to his head as he fled away. The police slowly cleared away the debris and collected the rioters' abandoned weapons. They broke the poles of the banner in pieces

and threw them in the ditch. The banner itself was folded and taken away. I watched them move back to the Black Maria. They looked tired. The young Malay inspector in charge, begrimed with sweat and dust, gave me a smile.

"Glad you soldiers have come," he said. "Just about in time, too. We're about dead beat."

We carried on to the operations center. This new concrete building, situated in a commanding position on top of Pearl's Hill overlooking the harbor is, with some justification, the pride of the Singapore Police Force. Protected by a high fence and thick walls, it is sound-proofed and air-conditioned throughout to provide the best atmosphere for planning and control. I was taken inside, where a row of staff officers sat on a raised platform and busily manipulated telephones and microphones. Huge maps and street plans lined the walls. Except for pretty girls balancing precariously on stepladders the place might have been an RAF fighter control room.

A brigadier came forward to brief us.

RIOTS WERE COMMUNIST-INSPIRED

He gave us as lucid an account of the position as would have done credit to a Macaulay. The trouble had started, as we already knew, in the Chinese schools—those bizarre institutions where many of the students are in their twenties, yet attend the same classes as the fourteen-year-olds. After clashes between the students and the police, rioting had spread with suspicious speed throughout the island. There was no doubt it was Communist-inspired, with the object of disrupting the work of the great fort, fomenting trouble in the unions, and forcing the Government to take unpopular action. The police, went on the brigadier, had done splendidly over the last few days, but were now becoming exhausted. That was the reason for the sudden call for troops: we were to take over static commitments from the police and to provide support where needed. Each battalion was allotted a sector of the city, and the brigadier suggested that now we go off and make our reconnaissance of the ground.

Before nightfall my battalion, so recently withdrawn from the jungle, but now clad in smart battle dress and steel helmets, was deployed throughout the sector on that variety of bridges, crossroads, and installations as decreed by the Internal Security Scheme. Throughout the night we filled sandbags, built rifle emplacements, and erected traffic blocks. Next morning the citizens of Singapore awoke to a formidable display of military force. Furthermore, now we had enough troops to enforce the curfew, that most effective of all devices for exercising control over the people.

But curfews must be relaxed for certain hours

of the day if only to allow the garbage men to get around, other essential services to function, and the people to do their shopping. Moreover, in the grossly overcrowded conditions of Singapore, where fifty or more persons may live in one medium-sized house, common humanity demanded that they should not be confined inside for longer than was absolutely necessary. The Communists, supported by hooligans and gangsters, made the most of these curfew-free hours. Trouble would start with a small group of youths getting together. There would be an ominous tinkling of glass as a few shop windows were broken. Irresistibly drawn by such a tempting noise, more people would collect. Soon the crowd would number two or three hundred: some there out of curiosity; others unable to resist the desire to destroy; all egged on by half a dozen ringleaders. At this stage, and after the orders of the police to disperse had been ignored, we soldiers would be required to take action.

On one of these occasions Corporal Wiltshire and I joined a strong platoon under Captain John Williams. Williams had just fallen-in his men in the correct anti-riot formation: a sort of hollow square with the distance between men kept flexible so that the square can contract or expand to fill the full width of any particular street. Inside the square were a number of men with special tasks. Toward the front were two men to carry our banner, a large, white affair with black lettering, bearing on one side the abrupt message DISPERSE OR WE FIRE; and on the reverse an equally unwelcome piece of news, for use in different circumstances: ANYBODY CROSSING THIS LINE WILL BE SHOT. Behind the banner were a diarist, whose job was to keep a running account of each major incident, a bugler to call the attention of the crowd to the banner, a photographer, a couple of stretcher bearers, a civilian policeman, and, in the middle of the square, John Williams himself.

"All set?" he now asked. "Right, Port Arms! By the center, Quick-March!"

Steel helmets well down on our foreheads, rifles with polished bayonets held across our bodies, we set off toward the jeering crowd. We had several hundred yards to go.

"Lef' ri', lef' ri', left," called out Sergeant Ryan, keeping us in step. The crowd became noisier and apparently more menacing.

I looked at the soldiers. Most were youngsters of nineteen and twenty, yet their faces showed no signs of emotion. Steady as veterans, they had the attitude of men employed on an unpleasant but necessary duty.

The noise from the crowd was now deafening. Screams coming from one or two throats sounded almost maniacal. We were getting close.

"Present!" shouted John above the din, and

with a crash of rifles the men came to the Guard position—bayonets pointing toward the chests of the leading elements of the crowd.

The next few seconds would decide things. John must now halt; spread out his banner; get the civilian policeman to speak to the crowd through the megaphone; and, if they still failed to disperse, duty demanded that he should fire the minimum number of rounds to achieve his purpose.

I glanced at John. He was just about to open his mouth when the crowd, as though sensing exactly how far to go, melted away like a snowball in a hot fire. One moment they were there, wild and ugly; the next, they had faded away. From behind half-open doors and shutters, hundreds of pairs of slit eyes stared unblinkingly at us. With a dull feeling of anticlimax we marched on.

"Lef' ri', lef' ri', left," Sergeant Ryan's voice echoed around the now empty streets. We marched on another fifty yards. Miraculously the crowd reappeared behind us and followed at a respectful distance.

"Lef' ri', lef' ri', left," piped a ten-year-old urchin in passing-fair imitation of Sergeant Ryan.

"About Turn!" ordered John, and back we went. Once more the crowd melted. If this continued much longer, I thought, we were going to be made to look very silly. True, no one now was tempted to break anything, and the jeering had virtually stopped, but there was no sign of the crowd dispersing for more than a few minutes at a time.

RIOT SQUAD TO THE RESCUE

Moments later the stalemate was relieved from quite an unexpected direction. Coming fast around a corner behind the crowd, two enormous red-painted vehicles of our friends, the Riot Squad, bore down toward us. With a shriek of brakes they came to a shuddering halt a few yards from the crowd. Twenty policemen immediately tumbled out, and running fast, seized on a dozen bewildered youths and hustled them into those cavernous red vans. The young British police officer in charge came towards me.

"My name's Stanton," he said. "I was on my way to report to you when we ran into this lot. I will be working with you from now on."

This was certainly welcome news. In his early thirties, square of frame and with a quiet, determined manner, Stanton was the sort of person to have around if things became difficult. And now, to cement, as it were, our new association, the shutters of a first-story window above us were flung open and a pint-sized bottle whistled past my head to land with a crash on the pavement. Almost before it had landed Corporal Wiltshire had his rifle in his shoulder, pointing at the window. The thrower had the sense to keep out of

sight. The shutters swung idly on their hinges.

"Don't fire," said Stanton quietly. "I have something better than a rifle."

From under his arm he now produced a short stubby gun of wide caliber, and into it loaded a long shell. Pointing the gun toward the window, he pressed the trigger and the shell, as though it was some child's toy, lobbed gently into the room beyond.

"One more for luck," said Stanton as he repeated the performance. We waited for the explosion; but there was only a faint *pop!*, followed by a billow of dirty, gray smoke.

"Mix smoke and tear gas," explained Stanton. "It's heavy stuff and will work downward."

SMOKE GETS IN THEIR EYES

We watched the offending house carefully. Slowly the smoke began to ooze out of the windows down stairs. Then a wisp curled out from under the front door. On the instant, there was the sound of heavy bolts withdrawn, the door was wrenched open from inside and, coughing and spluttering, arms stretched high above their heads in token of surrender, came a real rough-looking gang of nine or ten Chinese men. While the police were helping them into the van, Stanton bent over the pieces of the smashed bottle which had been thrown at us.

"It's all right, this time," he said, "but look out for acid in this part of the town."

We knew what he meant. Acid-throwers, those venomous brutes, who blind and maim their victims for life, are not uncommon in Singapore. The only way to deal with these gentry is to shoot first.

That night we established battalion headquarters in the disused airport at Kallang, with the old control tower as our OP. We had a magnificent view right across the city and over the sea beyond to the islands of the archipelago of Indonesia. It was a beautiful starlit night, but here and there in the Chinese part of the city, fire brigades and troops were dealing with wicked-looking little fires, to remind one how easily the overcrowded, jerry-built huddle of shops and houses could be burnt to the ground if, even temporarily, we lost control over the rioters and arsonists.

Before going to bed I got in my car and did a quick tour round the outlying platoons. One or two were perforce living in pretty squalid conditions in the slums of Chinatown, but mostly they had managed to find accommodations in empty schools and club houses, while in some cases owners of private houses had offered them shelter on their verandas. (Soldiers, I noted with amusement, had suddenly become immensely popular with the more well-to-do in Singapore!)

I motored back to battalion headquarters with the scout car as usual in close attendance behind. I was sleepy and paying little attention until Corporal Wiltshire suddenly jammed his foot on the brake. The beam of the headlight lit up a crude barricade of tree trunks and old barrels erected across the road in front. It seemed of little account, but for some reason our car failed to stop. We skidded and slithered on until coming to rest with a bump against the barricade.

We leapt out of the car. Up in the turret of the scout car, Private Williams gave us cover while Corporal Wiltshire and I went forward to investigate. On each side of the obstacle a quantity of heavy oil had been spread on the road with the plain object of causing a vehicle to skid and collide with the barricade. If anyone had been travelling really fast he might conceivably have done himself injury. As it was, the trap was futile, little more than a schoolboy prank. Indeed, throughout the riots it was difficult to distinguish between the Communist-directed, really dangerous, acts of sabotage, and those carried out by boisterous schoolboys taking full advantage of an opportunity of a lifetime to tease policemen and soldiers.

ROUNDUP OF THE RINGLEADERS

The next day Stanton and I worked out a little plan for arresting ringleaders from among the crowds. The problem was the same as the day before: on the approach of police or soldiers the crowds would scatter, the ringleaders along with the rest disappearing into shops and houses. But the first time we tried our new plan it worked fine. Keeping the police and soldiers in the background for the moment, Stanton and I concealed ourselves behind the corner of a house, and through our binoculars watched a crowd collecting at the end of the street. I had a particularly powerful pair of field glasses, and feeling rather like a bird-watcher, could easily pick out the features of a nasty-looking young Chinese in yellow shirt and blue shorts who was busily engaged in swinging a pickaxe at the curbstones to supply his comrades with hunks of concrete for use as missiles. Every now and again he would pause in his labors to harangue the growing crowd.

Someone started sling stones at the lamp posts. Stanton slipped quietly away from my side, and seconds later was leading a charge down the street. With my eyes glued to my glasses I watched Yellow Shirt, pickaxe over his shoulder, leg it into one of the nearest houses. In a few minutes we had the house surrounded and were knocking at the door. After a moment's pause it was opened by a dear old Chinese lady, dressed in black, and blinking benevolently at us from behind a pair of rimless spectacles.

No, there was no one else in her house. Yes, certainly we might have a look around. Her son, whom she had quite forgotten to mention, was, of course, at home, but he hadn't been out all day; she could vouch for that. Behind the door we came on Yellow Shirt completely absorbed, it seemed, in ironing a smart pair of trousers. Hidden under the table was a recently used pickaxe. Protesting their innocence to the end, Yellow Shirt and his mother were led away for questioning.

Other people were also discovering new dodges for dealing with rioters. There was, for instance, the very senior officer who flew over the city in his helicopter and took an active part in dispersing crowds by getting the pilot to hover over their heads while he gently dropped tear-gas bombs among them. After a time it was seldom necessary for him to drop the bombs; the crowds just faded away when they saw him flying toward them like a malevolent vulture.

Gradually at first, and then more quickly, the rioting died down. The Chinese are, above all, realists, and after the first day or so it was clear that the Communists had failed in their purpose. The early deployment of a large number of troops and the liberal use of tear gas—that most humane of all weapons—had nipped the trouble in the bud.

We soldiers had to stay on for a few more days, though, and the police took the opportunity to clean up some of Singapore's black spots. One day, for example, we put a surprise cordon around an area while the police raided opium dens inside, to produce several trays of the black, muddy drug—worth, so they told me, thousands of dollars—and a line of wretched addicts with frail, wizened bodies, and eyes yellow and glazed. Then, too, we helped the police while they rounded up some of the worst of the Secret Society men, the gangsters and the extortionists. We watched while detectives rolled up the sleeves of suspects to reveal, tattooed on the upper arm, the sign of their particular gang: two bantam cocks for Gang 308; a sleeping cobra for Gang 07.

By the end of the week it was all over and we were heading back north. Riots and vice had been an interesting change from jungle and rubber fields. For a time it had all been a lot of fun; but chasing hooligans around a city soon pall's. So does the city. By contrast our bandits in the jungle seem quite clean and wholesome. It was like getting back to the hunted fox after an unfortunate diversion with a common hare.

I got into my car and glanced up at Private Williams standing upright in the turret of the scout car.

"Glad to be going back?"

For answer I got a broad, beaming grin.

PART FOUR:
THEORY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

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The Principles of War and Psywar

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The principles of war are fundamental truths governing the prosecution of war. (Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations)

AT TIMES, in considering psychological warfare, there is a tendency to regard it as a separate entity, outside the scope of normal rules concerning military operations. Dr. Wilbur Schramm has commented on this "folklore" approach in his study of "The Soviet Concept of 'Psychological' Warfare."

One of the best ways to dispel this concept that "our psychological warriors are a rather special group of individuals, probably not psychologists and certainly not warriors, who are permitted to throw words at the enemy while our real warriors are at lunch" will be to see how the "principles of war" apply to psychological warfare.

Such an examination will reveal not only that the principles are vital to the successful accomplishment of psychological operations, but also that psychological operations contribute to the commander's compliance with the principles. It follows, then, that to be effective, psychological warfare must adhere to the principles of war and that it cannot be effective if the principles of war are violated in actions which it attempts to support.

In citing examples of past operations as instances of the application of the principles of war, the same difficulty is faced in psychological warfare as in any other military operation. A successful operation

utilizes all or most of the principles and a thorough analysis of the operation is necessary to indicate the principles. An unsuccessful operation, on the other hand, usually fails because one or more of the principles are violated, and in many instances the principle or principles violated are readily apparent.

Thus when examples of successful operations are cited under any separate heading it should be understood that other principles were being observed and that the example is mainly one which demonstrates readily the principle being discussed. Conversely, while failure of an operation may be attributed to the violation of one of the principles, it is quite possible that other principles also were being violated, making their contribution to the failure of the operation.

OBJECTIVE

Every military operation must be directed toward a decisive, obtainable objective.

The destruction of the enemy's armed forces and his will to fight is the ultimate military objective of war. Psychological warfare concerns itself with the phrase, "his will to fight." Destruction of the enemy's will to fight is the sphere of psychological warfare. Thus the psywar objective must be identical to that of the

Psychological warfare must adhere to the principles of war in its own activities and cannot be effective if the principles are violated either in psywar operations or by commanders for whom it is a support weapon

commander, since, as Field Manual 33-5, *Psychological Warfare Operations*, states, "the over-all objective of psychological warfare is to support the accomplishment of national policy and aims, or a military mission" (author's italics).

The discussion of psywar in this article will be limited to operations in support of the accomplishment of a military mission. FM 33-5 points out that psychological warfare activity, carefully integrated with combat operations (see Figure 1), contributes to the achievement of this ultimate objective "by using psychological warfare operations to reduce the combat efficiency of the enemy" and "to produce cumulative effects upon the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of the target audiences that will assist in the defeat of the enemy."

Efforts at reducing enemy combat efficiency are usually stated as "tasks" for psychological warfare. These tasks need not be carried out against the enemy at a point coinciding with the main effort of the commander in order to accomplish the psywar objective or to assist the commander in attaining his objective. Stated another way, the principle of the objective is not to be confused with the physical objective.

Adherence to the principle of the objective will prevent the propagandist from falling into the error of arguing with the enemy propagandist or engaging in pyrotechnic propaganda which, while interesting to conduct, has little or no effect on the target.

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A classic example of failure to hold to the objective was the German offensive of 1942 against Russia. After early successes in their efforts to reach Moscow and envelop a large part of the Red Army, the Germans split their forces to try for a second objective—the rich oilfields of the Caucasus.

For the German propagandist, this violation of the principle of the objective brought the distasteful task of attempting to explain to the German people how early success in both operations could turn to defeat. As a further sidelight to this operation, Allied propaganda analysts were able to predict the withdrawal of the German forces from the Kuban bridgehead as a result of the change in German propaganda treatment of the campaign.

The close relationship between the commander's objective and the psychological warfare objective is illustrated by the European campaign. The directive to General Eisenhower stated:

You will enter the Continent of Europe, and, in conjunction with the other United Nations, undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany and the destruction of her armed forces.

To support General Eisenhower, SHAEF Psychological Warfare Division established a two-phase program: Phase A—the phase before and after D-day up to a change in German morale; Phase B—the phase after the change in German morale. The psychological warfare objective was set forth in a "Standing Directive for Psychological Warfare Against Members of the German Armed Forces, June 1944."

The directive stated the objective of psychological warfare generally as follows:

It is the task of psychological warfare to assist the Supreme Commander in fulfilling his mission against the enemy with the most economical use of troops and equipment.

In support of this objective, two "long-

term" tasks were enunciated along with six pre-D-day and two post D-day "short-term" tasks.

The two "long-term" tasks were:

1. Maintenance and increase of belief in the reliability of the Anglo-American word and in unity between the Russians and ourselves.

2. Creation of an atmosphere in which the German soldier gradually would come to feel that, since defeat was certain, he had fulfilled his soldierly duty and could

now follow the example of the German Army in Tunisia.

OFFENSIVE

Only offensive action achieves decisive results.

For psychological warfare purposes this statement can be paraphrased to read: *Only positive psychological operations achieve decisive results.*

It is axiomatic that high morale and an aggressive spirit are the attributes of an



Deutsche Soldaten an der Westfront:

Wir Schwerbomber fügen Euch keinen unmittelbaren Schaden zu. Das überlassen wir der Bordwaffe unserer Jäger. Wir fliegen 10.000 Meter über Euren Kopf in den deutschen Luftraum ein. Eure Erdlöcher sind nicht unsere Zielpunkte. Unsere Ziele sind Fabriken, die Eure Munition erzeugen, Bahnen, über die Euer Nachschub herangebracht werden soll, Brücken, die Euch mit der Heimat verbinden.

Am 29.10. liefern unsere Bomben auf die Brücke bei Jülich. Vom 28. bis 31.10. haben wir in neun Grossangriffen Köln mit 9000 Tonnen Brand- und Sprengbomben belegt. Wir bombardieren systematisch kriegswichtige, operative Landstriche, 50 - 100 km hinter Eurer Front. Wir zwingen Euch, mit dem Rücken gegen ein lärmgelegtes Rheinland zu kämpfen.

DENKT AN DIE ZERSTÖRUNGEN, JEDES-MAL WENN WIR VIERMOTORIGEN KOM-MEN. UND WIR KOMMEN BALD WIEDER.

Auf Wiederhören!

CPHS

Figure 1.—*German Soldiers on the Western Front:* We, the Allied heavy bombers, do not cause you any immediate harm. We leave that to the strafing machineguns of our fighters. We fly into Germany 30,000 feet above your head. Your foxholes are not our targets. We aim for the factories which produce your ammunition, the railroads which carry your supplies, and the bridges which connect you with your home

On 29 October our bombs fell on the bridge at Juelich. From 28 to 31 October we dropped 9,000 tons of explosive and incendiary bombs in nine mass attacks on Cologne. We bomb systematically strategic military areas 30 to 60 miles in your rear. We force you to fight with your back against a paralyzed Rhineland.

Think of the destruction, every time we four-engined bombers come over. And we will be back soon. You'll be hearing from us.

army on the offensive, and that low morale and a defeatist attitude results when on the defensive. Thus either offensive action or, in some instances, the threat of offensive action in the near future are the situations in which psywar can be most effective.

In a stable, inactive situation, psychological warfare cannot cause the enemy to defect unless there are several other factors already at work. Among these would be the previous defeat of the enemy, a "clobbering" so extensive that the enemy, now that he has a chance to hear our message, will heed. Second, there is the threat of offensive action on our part which can be used by psychological warfare to cause defection, lower morale, and soften up the target prior to action.

Since the offensive is action by a commander to secure or maintain the initiative, to preserve his freedom of action, and to impose his will on the enemy, psychological warfare plays a leading role in support of this principle.

Psychological warfare, however, cannot wait until an offensive is underway before going into operation. Psywar should be used during the preparatory phase of an operation to soften up the enemy mind; to make it easier for the commander to impose his will on the enemy.

Applying the principle of the offensive to psychological warfare, it is mandatory that the messages addressed to the target audience be positive in nature. Counterpropaganda and defensive messages are not evidences of a campaign which aims at changing attitudes and imposing one's will on the target. They are, at best, answers to the opposing propagandist's efforts to impose his will on the same target. Such propaganda violates the principle of the objective in that it gives the initiative over to the enemy propagandist; allows him to select the objectives and the subjects to be argued. There are times, of course, when counterpropaganda can be useful; when it takes the form of counter-

punching in boxing; when it takes advantage of an enemy move and exploits an opening made by that move. But such counterpropaganda must be capable of two things: it must be in line with the existing policies and it must have the target audience, not the enemy propagandist as the *real* target. You cannot cause a concussion on the target audience by beating the enemy propagandist over the head with a leaflet.

Use Positive Approach

By the same token, you cannot persuade an enemy target audience to act or think as you want them to if your propaganda is on the defensive. While the task of the propagandist is easier when the military force he represents is on the offensive, the propagandist, even in a retrograde or defensive situation, must use a positive approach to his audience.

The danger in the defensive or retrograde situation, however, is not that the propagandist will go on the defensive, but that his efforts to take a positive approach will be thwarted by those who assume that any indication of a reverse is a sign of weakness. The good psywarrior will take advantage of this situation to build credibility in the target audience by admitting the reverses which are taking place.

The British Broadcasting Company during World War II is the outstanding example of taking advantage of reversals to gain the confidence of an audience by admitting setbacks. By using what is termed "mirror" propaganda, presenting both sides of the picture, the BBC became a source of information even to members of the German General Staff. Ultimately, the BBC was able to utilize this credibility to mislead German leaders as to the location of the invasion landing sites.

SIMPLICITY

Simplicity must be the keynote of military operations.

In psywar, simplicity can best be

achieved by adhering to the simple messages directed at specific groups with a definite purpose. Complex and complicated, "gimmicked" campaigns may be impressive to superiors and even make the propagandist feel that he is putting on a "spectacular" for the benefit of his target, but unless the message to the target is simple and understandable, it fails to do the job. (Figure 2.)



Figure 2.—An excellent example of the positive approach type message which is simple, understandable, and directed at specific groups with a definite purpose.

Simplicity also can be obtained through organization, by having sufficient control over the operational units to ensure that all follow the same policy line, all have the same objective, and yet all are allowed sufficient leeway to accomplish their assigned mission.

UNITY OF COMMAND

The decisive application of full combat power requires unity of command.

For psychological warfare, unity of com-

mand is essential since the progress of mass communication media and speed of transmission make both coverage and timing essential to any propaganda effort. Further, unity of command will ensure that the efforts of *all* information and propaganda communicators are coordinated. This is not to say that the Public Information Officer or the Troop Information Officer need to participate actively in the psychological warfare campaign against the target, or to propagandize their public or troop audience. However, coordination will prevent contradictions from appearing in presentation of the material to any audience. The Field Press Censor, too, can assist in the presentation of a timely message by psywar if proper coordination, obtainable by unity of command, is instituted.

On the tactical level, unity of command and recognition that psywar operations are a command function—a support weapon to be made a part of the weapons system—will prevent the recurrence of past instances where our troops were not informed of surrender instructions which were given to enemy troops by leaflets or loudspeakers with the result that enemy soldiers were shot trying to surrender.¹

MASS

Maximum available combat power must be applied at the point of decision.

Reports of propaganda operations in previous actions too often stressed the number of leaflets printed and disseminated, the hours of radio time utilized, and the number of loudspeaker broadcasts beamed at enemy frontline troops.

This concept of "mass" might better be spelled w-a-s-t-e.

Mass is not dependent upon numbers alone, but considers the critical time and place for the concentration of means. For psychological warfare this has special

¹ The euphemism usually used in psywar is "cease resistance," a term which has proved more palatable to enemy soldiers than "surrender."

meaning. One right message to the right target at the right time will be more effective than one million messages, hundreds of "themes" strewn about the enemy landscape, and radio wavelengths.

It may be defended as an American trait to be concerned with "doing things in a big way," using "blanket coverage" as an index of effectiveness of operations, but no enemy ever has been smothered effectively under a blanket of leaflets.

One splendid example of the application of the principle of mass in World War II Office of War Information operations is recounted by Dr. Paul M. A. Linenberger in *Psychological Warfare*, the "bible" in this field.

The Japanese offered to surrender, but with conditions. We responded, rejecting the conditions. The Japanese Government pondered its reply, but while it pondered, B-29's carried leaflets to all parts of Japan, giving the text of the Japanese official offer to surrender. This act alone would have made it almost impossibly difficult for the Japanese Government to whip its people back into frenzy for suicidal prolongation of war. The Japanese texts were checked between Washington and Hawaii by radiophotograph and cryptotelephone; the plates were put into the presses at Saipan; the big planes took off, leaflets properly loaded in the right kind of leaflet bombs. It took Americans three and a half years to reach that point, but we reached it. Nowhere else in history can there be found an instance of so many people being given so decisive a message, all at the same time, at the very dead point between war and peace.²

Psychological warfare also may assist the commander in achieving mass by training its operations on a secondary effort, thereby freeing troops for employment at a more critical point.

² This example also highlights the principle of maneuver and can serve as a classic illustration of the application of the principles of war in one operation.

ECONOMY OF FORCE

Minimum essential means must be employed at points other than that of decision.

One of the means of achieving mass in the critical area is to use deception. While most psychological warfare personnel (including the author) will quarrel with the utilization of psywar as a deceptive measure, there are ways in which psywar can help the commander to deceive the enemy.

Through the use of covert or black propaganda, deception can be practiced against the target audience without compromising the credibility of overt propaganda.

Again, a psychological operation in support of a secondary effort, rather than the main one, can throw the enemy propaganda analyst off track and deceive him as to the commander's "point of decision." Here the deception is practiced against the enemy's intelligence agency rather than against a target audience.

And finally, as the use of BBC prior to the European invasion indicates, a credible source can be used to deceive enemy commanders as to the impending operation. However, in the case of BBC, this was so brilliantly handled that the enemy actually misled himself by analysis of the BBC messages, and to have admitted that he had been misled would have lessened his prestige in the eyes of his troops.

PRESERVE INTEGRITY

This type of grand-scale, one-time, all-out deception may be proper for psywar if conditions are right. However, every now and then a commander feels that loud-speaker teams should be used to lure the enemy from foxholes and bunkers so that artillery can inflict casualties. The use of psywar media and techniques for such purposes, while soul-satisfying at the moment of use, will destroy completely any possible future use of psywar. The next time that commander tries to get the enemy's attention or cooperation by psywar he

will find himself in the position of the boy who cried "wolf."

From the viewpoint of psychological warfare, economy of force will include proper use of personnel and equipment, and, as was mentioned under the principle of mass, possibly fewer messages aimed at the proper target audience.

Trained propagandists will be at a premium in the event of a war; interrogators trained in the needs of psychological warfare intelligence will be difficult to obtain. In fact, all the personnel needed for psychological warfare operations—radio technicians and announcers, printers, artists, and interrogators—will be in demand by other agencies and activities. Psywar will have to use what it can obtain. Economy of force will be a must.

MANEUVER

Maneuver must be used to alter the relative combat power of military forces.

Advances in the fields of transportation and communications have made it possible to maneuver large forces rapidly. Similarly, advances in the field of mass communications media have made it possible for psychological warfare to reach target audiences previously denied to any commander.

Media available to tactical psychological warfare operations are principally the loudspeaker and the leaflet, including the frontline newspaper. Radio may be used, depending on the availability of receivers. Further maneuverability is gained for leaflets, such as the newspaper and safe conduct passes, by means of dissemination, including artillery shells and aircraft. Loudspeaker broadcasts may be made either by an announcer personally, or may be tape recorded messages from a representative of the United States forces.

On the strategic level, for messages aimed at an audience in the rear of the enemy's frontline positions, including both military and civilian audiences, the principal media are radio and leaflets. Leaflets

are disseminated by air or may be smuggled in by agents; radio broadcasts may be made by powerful fixed stations far removed from the combat zone or the theater itself, or may be broadcast by mobile radio transmitters operating in relatively forward areas.

Thus proper use of communication media and means gives psywar much of its maneuverability. But there is still another factor which adds maneuverability to propaganda operations. This is the ability to change propaganda themes when the situation warrants.

A propaganda campaign is not static. As intelligence indicates changes in the target for propaganda, the propagandist must adapt his messages to take advantage of the changes, for some of which he will have been responsible. He will maneuver his media and messages in such a manner as to alter the power of the target to resist and the enemy propagandist to refute.

Maneuverability in this respect may be the ability to act swiftly to counter an intercepted enemy radio broadcast to his own people who also may be our target audience.

Finally, the mobility and range of radio broadcasting facilities and loudspeaker teams, the accuracy and range of artillery firing leaflet shells, and the ability of aircraft to drop leaflet bombs in specific locations add to the maneuverability of psychological warfare.

SURPRISE

Surprise may decisively shift the balance of combat power in favor of the commander who achieves it.

Dr. Linebarger, in a talk to the graduating class at the Psychological Warfare School in June 1956, posed the question as to the reaction of an enemy if psychological warfare operations ceased completely—if, at a certain time, no more radio broadcasts were made, no more leaf-

lets were dropped, no more loudspeakers blared.

The result, he indicated, would be to take the enemy by surprise.

But since this plan seems to be one which would probably entail more effort than continuing normal operations, it might be wise to examine other ways in which psywar may assist the commander in achieving surprise.

Deception may be practiced against the enemy propaganda analyst. A psywar campaign, begun at a time when action is impending, may be continued in such a manner as to resist the efforts of the enemy propaganda analyst to determine what is planned. This eliminates the possibility that psywar operations will give away information of intelligence value to the enemy, not through *what is said*, but rather by the comparative frequency of *what is said*.

In short, a continuation of a propaganda campaign in an even, steady manner may be the best way in which psywar can contribute to surprise.

There may be times when, because of the themes which psywar has been using and the type of news reporting, someone will demand that such activities cease since they violate security. There are two answers to this, and the security-minded would be wise to remember them. First, the time to consider security is in the planning stage, and second, because intelligent analysis of a cessation of certain themes or certain types of reporting may indicate planned operations to the enemy and thus endanger security.

SECURITY

Security is essential to the application of the other principles of war.

As noted in commenting on the principle of surprise, security may be violated by canceling certain themes out of the effort, or by changing the emphasis on certain subjects. But more important than this, for psychological operations, is the need

for the psywarrior not to be surprised by the plans of his own commander!

Psychological warfare staff officers must be informed of the plans for future operations if they are to have their efforts at psychological warfare amount to anything more than a shot in the dark. They must know policy, and they will probably get sufficient policy guidance, even if of a negative nature, to make them aware of the limits of their operations. But unless they are aware of what the commander plans to do, they cannot give effective assistance.

This, of course, also goes back to the principle of unity of command and the need for coordination.

"Geilenkirchen Encircled"

With the foregoing discussion in mind, a brief examination of a World War II operation may serve to illustrate the application of the principles of war to psywar. From this viewpoint, the operation at Geilenkirchen, coordinated by the Ninth Army Psychological Warfare Division, stands as a classic example of the application of the principles and also as an excellent example of the integration of a psychological warfare plan into the overall plan for an offensive action.³

Geilenkirchen was a strong point situated directly on the boundary between the United States Ninth Army and the British Second Army. The plan to take the town called for a combined Allied encirclement followed by a frontal attack. The United States 84th Division, less the 333d Regimental Combat Team, was to take Waurichen, Immendorf, Prummern, and Süggerath; while elements of the XXX British Corps were to take Hatterath, Tripsrath, Niederheide, and Bauchem, meeting the 84th Division east of Süggerath. When the link-up occurred, the 333d was to make the frontal assault.

The psychological warfare objective in

³ Complete details of this incident will be found in "Baloney Barrage" by Major Edward A. Gaskin, *Infantry Journal*, December 1949.

the action was to induce the garrison of the town to surrender without a fight, an example of a simple, direct objective, albeit the most difficult one to attain.

The leaflet used (Figure 3) also was simple in design but put its point across by virtue of its simplicity. Acting on prior knowledge of the plan of attack, the propagandists depicted the situation as it would be at the moment of the Allied junction. The leaflet was prepared and ready for dissemination even before the encir-

clement began, a dangerous procedure because if any of the towns had not been captured, the leaflet could not have been used.

Perfect Timing Needed

Here, however, proper timing of the leaflet dissemination provided the shock value of surprise to the garrison. On a signal that the British and American forces had met at Süggerath, 30,000 copies of the leaflet were fired by artillery, using



Figure 3.—Geilenkirchen encircled: With the capture of Bauchem, Niederheide, Süggerath, Immendorf, and Prummern the Americans have bypassed the MLR. The assault on Geilenkirchen is on.

German soldiers in Geilenkirchen: You are encircled. All around American gun barrels are directed at you. You are living bull's-eyes.

Again and again German soldiers are being encircled on all fronts. Thousands of your comrades saved themselves unnecessary bloodshed in the pockets of Brest, Calais, St. Malo, and Aachen by giving themselves up.

In a war that is already lost you are fighting a losing battle. Your mission is fulfilled, your duty long since done. Whoever dies now in Geilenkirchen, dies in vain. Only as prisoners of war can you escape annihilation.

50 shells, into the town. This also was the signal for the attack by the 333d. One combat loudspeaker team from the Ninth Army Psychological Warfare Detachment accompanied the 333d in the attack and made a broadcast when about 1,000 yards from the town. They displaced forward and made another broadcast from the edge of town.

The operation resulted in the surrender of the entire garrison of Geilenkirchen to the 333d with only token resistance.

In the Geilenkirchen operation the principles of war as applied may be summarized briefly as follows:

1. *Objective*: A direct, concise objective—to induce surrender.

2. *Offensive*: A positive approach by the propagandists, taking advantage of the offensive nature of the action being supported.

3. *Simplicity*: Pictorial presentation of the situation in the leaflet and use of loudspeakers with the frontal assault.

4. *Unity of Command*: The entire effort was coordinated by Ninth Army PWD.

5. *Mass*: All propaganda facilities were brought to bear against the garrison in the town.

6. *Economy of Force*: Thirty thousand leaflets, using 50 artillery shells, and one loudspeaker team, sufficient force for the task.

7. *Maneuver*: The change to the specific "encirclement" theme from other general themes which had been used against all elements of the German Army in the area.

8. *Surprise*: Timing of the delivery of the leaflets with the link-up at Suggen-

rath, informing the enemy of an event just as it was taking place.

9. *Security*: Tied in with surprise, no prior propaganda dealing with the specific operation to alert the enemy of the planned attack.

This brief study of the principles of war and their application in the field of psychological warfare is by no means a complete consideration of the problem. Those who have had experience in psychological warfare, as they read, can call to mind numerous occasions on which the principles were violated or applied successfully.

The measure of psychological warfare's contribution to the commander will depend to a great extent on the observance of the principles of war.

Two main points are these:

1. *Psychological warfare must adhere to the principles of war in its own activities*.

2. *Psywar cannot be effective if the principles are violated either in psywar operations or by the commander for whom it is a support weapon*.

Far from restricting the military propagandist, application of the principles of war will enhance the efforts to destroy the enemy's will to fight. Use of the principles will do much to move psychological warfare from the "folklore" realm of "paper peddling" toward recognition as an effective support activity for military operations.

(The foregoing is not necessarily an expression of the Department of the Army or Special Warfare School policies.—Author.)

U.S. PROPAGANDA: What it can and can't be.

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U. S. Propaganda

What It Can and Can't Be

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An insult to a United States representative is often interpreted as a failure of our information system to win us friends. The "failure" of the system is likely due to limitations imposed by our political system, to a characteristic of American thought and action, or to the harsh realities of world events. A much clearer understanding of our propaganda capabilities is in order.

MOST AMERICANS are baffled by the disturbingly frequent episodes that show dislike for America by people in many countries. Many among those who consider our propaganda ineffective do so on the basis of the observation that all over the world—even in such Free World nations as Canada or West Germany—there is much, perhaps even increasing, “unfriendliness” toward the United States.

One of the basic, widely held misconceptions is that a primary objective of propaganda is to secure “friendship” and sympathy in a general sense. Unfriendly remarks or attitudes—such as would be resented in individual relationships—are, as a matter of course, considered proof of failing propaganda.

Actually, propaganda aims not at creating benign sentiments in others, but at influencing political opinion and creating favorable political reactions. Observers of foreign reactions to America and the Americans must conclude that, indeed, millions and millions of foreigners—including those in countries occupied for years by our forces—are ineradicably convinced that we are kind, generous, helpful, more so perhaps than any other group of people. But these same foreigners may feel, and say, that we are politically naive, mercurial, over-confident, too easily dejected. Hence, even those who wish nothing better than an immigration visa to this country might be decidedly critical and often most unfriendly in their utterances and political attitudes.

The experts and specialists—inside and outside the United States Information Agency (USIA)—seem to have no doubt that, indeed, the actual objective of our overseas information effort is to be respected rather than loved. Frequently it is much more important to convey the impression that we are

This article is a condensation of a very comprehensive and detailed paper on “US Capabilities in the Battle for Men’s Minds” prepared by Dr. Kraemer as part of an individual research project. The very process of condensation required elimination of all supporting evidence contained in the original study. Hopefully, even this radically abbreviated and, therefore, necessarily sketchy summary of some of Dr. Kraemer’s conclusions and observations might help our readers recognize better certain basic problems inherent in the United States propaganda effort.

strong, resolved, and powerful, than that we are kind, friendly, and eminently peaceful. In any event lack of "love" for the rich and, therefore, envied United States, a super-power whose every action and omission is felt and anxiously observed in all corners of the world, could not be remedied by any amount of propaganda.

Power Vs. Words

We must understand the extent to which actual realities can be overcome, in the long run, by words. The Scandinavian nations and West Germany unquestionably are profoundly anti-Communist and—because of recent or distant history—also anti-Russian. Nevertheless, they are geographically close to the Russian colossus and are small in comparison. They have the will and the desire to stay with the West, but what permits them to do so is United States power, not United States words. Deals are made by the weak with the strong, not necessarily out of love or sympathy, but frequently from fear. Should events—for example, a withdrawal of United States forces from Germany, or, God forbid, the loss of West Berlin—make Russian power appear in the ascendancy and United States power on the wane, the resulting loss of confidence could not be remedied by anything the USIA might do or say. The Berlin Air Lift and the naked fact of our fighting a war to save free South Korea, proved an incomparably greater propaganda asset, by demonstrating our resolve and firmness, than any paper or radio campaign. If the Arabs, who, rightly or wrongly, see in Israel their number one enemy, find that in point of fact the United States finances the existence of that enemy, while the Soviets do not, they will not be moved into our camp by propaganda.

Propaganda as an auxiliary weapon can effectively supplement the military, economic, diplomatic weapons of a nation. But it cannot change basic factors that speak louder than words. Most certainly it is no substitute for power.

It is a widespread misconception that propaganda provides a kind of magic wand, or mysterious nostrum for influencing a world-wide target audience in any desired manner regardless of military, economic, and political realities such as: China's growth into a world power; Sputnik; Soviet penetration into the Middle East, Africa, and even Latin America; overthrow of the pro-Western government in Iraq; the replacement of a pro-Western by an, at best, neutral government in Lebanon, *despite* the temporary deployment of United States forces in that country; the reduction of French and British, and the lagging build-up of German, NATO forces in continental Europe; the barbaric, but yet successful, suppression of the Hungarian freedom movement by Russian tanks; launching by the Kremlin of virtually ceaseless diplomatic offensives, increasingly more insolent and threatening in tone.

Those who ascribe the decrease in United States prestige and status in world opinion to an ineffective propaganda program simply attribute to the propagandist a magic power he does not possess. The prestige of this country depends—apart from short-term tactical propaganda coups—not on words but on deeds; i.e., on our actual foreign policy and the military, economic, and will power behind it.

Propaganda Results Cannot be Measured

Unfortunately the success of a propaganda effort cannot be "measured." If things go well in a particular area, credit is almost never given to the efforts of the USIA—and, indeed, the propagandists would be at a loss to prove that

Adenauer's Germany, for example, is friendly as a result of the Agency's operations. On the other hand, if the trend of opinion and policy turns against the United States in Indonesia or the Arab countries, the propaganda apparatus will be saddled with at least part of the blame.

At almost regular intervals attempts are made, through the establishment or re-establishment of evaluation offices within the USIA, through public-opinion surveys, etc., to evaluate concretely the effect of our overseas information program. From the manner in which, each year, the USIA representatives at budget hearings search for an answer to questions about their achievements, it is clear that these attempts have failed. Yet, it is just conceivable that one American book found on the shelves of a USIA library might give a future leader of his country his basic concepts of politics and society—as Sun-Yat-Sen was originally won for socialism by a pamphlet that chanced to come into his hands. But such "conversion," which might become politically important only 20 years hence, could not today be registered on any evaluation chart. Thus, while Congress and the public at large see the need for, and may even over-estimate the possible accomplishments of, an overseas information program, they look at the whole undertaking with suspicion.

Scale of Effort

It is understandable, therefore, that while some critics are loudly urging that the effort to influence people abroad by a government-conducted program be abandoned, others with equal heat are insisting that the program be massively expanded. From a study of all factors one must conclude that neither of these extreme views will prevail.

However great the suspicion toward official propaganda, as long as the Free World is faced with the Soviet threat, we will continue to maintain governmental machinery to present our case officially, authentically, systematically, to the peoples of the world. We will also, however, unless a new Korean-type war or some near catastrophic event on the international scene shocks us into a state of virtual mobilization, not appropriate any essentially larger funds for foreign information than we do now, regardless of warnings and implorations. This means that the sum total available for the USIA type of activities and for the State Department administered exchange-of-persons program will continue to range between \$100 and \$150 million per year.

No Change in General Character of U.S. Propaganda

Neither is the character of the United States propaganda effort likely to change. The question is not whether this is desirable or undesirable. A review of the United States informational activity—the studies by governmental committees, the budget justifications, the voluminous public discussions by experts of various grades—leads inevitably to the conclusion that the kind of propaganda we are now making, and which has changed little throughout the last decade, is exactly the type of propaganda this nation is "capable" of making and which, therefore, it will continue to make.

The public-information activity has been vociferously accused of several dramatically opposite shortcomings: It is too obsessed with anti-Communism, not anti-Communist enough; too materialistic, not sufficiently materialistic; painting too rosy and too seamy a picture of the United States; intent on imposing on others the United States way of life and not emphasizing that way of life sufficiently; too abstract and too concrete; too slavishly tied to our foreign policy, too isolated from it: too much wedded to Madison Avenue

thinking, neglectful of well-proven United States advertising methods; too softly peaceful and too blatantly provocative. Consequently United States propaganda has practically no choice but to follow an in-between line, to steer a careful, middle course.

The present balance is not, however, a mixture invented and prescribed by some master propagandists. It is simply a reflection of the cross currents of United States public, especially congressional, opinion. Faced with extreme diversity of views, the USIA cannot deviate perceptibly from its present well-established middle-of-the-road course.

We overlook basic traits of American psychology if we expect our propagandists to develop a single, succinct, dramatic doctrine. We are, for better or for worse, a pragmatic nation; we believe in developing "practical" solutions, "workable" compromises, individual roads to salvation; we are, by our temperament and our history, deeply wedded to the nondogmatic approach.

In the light of United States historical and psychological realities, it appears senseless to demand of our propagandists, or others, that they come forth with a full-fledged body of doctrine—a Capitalist Manifesto or the like—simply to counter in kind the Communist dogma. Any militant ideology presupposes a mystical sense of certainty, a fanatical fervor, an inclination to think in abstract and esoteric terms, and moreover an intolerance and one-sidedness, all of which are alien to our national character. And if, perchance, anyone were, nevertheless, to set forth such an ideology, then the rigidity and dogmatism bound to go with it would make it unacceptable to the nation at large and, thus, unusable for official propaganda purposes.

The innate American aversion to any ideological or any messianic element in United States propaganda is, however, but a symptom of an infinitely broader, deeply ingrained conviction that our propaganda should be hard-headed sober, realistic, factual, down-to-earth, and rational. Americans believe that in the ultimate analysis an appeal to reason is infinitely more powerful than an appeal to emotions, though the latter may produce temporary results. We are suspicious of flag waving; uniforms; rhetorics; preaching, as opposed to teaching; symbolism, as opposed to concrete demonstration; alleged idealistic motivation, as opposed to a frank admission of material interest. Thus we feel that it would be unbusinesslike to indulge, with taxpayer money, in any far-fetched psychological experiments.

Propaganda—Private-Initiative Style

In accordance with our firm belief in the general superiority of private over governmental initiative, strong emphasis has been given to the potential capabilities of a privately organized effort. Many insist that American individuals and organizations could supplement, or even outdo, by their own methods and in their own way, the official effort to influence opinion abroad. The classical and best-known examples are Radio Free Europe, Radio Free Asia, and Radio Liberation, all established by non-governmental groups and maintained with essentially private funds to broadcast to the subjugated people behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains.

Our most impressive and most advertised large-scale, non-government program in international communications is the People-to-People Foundation, Inc., launched with great expectations and considerable publicity by President Eisenhower in September, 1956. It was an attempt to mobilize the entire nation for a coordinated, systematic effort by all major business, civic,

scientific, artistic, religious, press, radio, sports, etc., groups and associations "to enlarge communications and contact between Americans and citizens in foreign lands in the interest of better understanding." The Foundation set up 41 functional committees (Advertising Organizations, Banking, Cartoonists, Fine Arts Groups, Hobbies, Nationality Groups, Radio and Television, Veterans, Women's Groups, etc.) composed of men and women recognized as top leaders in their respective fields. The Foundation was supposed to work out its own program and raise its own funds.

However noble the effort, this program was essentially stillborn. The budget was to be \$5 million. The Foundation in a year and a half raised but \$30,000, and their actual output was marginal.

The virtual collapse of the People-to-People Program illustrates that the American private citizen, while always eager to aid an obviously good cause, is not a persistent missionary in the field of foreign affairs. After a burst of enthusiasm, often characteristically accompanied by the creation of ambitious plans and organizations, he turns to more concrete problems nearer home.

A sustained propaganda effort by private groups or individuals, even under glamorous and authoritative leadership from their own ranks, must not be expected. Virtually the whole burden of effort rests with the government.

The deeper problem regarding privately sponsored efforts is, however, not lack of vitality, but their very nature. Planning and operations are exclusively aimed at creating friendship, good will, understanding between United States and foreign citizens and groups. It is assumed that friendly personal contacts must, as a matter of course, generate not only personal sympathies between people but also political sympathy for the United States.

Equating generally benign sentiments with political attitudes is fallacious. The expectation that nonpolitical activities by nonpolitical individuals—neither equipped nor inclined to blend their gestures of good will with appropriate political indoctrination—will produce political results is vain.

Even more serious is the misconception that these relatively shallow public relations-type gestures could really produce any deeper or more lasting effect, political or nonpolitical, on the souls, hearts, or minds of the intended addressees. In this age where—outside the United States—uncertainty and insecurity, doubts, and despair are very marked, it takes more to move men. Above all, it requires a greater intensity and profundity.

American Tourists and Businessmen cannot, for similar reasons, be considered as an army of natural propagandists. Their contacts with the local population are, in the overwhelming majority of cases, superficial and limited. Few of them will be politically minded or politically articulate, or, if they are, they seldom possess the inclination and aptitude to act as political missionaries on the side—not to mention the usual language barrier. On the whole, tourists will be appreciated for economic reasons and probably be liked personally, but they will hardly change the political preferences of those with whom they come in contact. In many cases they will be considered, regardless of what they do, with the same feelings the inhabitants of Maine entertain for the "summer people."

Our Commercial Information Media, however imposing their achievements in other fields, cannot carry the burden of propaganda. The output of commercial United States information enterprise is largely nonpolitical, to a degree that precludes any but the most marginal propaganda impact. But, political or nonpolitical, the product is tailored overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, to

American needs and tastes, even where a considerable foreign market is involved. This leads to the paradox that the product of our information industry, if used on non-Americans, may be more harmful than helpful.

Our Movie Industry actually shuns the political field. It does not undertake the production of films, in English or foreign-language versions, aimed at the political susceptibilities of foreign groups as do the Soviets and Chinese.

The high entertainment value of American movies is in itself sometimes assumed to be a propaganda asset. But here we encounter a paradox. The popularity of United States movies for entertainment is unique, especially among the younger age groups abroad. However, they also create, among the sophisticated and the unsophisticated alike, a picture of the United States, its life, culture, tastes, and ideals that is so distorted that part of the official United States information effort is actually to dispel the misleading image.

The Press—For somewhat different reasons, the same contradiction applies also to the American daily press, political magazines, and news services. Papers like the New York Times or New York Herald Tribune, wire services such as UPI and AP, are unparalleled in broadness of coverage and objectivity. But this very objectivity and extraordinary range of coverage, the extreme frankness with which our foreign policy, our military strategy and, in general, our innermost doubts and designs are discussed, bewilder and disturb those who do not know American ways and tradition.

America would not be America without its free press, without its public debate of all issues, and without its unrestrained expression of opinion by all and sundry. However, this daily stream of freely flowing words does not make it easier to guide and influence the impressions and thinking of foreigners in that specific, predetermined direction that would be desirable from the propaganda point of view. On the contrary, the freedom with which we rush into print has again and again provided our enemies, especially at moments of diplomatic or military crisis, with arguments and material highly useful to them and quite damaging to United States aims and policies.

A Suggestion for More Effective Effort

Regardless, however, of the many inherent limitations to an American overseas information effort, we must not lose sight of the possibilities of improving it within its given framework. Above all, much greater emphasis should be placed on the personal approach by trained people.

Students of Communist techniques agree that Communism—in countries outside the Iron Curtain—gains adherents and followers primarily by the “direct” or “personal” approach, i.e., by working on individuals through individuals. While there are, of course, cases in which intellectuals, or even others, are won over by the mere reading of Marx' or Lenin's writings, almost invariably men or women now Communists were converted by a teacher, fellow student, co-worker, relative, friend, or neighbor belonging to the Communist faith or, even more likely, by a member of the party apparatus specifically charged with recruiting.

The picture of Soviet mass propaganda seducing men by Big Lie tactics, mass hypnosis, and blatant promises of material betterment is an oversimplification. Two additional characteristics of Soviet propaganda are often not sufficiently understood: most extensive use of local elements in each country to spread the gospel; reliance on individual contacts and on calls for individual

participation as a primary means to gain a more than ephemeral influence over people. Without these characteristics it is unlikely that Soviet propaganda could win so many disciples.

The truth is that; quite independently and obviously not influenced by a conscious or subconscious desire to imitate Communist methods, we in the United States have likewise arrived at the conclusion that personal contacts between our propagandists and local people are the most effective and important single means at our disposal to get our propaganda across. A characteristic statement to this effect by an American newspaper correspondent abroad is quoted in the excellent Hickenlooper Report: "One ounce of personal contacts is worth a ton of literature." We also have recognized in theory that American propaganda in any given country can really reach wider circles only if it is spread there by native advocates of our views.

It is hopeless to expect the United States Information Agency missions, operating in 80 countries with less than 1000 U.S. citizens, to do the job. Even if this small group could devote itself exclusively to "personal contacts" it would, for purely physical reasons, be able to do so on only a very narrow front. Only a minor fraction of their time can possibly be spent on the personal-contact endeavor. This means not only that the actual number of individuals "contacted" is bound to remain very limited indeed, it means also that each contact must, of needs, be relatively brief and superficial. In the struggle for men's minds and souls, a few conversations in an office, at lunch, or over cocktails cannot produce any but minor or short-range effects.

The theoretically sound concept that well-selected Public-Affairs Office staff which, fully familiar with a given country, its culture and language, exercises influence on the local scene through personal contacts, is further shattered by our near-fantastic practice of rotating USIA personnel every two to four years from one country to another! It is ridiculous to think that a good propaganda officer will "learn" a new country in a few months and, by and large, do equally well wherever he may be stationed, and that even familiarity with the local language, however desirable, is not essential. Furthermore, American officials cannot and must not integrate themselves into the local way of life as would, for example, an American student or professor working and living completely in foreign surroundings during his stay abroad.

The Importance of History

There flows from American humanism and humanitarianism a belief, almost an article of faith, that human beings all over the world are very much alike, that their basic aspirations, interests, fears, and hopes are not really too different. We instinctively de-emphasize in our thinking the extraordinary differences that exist in the system of values and mentality of even such closely related nations as the French and Italian. Thus we come, not in theory perhaps but in actual fact, to the conclusion that it cannot really be so very important whether, in dealing with Frenchmen or Italians, we do know their history and literature, their peculiar social stratification, their special philosophy of life—in short, their true national individuality. Americans are also more "modern" than almost any other national group, in the sense that we live in the present and look into the future. This also leads to a natural non-concern with the underlying historical developments that have shaped those foreign nations that constitute our target audience today.

The ease and naturalness typically shown from the outset by Americans meeting with foreigners are paradoxically cause for disillusionment in the long run. The pleasant human touch and the absence of false fronts found even in American VIPs, civilian or military, are almost without exception the subject of delighted surprise by non-Americans who often find the rigidity and formality of their own stratified society somewhat exacting. But invariably there seems to come a moment when the other side, wanting to extend the conversation beyond mere niceties and beyond the business at hand, begins to be baffled by the lack of a genuine response. This lack of responsiveness, the somewhat uninspired way in which we discuss, if at all, ideas, ideologies, abstract principles, matters of faith and belief, raises an anxious question in the minds of many regarding the depth of our thinking, the degree of our understanding, and the intensity of our faith. The suspicion that we might be shallow and merely technicians of routine is particularly shocking to our interlocutors. They know that their fate as well as ours depends overwhelmingly on the strength of our resolve and on our ability to grasp not only the political, military, and economic but also the psychological and spiritual situation of the world.

Our home climate, in which we are rarely faced with the necessity to argue outside the notions and limits accepted by all of us, does not prepare us for the free-for-all debate that rages in a world where our self-evident truths are not taken for granted and even are aggressively challenged. The art to converse and the faculty to articulate ideas effectively and impressively are little practiced in our dealings with one another. Hence it is vastly more difficult than generally realized to find the right people for the task of influencing foreign opinion leaders, or potential opinion leaders, through personal contacts. The difficulty is all the greater, because those relatively few who are qualified must also possess a profound knowledge of the target area and its language.

But let there be no misunderstanding. The problem is not to find men with a purely oratorical skill, a glib golden tongue; the need is for personalities whose verbal expressiveness is simply a natural outgrowth of genuine intellectual and spiritual depth and dynamism. They should be able, in private conversations and in meetings with small groups, to give the impression of men who have thought and pondered far and deep about the complexities of our age, and who possess the clarity of mind and strength of faith to arrive at conclusive answers, answers which could serve as guidelines and beacons in a world of uncertainty. We cannot and should not imitate Communist fanaticism, but we could speak, at least on occasion, with a spark in our eyes and with an intensity that does not have to be reserved for bad causes.

Our society clearly is not a natural breeding ground for personalities of this type, but nobody who knows this country intimately would deny that they exist. The crux of the matter is that we have not really been looking for them. Wedded to our sober concepts of life and men, we prefer the team worker, the organization man, the well-balanced and experienced "expert in communications," to the unusual, tense and intense individual who shows a somewhat disturbing originality in thought, speech, and action.

A Recommendation

An entirely new and essentially non-bureaucratic recruiting procedure should be established for person-to-person propagandists, who would serve

abroad either as an integral component of the USIA organization or, in some cases, as individual missionaries not overtly connected with USIA. The selection of these propagandists must not be based on any formal technical criteria. It would be useless to send learned professors, brilliant Ph.D.s, well-known writers, top advertising and public-relations experts, or successful businessmen, unless they happen to possess that peculiar and rare combination of qualifications required to be politically persuasive in foreign surroundings. A young graduate student, an ex-military man, a well-to-do citizen with no particular trade or profession may, on the other hand, unaccountably turn out to be precisely what is needed. Even outstanding intelligence and expert knowledge of a foreign area would not, in themselves, be sufficient qualifications. The over-all personality of a man or woman would be decisive rather than any single traits. Whether or not a person possesses the required particular blend of characteristics could be established, even tentatively, only on the basis of prolonged personal interviews by individuals who themselves are exceptionally alert and dynamic as well as knowledgeable and experienced.

Screening by extended interview should, however, be only an initial step in the process of selection. A Research and Testing Center should be established. Those tentatively chosen would receive there such general or special training as might appear necessary or desirable. In such a Center, their actual aptitude could be definitely ascertained through daily observation and through assignments such as holding seminars with foreign-exchange students at American colleges, or escorting foreign visitors brought to this country under the State Department's Exchange-of-Persons Program.

It would, in fact, be of very great importance, if the Center could also become an instrument for the discreet political indoctrination of foreign exchangees in the United States. Since the average United States citizen who meets our foreign visitors is not politically minded, some tactful governmental action should fill the gap. The short one-week orientation courses given most exchangees at the beginning of their time in this country are, of course, merely in the nature of a general briefing, from which lasting political results cannot be expected. In the ultimate analysis it takes an individual to influence individuals. The overt or covert use of selectees from the proposed Research and Testing Center to associate with foreign exchangees would be much more than merely a method of testing our future overseas propagandists.

The proposed Research and Testing Center would originally be a staging organization for a special category of propagandists. Ultimately it could develop into an Institute with a staff and facilities sufficiently large to examine systematically and comprehensively the entire question of United States propaganda potentialities. This task simply cannot be undertaken by the USIA which must, of needs, dedicate itself to operations rather than meditation.

We cannot inject into our "information campaign" those elements of ideology, emotionalism, and fanaticism or such imaginative novel techniques and bold methods as would in a powerful sweep convert Communists, overwhelm neutralists, and create waves of thought and sentiment favorable to United States objectives. But we can by a sober and persistent effort, covering—if on a limited scale—all parts of the Free World, explain our case to those not yet blinded by prejudice or resentment, dispel false notions regarding our way of life and intentions, and, most important, make it impossible for the Communist side to gain further ground unopposed.

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Communist Psychological Warfare

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The Free World will make important progress in meeting the Communists' threat if we understand the techniques by which they sell an illogical philosophy and if we comprehend that the cold-hot alternation is but one of the major tools in their long-range strategy conflict.

HERE are many disquieting indications that the Communists may have developed, or stumbled upon, an all-inclusive or a totalitarian doctrine of psychological warfare.

Perhaps the most striking characteristic of Communist propaganda is how dull and unconvincing it is. Its arguments are not logically persuasive, and their presentation is commonly repellent and unattractive. Nevertheless, Communism has been able to achieve considerable successes, even in the intellectual domain.

This anomaly may have explanation in the circumstance that the Communists do not at all aim to persuade the mind. Instead they seem to be orienting the *souls* of their audience.

If we accept this as our first hypothesis, we should assume next that the techniques of soul surgery should become clearest in situations where they are easiest to apply. Hence, instead of looking for such techniques in the field of international diplomacy, we should expect that Communist psychological-warfare techniques are revealed most dramatically in the indoctrination of party members and in the activities commonly called "brainwashing" or "brain changing." The treatment of war and political prisoners, including party members, of young party recruits, and of captive populations may give more valuable hints about the Communists' secret doctrine of psychological warfare than their purely verbal efforts in so-called propaganda campaigns.

"Educating" the Party Worker

Fundamentally, Communists hold that behavior, especially the behavior of groups, classes, and nations, can be manipulated through the conditioning of reflexes. To a large extent, this theory underlies Soviet propaganda, especially

its insistence on monotonous repetition and its capture of symbolic words which, so to speak, "ring a bell." (As usual in the case of "planners," it is not specified how the planners are planned, or how the human "conditioners" can be conditioned. It can be deduced from this omission that Communists assume their own elite's freedom from the conditioned reflex mechanism.)

The Communists have learned a great deal about the inter-relationships between physiology and psychology. This knowledge allows them, in their domestic and intraparty operations, to influence behavior through proper regulation of work, food, and leisure. In other words, they approach the mind through the body. The Communists appear to be consciously employing methods for inducing psychological disturbances in living organisms. By deliberate manipulation of stimuli, the desire for independent action, or the "freedom urge," is weakened or extinguished and neurotic behavior induced.

The artificial creation of insanity—a device which the Communists have applied to their prisoners by subjecting them to various forms of "invisible torture" such as uncertainty, fear, sleeplessness, stro. light effects, and kneeling or standing—may not lend itself to the treatment of large numbers of people. However, unpredictable behavior, the acceleration and calming of disturbances and crises, alternations between smiles and growls, i.e., variable creations and releases of fear, and the maintenance of tension in perpetuity may induce quasi-neurotic behavior, increase the values of the "signal," and facilitate the acceptance of new word-signals. By interfering with family life and placing major emphasis on public education of infants, the father image is vested in an external and non-human entity, the state, or the party. This method of rearing children probably induces them to become more submissive to higher authority; it undoubtedly aims at restricting the sphere of private life and conceivably alters the emotional structure.

The Soviets make sure that the human herd obeys the "signals" of authority, while individual consciousness, emotionality, and initiative remain underdeveloped. Relegation of sex and other types of affection to minor and regressive roles is expected to induce "sublimation" through productive work and party chores. This particular technique is employed to transform human beings into mere cogs within a gigantic machine.

The Communists adopted, although not for curative purposes, the basic techniques of psychoanalysis, in particular the psychoanalytic interview. The psychoanalytic interview between physician and patient obviously would be impractical if patients were to be treated in large numbers. Hence the Communists have developed more streamlined methods that allow the mass production, not of cures, but of "complexes" and "traumas." These techniques include the compulsory writing of diaries, autobiographies, and histories of one's thought development; of oral interviews with party members; of hearings before organizational and ideological commissions and the political police; and of public "confessions."

These interviews, frequently repeated, inculcate in the "patient" feelings of error, guilt, shame, and fear, as well as desires for repentance and revenge—and provide the party with powerful levers of blackmail. This process aims to weaken the patient's conscience, to increase his will to obey and believe, stimulate his survival instincts, and augment his pliability for party purposes.

Whenever the Communists succeed in convincing people that they are a sort of incarnation of humanity's social conscience and that they are history's

anointed arbiters of any action undertaken by non-Communists, a person will tend to be apologetic about any doubts he harbors concerning Communism. Opposition to or deviation from Communism is tantamount to a negation of mankind's loftiest ideals and of mankind's inevitable future.

The Communists try to exploit, negatively and positively, a person's relationship to communities such as his family. In this connection they have adopted or reinvented, in their own fashion, the inferiority complex and the power urge. They evoke in the "patient" various feelings of insufficiency, thus hoping to stimulate him into compensatory action that would satisfy his power cravings and those of the party.

While the therapist seeks to eliminate the sources of trouble, the Communist psychological manipulator works toward the destruction of the self-reliant personality. To employ modern terms, he tries his hand at "brainwashing." Once this operation has been completed, a supplementary activity, "brain changing," must be undertaken. The brain is emptied of mundane thoughts, while simultaneously and wherever possible the body is weakened and the sensuous drives are subdued by fatigue, hunger, deprivation, and anguish. The mind enters a state of receptivity and exaltation. At this point, thoughts, ideas, symbols, and emotions—in short, "visions"—are put into the cleansed mind. The "patient"—who may be a member of a Western Communist party or a student at a party "university"—is invited to learn by rote some of the basic texts of the Communist literature. He is asked to write down the various thoughts he considers right, and to apply the doctrine to current and concrete issues. He may even be asked to participate in conspiratorial activities and to commit himself through acts of immorality, which may range all of the way from informing and spying to the betrayal of one's parents, from leading a lynching party to straight murder. The propositions of the doctrine must be attached to the person by extreme emotions. Wherever possible, this process is eased by public discussions, such as "democratic criticism," confession, trials, etc., which may induce trance or, conversely, "hardening" of the soul.

The Communists extensively employ hypnotic and suggestive techniques. The student is urged to tell himself, often by mechanical repetition, that he is becoming a better Communist, that he is cutting himself loose from all the black shadows of the past, and that he desires to sacrifice himself to the cause. The "patients" themselves, while learning and acquiring the proper reflexes, must also produce the signals to which they themselves and others must react. The insistence on parrot-like repetition is designed to harden the conditioned reflexes, to maintain a system of mutual suggestion or hypnosis, and to "fix" the desired complexes.

A nation is more likely to win in conflict if it considers its cause to be just. While the attempt by a nation's leaders, during a conflict, to endow their cause with righteousness is not new, the Communists push this to the limit. The purpose is to inculcate into the Free World guilt feelings about resistance to Communism and at the same time immunize the "Soviet peoples" with a sort of ideological vaccination against any notion that Communist wars or even aggressions may be something less than emanations of an exalted sense of justice. The Free World has been infected to some degree by bad conscience and guilt feelings. Hence, partly at least, the often surprising paralysis of democratic will.

The social universe is broken down into such opposing relationships as classes and strata, exploiter and exploited, class-conscious Communists and

background elements, "comrade" and enemy, organizations and inert forces, etc. The craving for justice is monopolized in the sense that, according to the suggestion, only the Communists ever can really satisfy it. Communism, to put it differently, is both a myth that fulfills the eternal human requirement for myths, and a myth that satisfies the concrete needs of orientation—it gives direction and purpose to a man's daily chores.

Communist Surrogates for Religion

The Communist drive against religion assumes particular importance. In their attempts to undermine hostile societies, the Communists make every effort to destroy religious, ethical, and other higher motivations. They hope, thereby, that the preoccupation with immediate, mundane, material and private interests and the destruction of spiritual reserves will create frustrations and "atomize" society.

As religious beliefs wane, the number of possible recruits for Communism tends to increase. This is so not only because there is a mechanical relationship between Communism and atheism, but, also, more significantly, because the human hunger for redemption and assurance must be stilled and because the ingrained desire for a god craves satisfaction. Communism redeems on earth and proclaims man to be "god." The revolution is seen as the crucial "religious" event that transforms man from the object into the subject of history, i.e., into the creator of the perfect society.

The Communists' most powerful weapon in their onslaught on religion is social criticism addressed to situations of economic hardship, oppression, racial tension, delinquency, family trouble, and to shortcomings of religious organizations. The purpose of social criticism is to produce frustration-consciousness and persuade people that they cannot take such frustrations in their stride, let alone sublimate them by religious abnegation and hope for a hereafter. Instead they must overcome them by revolutionary and violent action, and by active sacrifice. Frustration, let us note, is a forerunner of aggressiveness, especially if aggressive impulses can be stimulated artificially.

The Communists must find for the societies under their rule a substitute for religion as a foundation of mental health. They cannot adopt religion, certainly not openly, because this would sensitize human conscience and thus undermine the foundations of their state and their world movement. Neither can they condone hedonistic tendencies or any objective, probabilistic, open-minded and multi-valued thinking that would jeopardize their dogmatic ideology and, most significantly in our context, preclude the effective application of psychological warfare, Communist style. Their obvious solution is, first, to peddle the pseudo-religion of materialistic Communism; second, to retain the aspects of religions: faith, brotherhood, initiation, salvation, redemption, grace, paradise, consecration, guilt, sin, sacrifice, atonement, asceticism—all of which have their counterparts in the Communist ideology; and third, to be excessively dogmatic about it all.

Communist dogmatism knows of saints and devils, incantations, indices of forbidden books, self-chastisement, anathemas upon heretics, ritualism, exegesis, apologetics, mysticism and talmudism (but not of a wailing wall for the leaders in power). This quasi-religiousness is at the bottom of the various psychoanalytic and hypnotic techniques which, without this "spiritual" foundation, probably would not "take."

There is still another way of looking at this. To the extent that Communism embraces a materialistic or atheistic cosmogony, it is religion. It answers one of the basic human questions by pointing to matter, the laws of nature, and accident as the causes and meaning of the universe and, by implication, to true death and extinction as the future. Communism admits the existence of a higher power, but it assumes that power—or force—to be blind and non-personal. Thus, it purges religion of the concept of a higher power which is purposive, and it rejects the notion of a higher power that has revealed its purposes in terms understandable by humans. It accepts the idea that higher forces are intervening in human lives, but it assumes this intervention to be entirely accidental and meaningless. Thus, it postulates that "science" may give man a capability to influence the higher forces, nay, to dominate them, but it rejects any idea of a personal relationship of man with God.

The dictator becomes god, the only god for that matter; and the party becomes the church. As a variant, collective leadership becomes a sort of Trinity. The central committee and the local leaders take care of polytheistic needs. The parallels could be pressed further. The point is that all the essential elements of religion except the Virgin Mother complex are represented.

Communist Sociological Assumptions

Fear is frequently a cause of human difficulty; it diminishes survival capabilities of all kinds; and it is the disintegrating factor *par excellence*. This, of course, is not a new discovery. It is not surprising that the Communists always have laid great stress on terror, violence, and purges, and nowadays have enlisted the specter of nuclear war in their strategy of terror. They usually obtain good results from military threats and movements, and from giving the impression that they are willing to go beyond the "brink of war." The "specter" of Communism now is in the nature of a ghost in the closet. The specter that really haunts the world is that of a technological monster heavily armed with nuclei and bacilli and propelled by jets and rockets.

However, the Communists have added an improvement to the age-old art of inducing fright. Once a phenomenon is understood and its behavior has become predictable, men no longer fear it. A danger that is perceived clearly may become a stimulant for action—a most unwelcome possibility. Consequently, the Communists have adopted the techniques of erecting impenetrable "curtains" and of acting unpredictably and capriciously. They alternate smiles with growls, arrest the innocent and free the guilty, keep prisoners in captivity beyond their terms but release them at any odd moment. In general they show themselves impervious to reasonable argument and immovable by counsels of moderation. Deliberately, the impression is being created that one never can know what is going to happen next; even if everything is calm now, the next disturbance may be of unparalleled violence.

"Frequency modulation" in diplomacy is designed to dislocate a nation's fortitude. The technique is patterned after Hitler's pioneering attempts during 1936-1939. The ups and downs from expectations of "peace in our generation" to fears of total war, and the frequent rearrangements between business as usual and war preparedness made rational decision-making quite impossible. Although in 1939 the decision was finally made for resistance, the Communists apparently expect that in the future the democratic decision will be against nuclear war. The peace-above-all theme, punctuated and made convincing by war scares, is designed to kill the national conscience.

Communist Crowd Psychology

The Communists have discovered that crowds are not formed just by direct physical contacts among a mass of people, such as in meetings or demonstrations. Instead, crowd attitudes can be created among people who are physically isolated. It is merely necessary to arouse excessive fears, exploit a calamity, stimulate a panicky attitude, give signals for action against scapegoats or for actions with a symbolic character, and keep the majority of the population paralyzed. One of the great objectives is to induce in all hostile groups the attitude of no-will.

Communist Selection Process

The Communist techniques are particularly apparent in the selection of their party members. The process embodies essentially five aspects.

1—The candidate is requested to prepare extensive biographical accounts of himself and to repeat this literary effort several times for the purpose of revealing whatever personal weaknesses or strengths he might have.

2—The individual must show a capability of absorbing the Communist doctrine and at the same time eliminating non-Communist thoughts. This result is achieved by restricting his reading to approved Communist texts, by having him learn many of these by rote, and by keeping track, through diaries, of the person's intellectual development.

3—In accepting an individual into the party, and particularly into the apparatus, the Communists see to it that the party satisfies all his needs for community and personal life. The major needs are taken care of to such an extent that, even if the party member should lose faith, his personal attachments would keep him in the fold.

4—Great emphasis is placed on evoking in the member an emotional attachment to his "iron will." He must develop an image of self characterized by such ceaselessly repeated words as merciless, implacable, irreconcilable, ruthless, relentless, fearless, etc.

5—The party employs the member for many chores and tasks, gladly pushing him into ever more responsible and perilous assignments. It is on the basis of his behavior in tight situations, his initiative and drive as an "organizer," and his ability to instill class hatred in others, that the final evaluation of his capacity and reliability is made. These methods are strengthened considerably by more brutal forms of pressure such as the splitting up of families, keeping of hostages, involvement in criminal acts, and in general the incorporation into the party of the member's entire family, or, conversely, the encouragement of liaisons and marriages between party members.

Communist Communications Theory

Within these various efforts, the modern tool of radio has played a great role, although older tools such as newspapers, posters, and books have not been neglected. Inside the areas under Communist control, all audiences are captive. The radios are ubiquitous and noisy, and cannot be turned off. The purpose is to prevent independent thinking, to make sure that whatever message goes into a person's mind is of an approved and planned type, and to drown out all messages which interfere with the process of conditioning.

Radio also is used on a large scale in countries outside of the Iron Curtain. While the Communists find no captive audiences for their broadcasts, they have captured numerous listeners indirectly, by repeating a limited number

of slogans or symbols, provoking anti-Communist speakers into replies and arguments, proposing and opposing solutions, and making "news." Counter-propaganda, aimed at the Communists, if executed clumsily, may recruit followers into the Communist fold, simply because to refute it must pick up Communist points. The danger they must avoid is the silent treatment.

In their radio and conventional mass-communications the Communists simplify and sloganize their messages, employ exaggerations, distortions, sensationalism, human-interest stories, and scapegoats, and slant the messages according to situation and target. They do not hesitate to use lies. They couch their message in an authoritative style, indicating that only they know the answers, while the non-Communists preach impractical solutions and, in addition, are inferior human beings.

Beyond this, the more or less conventional, though streamlined, propaganda technique, the Communists have developed three improvements:

1—They make a distinction between agitation and propaganda, that is, they address themselves to concrete issues and cleavages, *as well as* to the more fundamental and enduring problems. They try to create, especially among the more intelligent audiences, an understanding of the Communist doctrine as such. At the same time they try to capitalize on the grievances and desires of any group, especially of the underprivileged type, which by force of circumstances is contemplating, or engaged in, some kind of rebellious action.

2—Far from preaching one simple gospel, and addressing it to the mentally most advanced, they present many different teachings ranging all the way from pure Communism via crypto- and semi-Communism to "front doctrines" and even synthetic ideologies for such unlikely customers as nationalists, conservatives, liberals, and even anti-Communists. By and large, their best target among the educated and semieducated is the frustrated intellectual whose scientific thought habits are under-developed. The ideal devotee of the Communist gospel is one who seeks certainty, is emotionally attached to a prejudice or a pre-established position, is unwilling to verify his preconceived notions, and has the wrong idea of objectivity.

3—The Communists combine propaganda with organization. The propagation of their messages leads necessarily to the recruitment of additional members. The new members, in turn, must participate in the wider propagation of the faith.

The Communists make the most of treating all issues in only black and white or in either-or terms, without admitting the possibility of shading. The Communists employ this device in their "social criticism" of the imperfections of the free-enterprise system. At the same time, the imperfections of the Soviet system can be glossed over by pointing out that the welfare of the masses is slowly increasing.

"Either-or" thinking, however, is less a device than an essential ingredient of Communist thought. The Communist thinks in simple alternatives, and only in them, such as friend-enemy, "who is not for me is against me," "one or the other system will win." Thinking in all-or-nothing terms ("all capitalists are . . .") is a variant of this pre-scientific mode of cogitating.

The Communists are adept at all kinds of semantic and sophistic chicanery. They point out that the originator of an unwelcome thought is a capitalist, a slave of capitalism or, in any event, not a proletarian and certainly not a class-conscious one. They artfully assign concrete reality to abstractions. Thus,

a "class" is treated as though it were an individual. The individual's reality is "determined" by his belonging to one or the other "class." The term, "capitalism," also is an abstraction; moreover, it is a generic term which covers many different economic systems.

Specific Goals of the Communist Effort

In summary it can be said that Communist psychological warfare aims at the following objectives:

1—The creation of a psychologically strong, obedient, disciplined, steadfast, and iron-willed leadership core which thinks and behaves in a certain way, in that way only, and in that way for a long time regardless of obstacles.

2—The creation of a larger group of oriented propagandists who spread Communist notions and are instrumental in creating and maintaining a suitable frame of reference imposed upon non-Communists.

3—The creation in both groups of a burning sense of hatred.

4—Docility, discipline, and controllability of subject populations which must be commanded by the unopposed will of the party leadership.

5—The creation, in the ruling, upper, and intellectual classes of non-Communist societies, of frustration, confusion, pessimism, guilt, fear, defeatism, hopelessness, and neurosis, of lack of will, in essence the psychological destruction of anti-Communist leadership.

6—The splitting of a society into many competing and mutually hostile groups and the sapping of the spirit of loyalty, community, mutual helpfulness, positive expectation, and willingness to take risks and to act.

7—The creation and stimulation of an all-pervading sense of fear and anxiety, whether it be fastened onto the dangers of nuclear war, or physical terror, or professional, social, and human ruin.

8—The capture of the time dimension in the sense that an expectation of cataclysm and no-progress under capitalism is established and paired with the affirmed expectation that the future belongs to Communism.

9—The promise of relief from all troubles by means of an infallible as well as inevitable solution.

10—The semantic domination of intellectual, emotional, and socio-political life as well as the semantic control of all political arguments.

11—The weakening and destruction of national consciences in the Free World and the inculcation of bad conscience about firm opposition to Communism and the ideals usurped and distorted by it.

In former times, the Communists perhaps had illusions about their ability to convince. They expected that the great majority of all peoples would become "proletarian" in status and conscience. With these early expectations gone, it seems that the Communists have adopted a more moderate but presumably more practical objective: simply to frustrate the anti-Communists.

The rationale of zigzag tactics is to cause the opponent to build up a defense against zig, and shortly before it becomes effective, to "annul" this defense (the term is Bulganin's) by performing a zag. Thus, the initiative is slated to remain in Communist hands. The West, it is hoped, never will reach its objective successfully. As a result of the Free World's near failures, the Communists achieve mental and psychological ascendancy; in particular they prove that the stronger will is theirs. The recipe is simple: fears, guilt neuroses, lack of will power, and disoriented minds for the democracies, and fearlessness


and resoluteness for a Communist elite acting with firm discipline and according to one doctrine. Psychological weakness in the Free World will then be pitted against the psychological strength of the Communist janissaries.

Much of this may be wishful thinking on the part of the Communists, but to the degree that the most crucial decision of all, war or peace, has been allowed to slip into Communist hands, the Communists have achieved psychological dominance. The Kremlin almost has become the master of mankind's fate: harsh, jealous, revengeful, and unpredictable like Jehovah—a father image the like of which the world has never seen. John Foster Dulles described this unhealthy situation as early as 1946: "Few men in political life anywhere act without first thinking whether they will please or displease the leaders of the Soviet Union. Never in history have a few men in a single country achieved such world-wide influence."

This world-wide influence is the true measure of Soviet success in psychological warfare.

The only redeeming feature is that the Kremlin Olympus is neither omnipotent nor omniscient. It is beset with its own fears and psychological difficulties, which today are increasing at a staggering rate. Its methods work only for a time and to a degree. At the height of physical power, the motivation and conviction of Communism have begun to wane. The Männerbund at the top of the Communist movement has been split up, because the image of the iron-willed robot is an unreal one, because neither healthy psyches nor minds can be kept in a state of constant disorientation, and because the Communists bear a huge guilt for numerous crimes and gradually are beginning to feel the pangs of conscience.

The psychological planning of man has remained impossible. Yet we would be foolish to ignore that the Communists have made great strides in the art of psychological manipulation. The West does not yet understand the nature of the psychological attack that has been launched. It does not comprehend the causes of its paralysis, and often does not even notice that its freedom to act has been impeded. Once the Free World will assess the conflict in its psychological dimension, the course of history will be reversed.



The Communists play up and down a wide scale of events, incidents, and surprises—all designed to keep the Free World off balance.

END

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